dissenting.
Certification was granted in this case to determine two distinct issues: “(1) whether a conviction under former N.J.S.A. 2C:34-1(a)(2) constitutes ‘such an offense’ for purposes of enhanced grading under N.J.S.A. 2C:34-l(c)(4); and (2) whether a prior uneounseled conviction of a petty disorderly persons offense can be used to elevate a disorderly persons offense to an indictable offense under a conversion-of-charge statute.” State v. Gelman, 192 N.J. 474, 932 A.2d 26 (2007).
According to the majority, the issue on appeal is “whether that petty disorderly persons conviction was a legally cognizable predicate offense under the current statute, thus justifying the upgraded charge of fourth-degree prostitution.” Ante at 478, 960 A.2d at 881. The majority concludes that “the current N.J.S.A. 2C:34-1— even after consideration of its legislative insolubly ambiguous concerning whether a defendant can be charged with the fourth-degree crime of prostitution based on a prior petty disorderly persons conviction under the predecessor statute.” Ibid. Given that conclusion, the majority is “compelled to apply the doctrine of lenity and dismiss the indictment.” Ibid.
Stated more directly, the majority reasons as follows. In 1989, defendant was convicted of prostitution as a petty disorderly persons offense under former N.J.S.A. 2C:34-1(a)(2). That statute was amended in 1991 to “[r]evise[ ] the law governing prostitution and upgrade[] offenses involving prostitution in certain cases.” L. 1991, c. 211 (codified at N.J.S.A. 2C:34-1). Those revisions were designed to “ratchet-up” the penalties for prostitu*489tion and are relevant to this ease in two distinct respects. First, the penalty for prostitution was raised from a petty disorderly persons offense to a disorderly persons offense. Compare former N.J.S.A. 2C:34-1(a)(1) (“[a] person is guilty of prostitution, a petty disorderly persons offense, if he or she ... engages in sexual activity as a business”), with current N.J.S.A. 2C:34-1(b)(1) and (c)(4) (“[a] person commits [a disorderly persons offense] if ... [t]he actor engages in prostitution”1). Second, the 1991 amendments sought to provide enhanced penalties for those who repeatedly engage in prostitution, see current N.J.S.A. 2C:34-1(c)(4) (providing that first-offense engaging in prostitution is a disorderly persons offense, but that “second or subsequent conviction for such an offense constitutes a crime of the fourth degree”), whereas enhanced penalties for engaging in prostitution were not available under the former law. See former N.J.S.A. 2C:34-1(c) (allowing enhanced penalties only for promoting prostitution under subsection 1(b), but not for engaging in prostitution under subsection 1(a)).
The distinction between the former and current versions of the prostitution statute is relevant. If a prior prostitution petty disorderly persons offense conviction does constitute “such an offense” under the 1991 amendments, then a second or subsequent prostitution conviction is punishable as a fourth-degree crime; if not, then a defendant starts with a clean slate and the subsequent prostitution conviction is punishable only as a first offense, that is, a disorderly persons offense.
In the majority’s view, that difference is the result of a “textual ambiguity[,]” ante at 486, 950 A.2d at 885, constitutes an “irresolvable ambiguity[,]” id. at 487, 950 A.2d at 886, simply “is insolubly ambiguous[,]” id. at 478, 950 at 881, and “is mired in ambiguity.” Id. at 486, 950 A.2d at 886. Based on that conclu*490sion, it is the majority’s view that the “ambiguity must be resolved in favor of defendant under the doctrine of lenity.” Id. at 487, 950 A.2d at 886.
I respectfully dissent. The “irresolvable and insoluble ambiguity” on which the majority relies is entirely illusory and utterly laid bare by the explicit definitional provisions of the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice. At the core of the majority’s analysis is its conclusion that the phrase “such an offense” as used in N.J.S.A. is ambiguous. That conclusion is, in a word, wrong. We are commanded that,
[i]n the construction of the laws and statutes of this state, both civil and criminal, words and phrases shall be read and construed with their context, and shall, unless inconsistent with the manifest intent of the legislature or unless another or different meaning is expressly indicated, be given their generally accepted meaning, according to the approved usage of the language. Technical words and phrases, and words and phrases having a special or accepted meaning in the law, shall be construed in accordance with such technical or special and accepted meaning.
[N.J.S.A. 1:1-1.]
Accord Soto v. Scaringelli, 189 N.J. 558, 569-70, 917 A.2d 734 (2007) (describing process of statutory interpretation). We have explained that “[sjtatutory language is to be construed with the context of the whole statute, its purposes, and the circumstances under which the words were employed, and to be given the generally accepted meaning unless the contrary intent is clear.” Grogan v. De Sapio, 11 N.J. 308, 323, 94 A.2d 316 (1953). We engage in that task thusly:
“[w]hen interpreting a statute, our overarching duty is to construe and apply the statute as enacted. We do so by applying the following principles. First, a court should not resort to extrinsic interpretative aids when the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, and susceptible to only one interpretation. That said, if there is ambiguity in the statutory language that leads to more than one plausible interpretation, we may turn to extrinsic evidence, including legislative history, committee reports, and contemporaneous construction. We have explained that we may also resort to extrinsic evidence if a plain reading of the statute leads to an absurd result or if the overall statutory scheme is at odds with the plain language. We are guided by first principles: our analysis begins with the plain language of the statute.”
*491[In re Liquidation of Integrity Ins. Co., 193 N.J. 86, 94, 935 A.2d 1184 (2007) (quoting Daidone v. Buterick Bulkheading, 191 N.J. 557, 565-66, 924 A.2d 1193 (2007) (citations, internal quotation marks and editing marks omitted)).]
Our obligation, therefore, is clear: “to construe and apply the statute as (emphasis supplied). If that is our obligation, then our task here is simple. It is inescapable that the Legislature in fact has defined what it means by the term “offense[,]” a fact notably absent from the majority’s reasoning or analysis. N.J.S.A. 2C:1-14(k) makes patent that “[i]n this code, unless a different meaning plainly is required ... ‘offense’ means a crime, a disorderly persons offense or a petty disorderly persons offense unless a particular section in this code is intended to apply to less than all three[.]” (Emphasis supplied). Thus, one is led to ask: if the Legislature has defined an “offense” to include crimes, disorderly persons offenses and petty disorderly persons offenses, where, pray tell, is the “textual ambiguity” the majority finds so “irresolvable” or “insoluble”?
When the Code of Criminal Justice is read as a it plain meaning of current N.J.S.A. 2C:34-1(c)(4) brooks no ambiguity. It states, clearly and unequivocally, that “[a]n offense [for engaging in prostitution] constitutes a disorderly persons offense ... except that a second or subsequent conviction for [engaging in prostitution either as a crime, or a disorderly persons offense, or a petty disorderly persons offense] constitutes a crime of the fourth degree.” There is no doubt that defendant had a prior conviction for prostitution as a petty disorderly persons offense. Thus, on its face, she is subject to the enhanced penalty provisions of N.J.S.A 2C:34-1(c)(4), and the indictment so charging should be sustained. As the Appellate Division common-sensically noted, “[h]ere ... we discern no ambiguity. The act charged in 2004 is the same act charged in 1989. Defendant was convicted of offering to engage in sexual activity in exchange for money in 1989, and is, therefore, exposed to the enhanced grading for the current offense.” Therefore, the judgment of the Appellate Division reversing the trial court’s order dismissing the *492indictment based on a manufactured and non-existent “ambiguity” should be affirmed.2
I respectfully dissent.3
For Justice RABNER and Justices LONG, LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, WALLACE and ForCurrent N.J.S.A. 2C:34-1 (a)(1) defines "prostitution" as "sexual activity with another person in exchange for something of economic value, or the offer or acceptance of an offer to engage in sexual activity in exchange for something of economic value."
According to the majority, this dissent presents "a reasonable interpretation of the statute, [but] there is more than one reasonable interpretation of the statute." Ante at 487, 950 A.2d at 886. That conclusion can be reached only by ignoring the overriding definitional provisions of the Code. It is then, and only then, that real and abound.
Definitional sections, however, exist for a specific reason: to remove or avoid possible ambiguities. If definitions are not to be applied, what is the need for them? Ignoring clearly set forth definitions contravenes established canons of statutory construction and denies the deference rightly due a co-equal branch of government.
Because the majority does not address the second issue certified, ante at 481, 950 at is, "whether a prior uncounseled conviction of a petty disorderly persons offense can be used to elevate a disorderly persons offense to an indictable offense under a conversion-of-charge too express no detailed opinion on its outcome. But see State v. Hrycak, 184 N.J. 351, 362-63, 877 A.2d 1209 (2005) (holding that " ‘in the case of repeat DWI convictions based on uncounseled prior convictions, the actual period of incarceration imposed may not exceed that for any counseled DWI convictions’ " and that "defendant has the burden of proving ... that he or she did not receive notice of the right to counsel in the prior case” (quoting State v. Laurick, 120 N.J. 1, 16, 575 A.2d 1340, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 967, 111 S.Ct. 429, 112 L.Ed.2d 413 (1990))). A reading of the statute as advanced in this dissent also would require that such question be addressed. However, because, under Hrycak and Laurick, defendant bears the burden of negating the basis for penalty enhancement, the indictment should be reinstated and defendant put to her proofs, either on a motion to dismiss or at trial.