dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I would hold that the trial court abused its discretion by not ordering retroactive child support. While it is true that Mr. Blanton paid Ms. Garza some monies prior to the entry of the final judgment, the evidence before the trial court militates in favor of ordering retroactive child support.
Section 160.005 of the Texas Family Code provides that, upon a finding of parentage in a paternity action, the trial court may order support retroactive to the time of the birth of the child. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 160.005(b) (Vernon 1996). In making an award for retroactive child support under this section, the trial court shall use the child support guidelines provided by chapter 154 of the code, together with any relevant factors. Id. § 160.005(c).
Section 154.131 of the code provides that the child support guidelines are intended to guide the court in determining the amount of retroactive child support, if any, to be ordered. Id. § 154.131(a).
In determining whether to order retroactive child support, the court must consider the net resources of the obligor during the relevant time period and whether: (1) the mother had made any previous attempts to notify the biological father of his paternity or probable paternity; (2) the biological father had knowledge of his paternity or probable paternity; (3) the order of retroactive child support will impose an undue financial hardship on the obligor or the obligor’s family; and (4) the obligor had provided actual support or other necessaries before the filing of the action.
Id. § 154.131(b)(l)-(4); see also id. § 154.123(b)(l)-(17) (listing nonexclusive factors court may consider in applying guidelines). The trial court’s decision whether to award retroactive child support *712is discretionary. Id. §§ 154.131(a), 160.005(b). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court acts without reference to any guiding rules or principles. Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex.1985). The test is whether the trial judge’s action was arbitrary or unreasonable. Id. at 242.
In this case, the evidence before the court proved that Mr. Blanton was aware of Ms. Garza’s pregnancy and that he was the biological father. The subject child was born on September 4, 1999. Ms. Garza filed her paternity action on November 1, 1999. It is undisputed that temporary orders were entered pursuant to a hearing on May 31, 2000 in which the court ordered temporary child support in a sum which omitted part of Mr. Blanton’s net resources absent his full disclosure. During the final hearing on August 18, 2000, Ms. Garza testified that the $2,000 lump sum Mr. Blanton paid some time in July 1999, while she was pregnant, was to help her with bills. She explained that bills were overdue since her doctor ordered her not to work during her pregnancy due to hemorrhaging. She added that she used the money to make three vehicle payments, buy groceries and pay her light, gas, telephone, and water bills. She further testified, without contradiction, that the $275 sum was court-ordered child support and part of the remaining payments Mr. Blanton made “were attorney fees.”
The record establishes that Mr. Blanton was gainfully employed. He made no medical payments before or after the pregnancy. Previously ordered to provide medical insurance, he had not complied although health insurance was available for the child through his employer. When asked if he could make a lump sum payment if so ordered, Mr. Blanton admitted that, although difficult, he had the ability to pay. He testified that “incidental” to the paternity proceedings initiated by Ms. Guzman, he had recently transferred over $300,000 from a four-year-old personal injury settlement to his wife, a conveyance that the trial court nullified in the final judgment without objection.
In the final judgment, the trial court also ordered Mr. Blanton to pay $551.84 per month in child support to begin on August 18, 2000, the date of the final hearing. Not ordering retroactive child support where, as here, the subject child’s father made a cursory effort to meet his court-ordered child support obligations while gainfully employed and with access to $300,000 is unreasonable. I would hold that the trial court abused its discretion in not ordering retroactive child support.