DISSENTING OPINION BY
Judge COHN.Respectfully, I dissent because I believe that the evidence of record, credited by the Board, supports its conclusion that Claimant had no reasonable basis for her belief that she was on Family Medical Leave (FML).
The key findings in this case are that Claimant did not formally request family medical leave (Finding of Fact (FOF) 5) and that Claimant called off on February 25, 2000, but indicated that she would be in to work the next day. (FOF 8). FOF 5 is based on the testimony of Becky Houser, the human resources coordinator and Eric Horn, her supervisor. These witnesses explained that when Claimant saw Houser “outside of the lunchroom she asked her about FML.” (N.T. 19.) Claimant never even set up an appointment to discuss the matter. (N.T. 18-19.) Further, Claimant admitted that she was told she would be eligible for FML, but not that she was approved (N.T. 21.) It is also clear that she never filled out any paperwork; in fact Employer never gave her any paperwork, no doubt because Claimant never made it clear that she sought such leave. (N.T. 23.) FOF 8 is based on the testimony of Houser. This witness stated, “She [i.e., Claimant] left me a message on my machine, again, stating that she would be back to work on February 26.” (N.T. 25).1
Employer asserted, based on this evidence, that Claimant’s failure to report to work on the 26th was willful misconduct. Claimant, in order to rebut that assertion, *951argues that she had “good cause” for failing to report. Good cause is that which is “justifiable under the circumstances.” Herbert v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 123 Pa.Cmwlth. 546, 554 A.2d 616, 618 (1989).
Claimant’s asserted good cause was her belief that she was under the FMLA. The Board, however, concluded that this belief was not reasonable. That conclusion is supported by the evidence of record, discussed above, that supports FOF 5. Thus, there is substantial evidence from which the Board could have concluded that Claimant’s belief that she was on FML was not reasonable.
The majority, however, concludes that because of Employer’s apparent violations of the FMLA, Claimant’s belief that she was on FML was reasonable. I submit that Employer’s violations of the FMLA, if in fact there were any, are irrelevant to this case. The question of whether Employer violated the FMLA does not render Claimant’s belief reasonable in contradiction to the Board’s credibility determination that her belief was not reasonable. The Board specifically credited the testimony of Employer’s witnesses over that of Claimant. Viewing that evidence in the light most favorable to those witnesses, as already noted, the record reflects that Claimant asked about FML only in a very informal way, she never set up an appointment to discuss the matter more formally, she never completed any paperwork and that, although she was advised that she was eligible for FML, she was not told that she was approved.
The majority states that the Board’s conclusion that Claimant’s failure to formally request FMLA leave or to complete related forms is not supported by the “totality of the facts;” however, that is not the legal standard. The question is whether the findings and legal conclusions drawn from them are supported by substantial evidence in the record.2 The Board had substantial evidence, based on the testimony of Houser and Horn, as recited above, from which to conclude that Claimant never really engaged the FML process and, thus, that her belief that she was on such leave was unreasonable.
It has long been the law that failure to report for work or call off, in violation of an employer’s policy and without justification, constitutes willful misconduct. See, e.g., Cassidy v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 110 Pa.Cmwlth. 367, 532 A.2d 524 (1987); Kells v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 32 Pa.Cmwlth. 142, 378 A.2d 495 (1977). The Board here found, based upon substantial evidence of record, that Claimant did fail to report off and that she had no justification, i.e., good cause, for doing so. Thus, I would affirm the Board’s order.
Judge LEADBETTER joins.
. While it is true that Claimant testified that her telephone message contained conditional language, that testimony was not accepted. As we have reiterated over and over again, "The Board ... is the ultimate fact-finder and arbiter of witness credibility.... As such, it [is] free to reject ... testimony as not being credible, even if it [is] uncontradicted.... This Court, on an appeal from the Board’s decision, is unable to disturb the Board’s credibility determination.” Teitell v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 118 Pa.Cmwlth. 406, 546 A.2d 706, 711 (1988). Here, the evidence is contradicted, so clearly this Court cannot disturb the Board’s credibility determination.
. Substantial evidence is that which a reasonable mind, without weighing the evidence or substituting its judgment for that of the fact-finder, might accept as adequate to support the conclusion reached. Centennial School District v. Department of Education, 94 Pa.Cmwlth. 530, 503 A.2d 1090, 1093 n. 1 (1986), affirmed, 517 Pa. 540, 539 A.2d 785 (1988).