dissenting.
I write briefly in dissent.
That South Texas College of Law (“South Texas”) and Texas A & M University (“A & M”) have entered into a far-reaching agreement (the “Affiliation Agreement”), which the Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board (the “Coordinating Board”) asserts is the first step toward A & M’s establishing a college of law, is undisputed. The record reflects that their actions may in fact be designed to ultimately reach that end. However, I disagree with the majority because I believe that the two institutions have not yet taken action that comes within the purview or requires the approval of the Coordinating Board.
The Coordinating Board is given an extremely narrow and restricted charge by the legislature: “It shall perform only the functions which are enumerated in [the Education Code] and which the legislature may assign it.” Tex.Educ.Code Ann. § 61.021(a) (West 1996). The legislature has carefully enumerated the Coordinating Board’s functions. See id. §§ 61.051-084 (West 1996 & Supp.2000).
The majority holds that the Affiliation Agreement “usurp[s] the Coordinating Board’s singular purpose and frustrated] clear legislative intent.” Supra at 136.1 In so holding, the majority reads too broadly the intent of the legislature. The Affiliation Agreement does not create a new degree program or change the role or mission of A & M. See Tex.Educ.Code Ann. § 61.051(d) (West Supp.2000) & § 61.0511 (West 1996). It neither initiates nor consolidates a degree or certificate *141program. See id. § 61.051(e) (West Supp.2000). A & M has not expended funds for a program disapproved by the Coordinating Board. See id. § 61.054 (West 1996). Arguably, the Affiliation Agreement may signal A & M’s decision to do such things, and, if A & M proceeds without Coordinating Board approval, the university may exceed its delegated authority and infringe on that possessed by the Coordinating Board.
I do not believe that, because the Coordinating Board is “the highest authority in the state in matters of public higher education,”2 it has the power to expand its enumerated functions in order to prohibit or discourage cooperative efforts between public and private institutions. The legislature has specifically instructed that the Coordinating Board “shall ... encourage cooperation between public and private institutions of higher education wherever possible and ... cooperate with these private institutions, within statutory and constitutional limitations, to achieve the purposes of this chapter.” Id. § 61.064 (West 1996). Clearly, the Coordinating Board is not encouraging the public-private cooperation envisioned by the legislature in the Education Code. The majority holds that the Coordinating Board may not do so in this case because the Coordinating Board “decided that this Affiliation Agreement violated both statutory and constitutional provisions.” Supra at 139. The majority reaches this result, in part, because it construes the Affiliation Agreement to expand A & M’s role and mission without Coordinating Board approval. See Tex.Educ. Code Ann. § 61.051(d) (West Supp.2000); supra at 138-39. By the Affiliation Agreement, A & M does not establish a law-degree program. To do so, A & M must seek Coordinating Board approval to amend its mission statement, table of programs, and degree program. See Tex.Educ.Code Ann. § 61.051(d), (e). Until that time, section 61.064 would seem to mandate that the Coordinating Board encourage cooperation between the two institutions. Encouraging such cooperation does not obligate the Coordinating Board to ultimately approve any expanded degree program submitted by A & M.
This case presents a close question concerning the extent of the powers of the Coordinating Board. The relationship created by the Affiliation Agreement may or may not prove to be satisfactory. It is quite possible that South Texas and A & M may need, but not receive, Coordinating Board approval to go farther. But the next step is not the question before us. I believe that the legislature has not granted the Coordinating Board authority over the arrangement created by the Affiliation Agreement. I agree with South Texas that the agreement is a compact between public and private institutions and does not come under the auspices of the Coordinating Board’s limited authority. Where the legislature has narrowly restricted a public body’s authority, courts should not construe the legislature’s action in such a way that the body’s authority is expanded. I fear that the result of today’s decision is to grant the Coordinating Board overarching authority to review cooperative agreements between institutions of higher education. I do not believe that end to be the intent of the legislature. I would, therefore, hold that by entering into the Affiliation Agreement A & M did not exceed its authority, the Coordinating Board does not have the authority to review and approve it, and the agreement does not violate state law. I would reverse the district court’s judgment and render judgment for South Texas and A & M. Because the *142majority does otherwise, I respectfully dissent.
. The substantive portion of the Affiliation Agreement is set forth in the majority opinion. See supra at 132-34.
. Tex.Educ.Code Ann. § 61.051(a) (West Supp.2000).