OPINION ON PETITION TO REHEAR
Appellant (“STI”) has filed a Petition for Rehearing pursuant to T.R.A.P. Rule 39. The Rule provides in pertinent part the following:
Rehearing may be granted by the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or Court of Criminal Appeals on its own motion or on petition of a party. In determining whether to grant a rehearing, the following, while neither controlling nor fully measuring the court’s discretion, indicate the character of reasons that will be considered: (1) the court’s opinion incorrectly states the material facts established by the evidence and set forth in the record;... (3) the court’s opinion overlooks or misapprehends a material fact or proposition of law;...
T.R.A.P. 39(a)(2005).
In support of its Petition for Rehearing, STI contends that the Court incorrectly stated that STI “did not pursue an estoppel theory before the Trial Court.” STI notes that in its Answer to the Claw-sons’ Third Amended Complaint it specifically pled estoppel. The relevant portion of STI’s Answer stated, “Because Plaintiffs [the Clawsons] have recovered workers’ compensation benefits as a result of injuries to the decedent, Summers-Taylor pleads accord and satisfaction, estoppel, election of remedies and waiver as a bar to their claims against it.”
Although STI pled “estoppel” in its Answer, it did not pursue this theory in its “Motion for Summary Judgment Based on the Tennessee Workers’ Compensation Act,” in its Brief in Support of Summary Judgment, or in its Supplemental Motion and Argument in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. STI’s Motion for Summary Judgment and supporting documents presented two alternate theories for summary judgment. First, STI argued that the Clawson’s acceptance of payments — which STI’s insurer voluntarily paid and labeled as workers’ compensation benefits — triggered the § 50-6-108 exclusivity provision and thereby barred their tort claim, regardless of whether the Decedent’s death occurred in the course and scope of her employment. Second, STI argued that the election of remedies doctrine barred the Clawson’s tort claim. The doctrines of judicial or equitable estoppel were never discussed. Moreover, during the Circuit Court’s July 10, 2006 motion hearing, STI never mentioned the doctrines of judicial or equitable estoppel. STI’s argument at the hearing consisted of only two theories, i.e., the § 50-6-108 exclusivity provision and the doctrine of election of remedies.
Although STI pled estoppel in it Answer, it never brought this theory to the attention of the Trial Court as a ground for summary judgment. Under these circumstances, consideration of this theory *65was not appropriate. See, Griswold v. Income Properties, II, 880 S.W.2d 672, 678 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998) (declining to consider a defensive theory pled in the answer but not brought to the trial court’s attention in a subsequent motion for summary judgment).
We respectfully deny STI’s Petition for Rehearing.