(dissenting). I would deny the motion to dismiss the appeal and proceed to determine the legal sufficiency of R. S. 48:10-1, et seq., the statute purporting to invest “pipe line companies, associations and corporations” with the sovereign power of eminent domain in respect of lands and other property needed for public use as a right of way, asserted to be not inclusive of foreign corporations, but on the contrary hypothesis assailed as vague and uncertain in disregard of constitutional standards, primarily in its failure to specify the particular pipe line public uses for which the power of condemnation may be exerted, citing Slingerland v. Newark, 54 N. J. L. 62 (Sup. 01. 1891), and to prescribe constructional and operational safety regulations.
The nature of the power is such that this denial of the grant asserted here should be determined in the public interest, rather than sustain its exercise on grounds of estoppel alone.
I would call attention to this limitation introduced into the Constitution of 1947:
“Individuals or private corporations shall not be authorized to take private property for public use without just compensation first made to the owners.”
Article I, paragraph 20. Its significance in relation to the doctrine of estoppel has not had the attention of counsel; and I would not, for this reason also, consider the validity of the theory of estoppel until that question has been argued. Vide, Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. National Docks & New Jersey Junction Connecting Railway Company, 53 N. J. Eq. 178 (E. & A. 1895); Fitzpatrick v. Mayor and Aldermen of Jersey City, 36 N. J. L. 120 (S. Ct. 1873).
For granting—Chief Justice Vanderbilt, and Justices Olipi-iant, Waci-ieneeld, Burling, Jacobs and Brennan— 6. For denial—Justice Hehee—1.