This case involves a claim for damages as a result of personal injuries suffered by the minor-appellant, Jeffrey Slavish, in an accident which occurred on March 7, 1973. The trial resulted in a jury verdict for the defendant. The only issue on appeal involves a part of the jury instruction on the liability aspect of the case.
Where the accuracy of a charge is in issue, an appellate court must look to the charge in its entirety against the background of evidence in order to determine whether or not error was committed and whether that error was prejudicial to the complaining party. Whitner v. Von Hintz, 437 Pa. 448, 263 A.2d 889 (1970); See also Dollison v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Co., 446 Pa. 96, 284 A.2d 704 (1971); McCay v. Philadelphia Electric Co., 447 Pa. 490, 291 A.2d 759 (1972).
The evidence indicated that Jeffrey Slavish, age five, and three playmates were playing “cops and robbers” on the premises of the appellee, John Ratajczak. During the course of this amusement, Jeffrey and one of his companions were located on a landing between two stairways located outside the Ratajczak residence. The landing which is about five and one-half feet above the ground was enclosed by railings except at one portion of the landing adjacent to the house where there is an unguarded space. The evidence as to the width of this space varied from between fourteen inches to two and one-half feet. It was through this opening that Jeffrey fell and suffered his injuries. Jeffrey, while standing on the landing, played that he got shot and then accidentally fell through the opening to the ground.
*275There was conflicting evidence as to the minor-plaintiff’s legal status on the premises at the time of the accident. Depending upon which version of the evidence the jury accepted, they could find that he was a trespasser or a licensee. The court left this issue to the jury and instructed them as to the law under Section 339 of the Restatement of the Law-Second Torts 2d, Artificial Conditions Highly Dangerous to Trespassing Children as well as the law applicable to the duties of a possessor of land to a licensee on the premises. During the course of the charge, after advising the jury that the minor plaintiff because of his age could not be guilty of contributory negligence, the judge stated:
However, while you cannot consider the negligence of Jeffrey in this case, there are certain tests that apply in children’s cases. And the law does provide that no danger is more commonly realized or risk appreciated even by children than that of falling. Consciousness of the force of gravity results almost from animal instinct. Certainly, a normal child nearly seven years of age, indeed any child old enough to be at large, knows that if he steps or slips from an elevated structure, he will fall to the ground and be hurt. It may be that some children, while realizing the danger, will disregard it out of spirit of bravado or because of their immature recklessness. But the possessor of land is not to be visited with a responsibility for accidents due to this trait of children of more venturesome type. . . .
This language is in substance a quotation from an opinion by Justice Horace Stern (later Chief Justice) in McHugh v. Reading Co., 346 Pa. 266, 269, 30 A.2d 122, 123 (1943). In that case the Supreme Court affirmed the grant of a nonsuit in a case where a six year old child fell off an abutment and was killed. The court using the above quoted language held that the duty to protect children from dangers which they are unlikely to appreciate does not extend to the risk of jumping or falling from an elevated structure, and thus there was no responsibility under the law. The principle of *276McHugh case has been followed in subsequent cases applying Pennsylvania law.1
In this case the court did not employ the rule to grant a non-suit or direct a verdict but read the quoted language to the jury2 and thereafter stated in its charge:
So //that applies, Members of the Jury you consider this an elevated structure, because there was testimony that the landing was five and a half feet off the ground, you may apply it, if you believe it appropriate to this case, (emphasis supplied)
Given the conflict presented by the evidence the court properly left to the jury the determination of the plaintiff’s legal status on the premises and charged the jury as to the applicable standards of appellee’s responsibility. The excerpt from the McHugh case is simply an expression of Pennsylvania law as it may be applied to the responsibility of a possessor of land to trespassing children under the Restatement of Torts. Section 339 of the Restatement sets forth the conditions under which a possessor may be subject to liability for injuries. Subsection (c) sets forth the requirement that:
The children, because of their youth, do not discover the condition or realize the risk involved in intermeddling with it or in coming within the area made dangerous by it.3
*277Section 339 has been adopted as the law of Pennsylvania, Bartleson v. Glen Alden Coal Co., 361 Pa. 519, 64 A.2d 846 (1949); Jesko v. Turk, 421 Pa. 434, 219 A.2d 591 (1966). Thus by reading the portion of the McHugh opinion, the court instructed the jury that if they found that the presence of a space on the landing without a railing created a risk of falling they might nevertheless conclude that the possessor of land was not subject to liability if they also found that Jeffrey, even though a youth, discovered the condition and realized the risk of falling.
Not every statement of the law even if relevant to the issues should, or even properly may, be read to a jury. Statements in opinions are often couched in argumentative language and may be formulated in words expressive of policy. As such they may mislead a jury. It is better to charge a jury in terms of legal standards and rules. Here, however, we think the language from McHugh was appropriate to advise the jury as to the standards they were to apply under the law of Pennsylvania with respect to the duties of a possessor of land to persons thereon.
We find no error.
Order affirmed.
SPAETH, J., files a dissenting opinion.. Dragonjac v. McGaffin Construction and Supply Co., 409 Pa. 276, 186 A.2d 241 (1962); Malloy v. Pennsylvania R.R., 387 Pa. 408, 128 A.2d 40 (1956); and Novicki v. Blaw-Knox Co., 304 F.2d 931 (3d Cir. 1962). “Pennsylvania does hold that even rather young children must be held as a matter of law to understand that if one falls from a high place he is likely to be injured.” 304 F.2d at 934; Kravetz v. B. Perini and Sons, 252 F.2d 905 (3d Cir. 1958).
. Appellant’s brief argues that the quoted language was improperly made “more vivid” to the jury since it was read from a Pennsylvania Supreme Court Reporter. There is nothing in the record to support this argument, nor do we see how any prejudice could ensue simply because a jury might be cognizant that a judge was using as his authority a prior decision of an appellate court.
. McHugh contemplates application of the falling principle to stairways. The opinion at 346 Pa. at 269, 30 A.2d at 124 states “. *277while the owner of premises may owe more duty to a child than to an adult coming upon his premises by implied invitation, yet he is not bound to guard every stairway, cellarway, retaining wall, shed, tree, and open window on his premises, so that such a child cannot climb to a precipitous place and fall off.” (emphasis added)