This case involves an appeal from an adjudication of delinquency.
On February 10, 1978, a petition alleging delinquency was filed against appellant, then 15 years old, stemming from an incident in which a 12 year old boy was severely beaten.
A hearing was conducted on June 21, 1978 before Howard Farber, Esquire, Master in Juvenile Court, and resulted in the Master issuing a recommendation that the petition be dismissed for insufficient evidence.
The Commonwealth then filed an Exception to Master’s Recommendations and Petition for a Rehearing, to which appellant filed an Answer.
On July 3, 1978, the Honorable Howard F. Reed, Jr. granted the Commonwealth a rehearing before the Juvenile *472Hearing Judge. Prior to the July 25, 1978 date set for this rehearing appellant filed a motion to dismiss the Commonwealth’s petition for a rehearing, raising the issue of double jeopardy. The Honorable Robert A. Wright agreed to hear the merits of the double jeopardy issue, and after oral arguments and submission of briefs entered an Order dated November 9, 1978, refusing appellant’s motion.
A full rehearing was held before the Honorable John V. Diggins on January 23, 1979, at which time appellant again raised the issue of double jeopardy. After hearing testimony from the same three witnesses who testified before the Master, the court below entered an Adjudication and Order for Further Study in which appellant was found delinquent.
Appellant now appeals from this Order.
The sole issue presented on appeal is that of double jeopardy. Appellant argues that the procedure followed in Pennsylvania in juvenile delinquency proceedings of allowing the Commonwealth to have a de novo hearing before a judge following a recommendation of dismissal of the petition by a Master, (Juvenile Act, Act of December 6, 1972, P.L. 1464, No. 333 '§ 5, 11 P.S. § 50-301) violates the ban against double jeopardy of the Pennsylvania and United States Constitutions.
Appellant cites the case of Swisher v. Brady, 438 U.S. 204, 98 S.Ct. 2699, 57 L.Ed.2d 705 (1978) for support. In Swisher, the Supreme Court upheld a recently enacted Maryland procedure for juvenile delinquency hearings against a double jeopardy attack. A single-judge federal district court had held that the prior Maryland procedure of allowing the state to re-try its case de novo in front of a judge was in violation of the ban against double jeopardy, Aldridge v. Dean, 395 F.Supp. 1161 (Md.1975). In response to this the Maryland Court of Appeals, pursuant to its rulemaking powers, promulgated a new rule, providing in pertinent part that the record is closed after the Master’s findings except where both parties consent to have it opened.
The Court found that under the new Maryland procedure the prosecution is prevented from getting the forbidden *473“second crack” at the defendant (438 U.S. at 216, 98 S.Ct. at 2707).
Appellant argues that the Pennsylvania procedure does not fall under this exception as it permits the Commonwealth to present evidence for its case twice before the trier of fact.
We find, however, that appellant waived his constitutional right not to be placed in double jeopardy at, the time of the master’s hearing. The Pennsylvania law provides that:
“Before commencing the hearing the master shall inform the parties who have appeared that they are entitled to have the matter heard by the judge. If a party objects, the hearing shall be conducted by the judge.” [11 Pa.C.S. § 50-301(b)]
In the notes of testimony for June 21, 1978 on page two Master Farber gave the required instruction and as no objection was made the hearing was the begun. This Pennsylvania procedure is entirely different from the Maryland rule, disapproved of in Aldridge (supra), where the juvenile had no choice as to whether to be heard by a magistrate or a judge. Instantly the juvenile had a choice whether he should be heard by a master, after which hearing he might have to be heard again by a judge, or be heard by a judge initially.
The Supreme Court defined “waiver” as the knowing and voluntary relinquishment of a right in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938). Thus when the juvenile, with his attorney, chooses voluntarily to be heard by a master, he waives his right to complain of double jeopardy should the Commonwealth request rehearing before a judge.
Order affirmed.
WIEAND, J., files a dissenting opinion.