with whom TAYLOR, C.J. and COLBERT, V.C.J. join, dissenting:
{ 1 After the hearing in the above styled and numbered small claims cause, the trial judge took the matter under advisement. Sua sponte and without the parties' input on either of the issues found dispositive or any opportunity to be heard, the trial court determined that the plaintiffs/appellant's claims were: 1) not viable because they were not raised in a contempt proceeding heard two (2) years earlier; and 2) barred by the two-year statute of limitations.1 The majority opinion holds that, because the small claims procedure is informal in nature, the trial judge has unlimited discretion to apply any legal principle, raised or not, to resolve the conflict before it. I dissent.
T2 The holding is far too broad and will have a chilling effect upon all future small claims cases. The purpose of the Small Claims Act (small claims), 12 O.S. Supp.2004 §§ 1751 et seq., as passed by the Oklahoma Legislature, was to facilitate a quicker resolution of minor disputes, primarily between parties appearing pro se. Small claims procedures were never intended to frustrate, discourage, or eliminate a party's constitutional right to a fair trial before an impartial jurist 2 or to effectively cloge the court house *1236doors by allowing decisions to be made in sequestered chambers without the opportunity for all litigants to be heard.3 All Okla-homans are entitled to right and justice administered without sale, denial, delay, or prejudice.4 Minimum standards of due process require that persons be afforded not only notice but also an opportunity to be heard before any of their substantial rights may be altered or affected.5 The right to a fair trial is an indespensible constitutional right.6 Even where a statute is not unconstitutional on procedural or substantive grounds,7 failure of notice to the party affected thereby is fatal to its application.8 Furthermore, this Court has recognized that even less formal administrative proceedings, which may directly and adversely affect legally protected interests, must be preceded by notice calculated to provide knowledge of the exercise of adjudicative power and an opportunity to be heard.9
T3 No statutory regime, until now, has received this Court's approval at the expense of one's constitutional right to due process,10 a fair trial, and the cold neutrality of a detached trial court judge.11 Due process entitles a person to an impartial and disinterested tribunal in both civil and criminal cases.12 The Okla. Const. art. 2, § 613 guar*1237antees to each citizen an open door to the courts of this state-including small claims court. Avenues to the courts should never be trumped by any statute which results in not only blocking access to the courts, but also the right to have one's cause heard by a fair and impartial judge, in a due process situation where all parties find themselves on a level playing field.14 Access to courts must be available to all through simple and direct means and the right must be administered in favor of justice rather than being bound by technicalities.15 In this case the majority goes too far. It deprives the plaintiff/appellant of a fair day in court.16
14 We have ample authority that a judge is confined to the record before him/her, the pleadings, and the evidence presented.17 Here, the judge waited until after both parties had presented their entire case and then, sua sponte, without notice or the opportunity to be heard, decided this case on legal theories not raised by the parties, and denied, in this case, the plaintiff/appellant his right to a fair trial-by a misguided interpretation of the Small Claims Act, 12 O.S. Supp.2004 §§ 1751 et seq. The due process clauses of the United States and the Oklahoma Constitutions provide that certain substantive rights-life, liberty, and property-cannot be deprived except by constitutionally adequate procedures.18 The right to a fair trial is, in and of itself, a substantial constitutional right.19 There can be no fair trial without the opportunity to be heard on all issues and to present all admissible evidence.20 Because this did not occur in this instance and has been sanctioned by the majority, I dissent.
. Title 12 O.S. Supp.2009 § 95(A)(3) providing:
"A. Civil actions other than for the recovery of real property can only be brought within the following periods, after the cause of action shall have accrued, and not afterwards:
. 3. Within two (2) years: An action for trespass upon real property; an action for taking, detaining, or injuring personal property, including actions for the specific recovery of personal property; an action for injury to the rights of another, not arising on contract, and not hereinafter enumerated; an action for relief on the ground of fraud-the cause of action in such case shall not be deemed to have accrued until the discovery of the fraud ..."
. Miller Dollarhide, P.C., see note 12, infra; [Kauger, J. writing for the majority.]; Pierce v. Pierce, see note 11, infra; Johnson v. Board of Governors of Registered Dentists, see note 11, infra; Craig v. Walker, see note 11, infra; Sadberry v. Wilson, see note 11, infra; Pitman v. Doty, see note 11, infra.
. The Okla. Const. Art. 2, § 6 providing:
''The courts of justice of the State shall be open to every person, and speedy and certain remedy afforded for every wrong and for every injury to person, property, or reputation; and right and justice shall be administered without sale, denial, or prejudice." [Emphasis provided.]
. Id.
. Patel v. OMH Medical Ctr., Inc., 1999 OK. 33, 39, 987 P.2d 1185, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1188, 120 S.Ct. 1242, 146 L.Ed.2d 100.
. Taliaferro v. Shahsavari, M.D., 2006 OK 96, 132, 154 P.3d 1240 [Kauger, J. writing for the majority]; A full and fair trial is guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution. Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 117 S.Ct. 1793, 138 L.Ed.2d 97 (1997), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 520 U.S. 1272, 117 S.Ct. 2450, 138 L.Ed.2d 209 (1997); Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 95 S.Ct. 1456, 43 L.Ed.2d 712 (1975); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 75 S.Ct. 623, 99 L.Ed. 942 (1955). The Okla. Const. art. 2, § 19 providing in pertinent part:
"'The right to trial by jury shall remain inviolate. ..."
. Procedural due process requires an inquiry into the constitutional adequacy of the State's procedural safeguards. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 110 S.Ct. 975, 983, 108 L.Ed.2d 100 (1990); Nelson v. Nelson, see note 8, infra [Kauger, J. writing for the majority.]; Matter of Adoption of J.R.M., 1995 OK 79, 112, 899 P.2d 1155. The substantive component of the due process clause bars certain governmental action despite the adequacy of procedural protections provided. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 106 S.Ct. 662, 665, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986); Nelson v. Nelson, see note 8, infra [Kauger, J. writing for the majority.]; Matter of Adoption of J.R.M., this note, supra.
. Nelson v. Nelson, 1998 OK 10, 15, 954 P.2d 1219 [Kauger, C.J. writing for the majority.]
. Dulaney v. Oklahoma State Dept. of Health, 1993 OK 113, 9, 868 P.2d 676 [Kauger, J. writing for the majority.]; Harry R. Carlile Trust v. Cotton Petroleum, 1986 OK 16, 113, 732 P.2d 438, cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1007, 107 S.Ct. 3232, 97 L.Ed.2d 738 and 483 U.S. 1021, 107 S.Ct. 3265, 97 L.Ed.2d 764 (1987); Cate v. Archon Oil Co., 1985 OK 15, 10, 695 P.2d 1352 (Okla. 1985) [Kauger, J. writing for the majority.].
. Oklahoma's due process clause has a definitional sweep coextensive with its federal counterpart. Zeier v. Zimmer, 2006 OK 98, fn. 8, 152 P.3d 861; Barzellone v. Presley, 2005 OK 86, 115, 126 P.3d 588; Presley v. Board of County Comm'rs, 1999 OK. 45, 8, 981 P.2d 309; City of Bethany v. Public Employees Relations Bd., 1995 OK 99, fn. 44, 904 P.2d 604 [Kauger, V.C.J. writing for the majority.]; Oklahoma Ass'n for Equitable Taxation v. City of Oklahoma City, 1995 OK 62, 12, 901 P.2d 800, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1029, 116 S.Ct. 674, 133 L.Ed.2d 523 (1995) [Kauger, V.C.J. writing for the majority.]. The United States Const., Amend. 14, § 1 providing in pertinent part:
"... nor shall any state ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protections of the laws...."
The Okla. Const. art. 2, § 7 providing:
"No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
. Miller Dollarhide, P.C. v. Tal, see note 12, infra [Kauger, J. writing for the majority.]; Pierce v. Pierce, 2001 OK 97, 13, 39 P.3d 791; Johnson v. Board of Governors of Registered Dentists, 1996 OK 41, 32, 913 P.2d 1339; Craig v. Walker, 1992 OK 1, 5, 824 P.2d 1131; Sadberry v. Wilson, 1968 OK 61, 15, 441 P.2d 381; Pitman v. Doty, 1968 OK 16, 0, 441 P.2d 428.
. Miller Dollarhide, P.C. v. Tal, 2007 OK 58, 116, 163 P.3d 548 [Kauger, J. writing for the majority.].
. The Okla. Const. art. 2, § 6, see note 3, supra.
. See, Miller Dollarhide, P.C. v. Tal, note 12, supra [Kauger, J. writing for the majority.].
. Zeier v. Zimmer, Inc., see note 10, supra; Woody v. State ex rel. Dept. of Corrections, 1992 OK 45, 10, 833 P.2d 257.
. Nelson v. Nelson, see note 8, supra [Kauger, C.J. writing for the majority.].
. See, Rox Petroleum, L.L.C. v. New Dominion, L.L.C., 2008 OK 13, 7, 184 P.3d 502 [Appellate review limited to record actually presented to trial court.]; Matter of Assessments for the Year 2005 of Certain Real Property Owned by Askins Properties, L.L.C., 2007 OK 25, 10-11, 161 P.3d 303 [Opining on an issue not presented within the confines of the factual issues is inappropriate. Our decision is limited to determining only the legal issues presented by the record before us.]; Shero v. Grand Savings Bank, 2007 OK 24, 13, 161 P.3d 298 [Appellate court review limited to the issues raised by the parties and presented by the proof, pleadings, petition in error, and briefs.]; Jordan v. Jordan, 2006 OK 88, 16, 151 P.3d 117 [To the same effect.].
. Dulaney v. Oklahoma State Dept. of Health, see note 9, supra [Kauger, J. writing for the majority.].
. Taliaferro v. Shahsavari, see note 6, supra [Kauger, J. writing for the majority.].
. Atkinson v. Gurich, 2011 OK 12, 1, 248 P.3d 356 [Taylor, C.J., with whom Winchester and Reif, JJ., join, dissenting to the majority opinion authored by Kauger, J.].