As the result of a contretemps at a hospital between Petitioner, Rhonda Michelle Polk, and a special police officer, Corporal Raymond Sperl, Polk was convicted of disorderly conduct in violation of Md.Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol., 2001 Supp.), Art. 27 § 121(b)(3) (“A person may not willfully fail to obey a reasonable and lawful order of a law enforcement officer made to prevent a disturbance to the public peace.”)1 and resisting arrest. We agree with the Circuit Court for Wicomico County and the Court of Special Appeals that facts placed before the trial court were sufficient to support those convictions and, therefore, shall affirm the judgments.
I.
On the afternoon of 8 June 2001, Polk, accompanied by her nine-year-old daughter, went to the Peninsula Regional Medical Center in Salisbury, Maryland. Polk previously worked as a secretary in the Hospital’s Heart Center, but her employment had been terminated recently. She returned on this occasion to pick up her final pay check.
Polk first visited the Human Resources Department for her pay check, but was directed to go to the Heart Center. When *4she reached the Heart Center, she was told by her former supervisor, Shannon Brady, that her check was not at the Center and that she should return to Human Resources. Soon after Polk, muttering insults under her breath, left for Human Resources, Brady located the pay check. To avoid further interaction with Polk, Brady contacted Hospital security to have the check delivered to her at Human Resources.
Corporal Raymond Sperl, a special police officer stationed at the Hospital for security, responded to Brady’s request. He carried the check to Human Resources and there encountered Polk. When Polk asked him about the pay check, Corporal Sperl replied that he “ha[d] to take it to personnel.” Polk responded, “[F]uck you, asshole.” As the officer continued toward Human Resources with the check, Polk began “screaming,” “[G]ive me my check.” A Human Resources employee indicated to Corporal Sperl that he could give Polk the check. Polk snatched it from him, adding another, “[F]uek you, asshole.” Corporal Sperl described the exchange that followed as Polk walked down a hallway toward a Hospital exit:
I said just keep your mouth quiet and leave. Again, [she responded] fuck you, asshole. I said I feel sorry for your child, she had a child with her. After I said I feel sorry for your child, she said fuck you, asshole. I said keep your mouth quiet and leave or I’m going to lock you up for disorderly conduct.
The officer also commanded Polk to “keep [her] mouth shut, stop [her] cursing, [and] just leave the property.” Polk called Corporal Sperl an “old white baldheaded cop wannabe.” In the course of their exchange, the Corporal stressed several times that “she’d be locked up [for disorderly conduct] if she didn’t stop her profanity.” When two women at the end of the hallway “heard the commotion,” they walked away down another hallway. When Polk reached the Hospital exit, she turned toward, the officer and shouted, “[F]uck you, asshole,” once again as she passed through the doors.
*5Now outside, Polk’s continuing tirade at Corporal Sperl “startled” a group of ten or fifteen Hospital employees standing nearby. Corporal Sperl escorted Polk toward the Hospital parking garage. Polk was “very irate” and “was letting [Corporal] Sperl know how irate she was” by “yell[ing] at him and cursfing] at him.” At one point, Polk abruptly stopped walking, causing the officer to step on the back of one of her “flip-flop” sandals and almost lose his balance. When the “vulgarity ... intensified,” the Corporal announced that Polk was under arrest and attempted to apprehend her. He grabbed her shoulder, but she pulled away and bit his arm, breaking the skin on his wrist. During the scuffle, other security officers arrived and eventually subdued and arrested Polk.
Polk was charged with engaging in disorderly conduct in violation of Maryland Code, Article 27 § 121(b)(3) (1957, 1996 RepLVol., 2001 Supp.), resisting arrest, and second-degree assault in violation of Maryland Code, Article 27 § 12A (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol.).2 She was tried before a jury in the Circuit Court for Wicomico County on 28 November 2001. After the State presented its case-in-chief, Polk moved for a judgment of acquittal as to all of the charges, arguing that Corporal Sperl’s initial orders to “stop cursing” were unlawfully directed at the content of her speech and that a “domino effect” made her subsequent arrest illegal. She maintained that, by using profanity toward the officer, she was engaging in protected speech. According to Polk, because she had not disobeyed a lawful police order and the officer had no reason to arrest her, she rightfully resisted the attempts to arrest her.
The Circuit Court denied Polk’s motion for acquittal. The judge concluded that Corporal Speri’s orders to “quiet down” *6constituted lawful orders to prevent a disturbance to the public peace. The orders, in his view, were directed at the volume of Polk’s speech rather than its content. In this regard, the judge stated:
“[Tjhere is the testimony of Corporal Sperl that Ms. Polk was irate, was using profane language, and I think it’s reasonable to infer from his testimony that she was doing so loudly because he told her on several occasions that she had to be quiet and he told her that if she wasn’t quiet that he would place her under arrest for disorderly conduct.
“There is testimony from Corporal Sperl that two other people who were in the hallway at the time changed their direction to walk away from where he and Ms. Polk were located, and it may be that they just don’t like hearing someone say fuck you, asshole, but it could have also been because of the fact they didn’t like the volume of the language, as well as the content.
“And because of that possibility, in looking at it in the light most favorable to the State, I think I have to assume at this point that they walked away for reasons other than merely the content of it.
“There is also testimony from Corporal Sperl and from other people who [observed the incident outside the hospital’s exit doors] that Ms. Polk was out of control at the point when she exited the building, was speaking in a manner which I think could be considered loud, Sperl said that it caught everyone’s attention in [that area] when they left.”
From these findings, the judge concluded that a reasonable fact-finder could find that Polk failed to comply with the officer’s orders to reduce the volume of her voice.
The jury found Polk guilty of disorderly conduct and resisting arrest, but acquitted her of the assault charge. The trial judge merged the two convictions and sentenced Polk to 18 months incarceration, suspending all but 60 days.
Polk appealed. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the judgments in an unreported opinion. Before that court, Polk again argued that the officer’s orders were directed unconsti*7tutionally at the content of her speech. The intermediate appellate court noted that the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution “render[s] unlawful any order to refrain from profanity.” Nonetheless, from the testimony that Polk was “irate,” “yell[ing],” and “laps[ed] into ... tirades of vulgarity,” the court determined that she was “shouting when she cursed at [Corporal] Sperl.” It determined, further, that the officer’s orders to “keep [her] mouth quiet” sought to control the volume, rather than the content, of Polk’s speech. Based on these determinations, the court concluded that a rational trier of fact could have found that “[Corporal] Sperl lawfully ordered [Polk] to quiet down, and that [she] ignored the order.” Because Polk’s challenge to the conviction for resisting arrest also was based on the illegality of the officer’s orders the court held that, “that challenge must fail as well.”
We granted Polk’s petition for a writ of certiorari, Polk v. State, 372 Md. 429, 813 A.2d 257 (2002), to consider the following questions:
1. Does an officer’s order to “stop cursing” and “stop [your] profanity” constitute a “lawful order” to the extent that an individual’s refusal to comply would be a violation of Maryland Code, Article 27 § 121(b)(3)?
2. If such an order is not “lawful” for purposes of Article 27 § 121(b)(3), was the evidence sufficient to sustain the appellant’s conviction for disorderly conduct?
For the reasons explained below, we conclude that, Petitioner’s framing of her issues notwithstanding, Corporal Sperl’s orders directed toward the volume of Polk’s voice were reasonable and lawful orders and the evidence indicating she failed to obey those orders was sufficient to support her convictions.
II. Standard of Review
In Moye v. State, we recently reiterated the standard of review for evaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence underlying a criminal conviction as:
*8whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crimes beyond a reasonable doubt. We view the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution. We give “due regard to the [fact finder’s] finding of facts, its resolution of conflicting evidence, and, significantly, its opportunity to observe and assess the credibility of witnesses.” Although our analysis does not involve a re-weighing of the evidence, we must determine whether the jury’s verdict was supported by either direct or circumstantial evidence^]
369 Md. 2, 12, 796 A.2d 821, 827 (2002) (Citations omitted). If the facts as found by the trier of fact are not clearly erroneous, our review of the application of the law to those facts, such as where impingement on an individual’s constitutional rights may be in question, is de novo. See Glover v. State, 368 Md. 211, 220, 792 A.2d 1160, 1165 (2002) (reviewing de novo the lower court’s judgment on a motion to dismiss for violation of the constitutional right to a speedy trial); see also Cartnail v. State, 359 Md. 272, 282, 753 A.2d 519, 525 (2000) (stating that with regard to a Fourth Amendment question, “this Court makes an independent determination of whether the State has violated an individual’s constitutional rights by applying the law to the facts”). When we perform an independent constitutional review, “[w]e do not engage in de novo fact-finding.” Cartnail, 359 Md. at 282, 753 A.2d at 525. Instead, we defer to the trial court’s factual findings unless clearly erroneous. Glover, 386 Md. at 221, 792 A.2d at 1166.
III.
The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution applies to state and local governments through the Fourteenth Amendment. Eanes v. State, 318 Md. 436, 445, 569 A.2d 604, 609 (1990), citing Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 45 S.Ct. 625, 69 L.Ed. 1138 (1925).3 Though the U.S. Constitution *9protects individuals from state regulation of speech, it is undisputed that “the First and Fourteenth Amendments have never been thought to give absolute protection to every individual to speak whenever or wherever he [or she] pleases, or to use any form of address in any circumstances that he [or she] chooses.” Eanes, 318 Md. at 446, 569 A.2d at 608-609 (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 19, 91 S.Ct. 1780, 1785, 29 L.Ed.2d 284, 290 (1971)).
In arguing for reversal, Polk relies heavily on Diehl v. State, 294 Md. 466, 451 A.2d 115 (1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1098, 103 S.Ct. 1798, 76 L.Ed.2d 363(1983). In Diehl, the defendant, an automobile passenger, was convicted for disorderly conduct under a former version of § 121 after the driver was pulled over in a grocery store parking lot for a traffic violation. Diehl, 294 Md. at 467-69, 451 A.2d at 116-117. The statute prohibited “wilfully disturbing] any neighborhood in [any Maryland] city, town or county by loud and unseemly noises, or [] profanely curs[ing] or swear[ing] or us[ing] obscene language upon or near to any [] street or highway within the hearing of persons passing by or along such highway.... ” Art. 27, § 121 (1957, 1976 RepLVol.). Diehl refused to obey a police officer’s order that he return to the car and stated: “Fuck you, [officer];” “I know my rights;” and “you can’t tell me what to do.” Id. at 468, 451 A.2d at 116. In response, the officer arrested Diehl for “screaming obscenities and ... drawing a crowd” while protesting the officer’s order. Id. at 468, 451 A.2d at 117. We reversed Diehl’s conviction for disorderly conduct because Diehl never acted unlawfully. We concluded that “where, as here, a person is acting in a lawful manner (a passenger getting out of a stopped car) and is the object of an unlawful police order [to return to the car], it is not usually a criminal violation for such person to verbally *10protest a police officer’s insistence upon submission to such an order.” Id. at 479, 451 A.2d at 122. Because Diehl was protesting an unlawful order, any disturbance created by Diehl’s protests did not constitute disorderly conduct. Id. at 478, 451 A.2d at 122.4
Diehl subsequently was qualified by our holding in Eanes v. State, where we affirmed the defendant’s conviction for disorderly conduct under § 121(b)(5)5 for shouting loudly in front of an abortion clinic in a residential neighborhood. Eanes, 318 Md. 436, 468, 569 A.2d 604, 620 (1990). In Eanes, we stated:
*11“[As Justice Harlan, writing for the Supreme Court in Cohen, explained:][T]his Court has recognized that government may properly act in many situations to prohibit intrusion into the privacy of the home of unwelcome views and ideas which cannot be totally banned from the public dialogue .... The ability of government, consonant with the Constitution, to shut off discourse solely to protect others from hearing it is, in other words, dependent upon a showing that substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner.”
“Moreover, a captive audience that is entitled to protection may exist outside the home. Because riders on public rapid transit vehicles are captive audiences, a municipality may decline to accept political advertising on these vehicles. Lehman [v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 304, 94 S.Ct. 2714, 2718, 41 L.Ed.2d 770, 778 (1974)]. See also Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972) (ordinance prohibiting disturbance of school).
“The principle is grounded on the concept of privacy. “The Supreme Court permits the state to protect listeners who are ‘captive’ to unwanted speech — when speech invades their privacy interest in an essentially intolerable manner.” Note, Too Close For Comfort: Protesting Outside Medical Faculties, 101 Harv.L.Rev. 1856, 1863 (1988) [footnote omitted]. Although that protection is most often extended to those "within their homes, it may be extended to any situation in which “privacy interests [are] substantially threatenedbecause “individuals cannot escape ‘bombardment of [their] sensibilities.’ ” Id. at 1864 (quoting Erznoznik [v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. [205,] 211, 95 S.Ct. [2268,] 2273, 45 L.Ed.2d [125,] 132 [ (1975) ], quoting Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21, 91 S.Ct. at 1786, 29 L.Ed.2d at 292). See also Comment, ‘I’ll Defend to the Death Your Right to Say It ... But Not to Me’—The Captive Audience Corollary to the First Amendment, 1983 S.Ill.U.L.J. 211, 215-216.
*12“Sound is one of the most intrusive means of communication. The unwilling listener is not like the passer-by who may be offered a pamphlet in the street but cannot be made to take it. The eases support the view that content-neutral regulations controlling its loudness are permissible. It may be otherwise outside the home or office, where the audience is ordinarily not captive. But § 121 prohibits only that volume level of communication that unreasonably disturbs individuals whose rights to be free from aural abuse override the right of a speaker to address them by direct or incidental oral communication. This is the type of balance of conflicting interests contemplated by first amendment jurisprudence.”
Eanes, 318 Md. at 451-53, 569 A.2d at 611-12 (some citations omitted) (some emphasis added).
In Eanes, we set forth the factors to be weighed in determining whether a regulation of speech is constitutional. Those factors include: (1) whether the regulation is content-based or content-neutral; (2) the circumstances surrounding the time and place where the speech occurred, as well as the overhearing parties’ location; and (3) whether there are less disruptive alternatives available to the speaker.6 Eanes, 318 Md. at 447, 454-56, 569 A.2d at 609, 613. Under Eanes, an order, such as Corporal Sperl’s to “keep your mouth quiet,” may be legitimate even if it results in a restriction on otherwise protected speech, if the three-pronged test is satisfied. See, e.g., Briggs v. State, 90 Md.App. 60, 71, 73, 599 A.2d 1221, 1226, 1227 (1992) (upholding the defendant’s arrest for disorderly conduct because of his loud and disruptive behavior, despite the fact that his speech was protected under the First Amendment).
*13jWanes is clearly controlling here.7 Diehl is not applicable to, and is in fact distinguishable from, the facts of the case sub judice. The Court in Danes explained that the Diehl holding “is only applicable when the prohibition against ‘loud and unseemly noise’ seeks to regulate the content of speech.” Eanes, 318 Md. at 444, 569 A.2d at 608 (emphasis added). The trial court in the present case applied the analysis approved in Danes and found that (1) Corporal Sperl’s orders, in the main, were content-neutral, (2) there was a sufficiently compelling state interest in protecting the rights of patients, visitors, and staff to be free from disturbances in a hospital setting, and (3) there were alternative means of expression available to Ms. Polk. Because there is sufficient evidence in the record of the present case supporting the trial court’s findings that Corporal Sperl’s orders, in the main, were content-neutral, the trial court’s findings are not clearly erroneous and Diehl is inapposite.
Significantly, and unlike the present case, the arresting officer in Diehl testified that he arrested Diehl because of the content of his language. Diehl, 294 Md. at 478, 451 A.2d at 122. Corporal Sperl, on the other hand, did not testify that he arrested Polk based on the content of her language. Instead, he stated that he told Polk “just shut your mouth and leave or you’re going to be locked up for disorderly conduct.” This testimony supports the rational inference drawn by the trial court that the order was a lawful attempt to prevent Polk’s violation of § 121 due to her loud and disruptive behavior.
The first factor of the Danes test, whether the order was content-based or volume-based, must be considered in light of the appropriate standard of review. As noted, supra, we must conduct a de novo review regarding any constitutional implications, but that analysis is informed by the trial court’s findings of fact. Thus, the issue before us is not whether Corporal *14Sperl’s orders were more likely content-based than content-neutral, but whether the trial court’s factual determination was clearly erroneous that his orders, in the main, were directed at the volume of Polk’s speech.
The Court of Special Appeals concluded that there was sufficient evidence in the record for a rational trier of fact to determine that Corporal Sperl’s orders were directed at the volume of Polk’s speech. The Court of Special Appeals stated:
From the testimony of Sperl and Donohoe [a maintenance mechanic at Peninsula Regional Medical Center], the trier of fact could have inferred that appellant was shouting when she cursed at Sperl. Appellant’s own testimony provided direct evidence that appellant wás ‘yelling’ at Sperl. Appellant does not dispute that, if she was making enough noise to disturb other persons in the hospital, Sperl could have lawfully ordered her to be quiet. Indeed, § 121(b)(5)(ii) of Article 27 specifically states that “[a] person from ány location may not by unreasonably loud noise willfully disturb the peace of another ... [i]n a place of business.... ” From Sperl’s testimony, the trier of fact could have determined that Sperl ordered Appellant to quiet down.
The record contains ample testimony before the trial court supporting its finding that Corporal Sperl issued orders aimed, in the main, at the volume of Ms. Polk’s speech. Corporal Sperl testified that, when Polk first cursed at him outside the Human Resources Department, he told her to “keep [her] mouth quiet and leave.” In addition, he warned her “four or five times” thereafter to “keep [her] mouth quiet” as her tirade continued. Several witnesses confirmed his testimony regarding both Polk’s conduct and his response. Polk was described as “screaming” to the employees of the Human Resources Division, “tell him to give me my check, tell him to give me my check.” Brandon Donohoe, who witnessed the incident from an outdoors smoking area, described Polk as “very irate” and testified that she continually “lapse[d] into ... tirade[s] of vulgarity.” Polk herself admitted that, as she and Corporal Sperl walked out the doors of the Hospital, she *15“was so happy to be outside [she] did just, you know, yell at him and curse him.” She further acknowledged that it was not until after she began yelling that the Corporal placed her under arrest. Charles Landherr, supervisor for facilities management at the hospital, testified that “[Corporal Sperl] was a little winded, but he was very calm. I thought he handled himself very professionally. He didn’t use any foul language, and he was just trying to get Rhonda [Polk] to cooperate, which she obviously did not. She was totally out of control when I went out there.” The Human Resources manager at the hospital, Craig Koppenhaver, a witness to some of Polk’s outbursts, testified that “I heard Officer Sperl at one point say something to the effect, you’re going to have to calm down, otherwise I’m going to have to place you under arrest.” Each of these statements may be understood to mean that Corporal Sperl was attempting to do his duty to “maintain peace and order in the hospital.”
The trial judge noted that the evidence would support a rational inference that Ms. Polk’s unreasonable volume and disorderliness prompted her arrest, stating:
[t]here is testimony from Corporal Sperl that two other people who were in the hallway at the time changed their direction to walk away from where he and Ms. Polk were located, and it may be that they just don’t like hearing someone say fuck you, asshole, but it could have also been because of the fact they didn’t like the volume of the language, as well as the content ... And because of that possibility, in looking at it in a light most favorable to the State, I think I have to assume at this point that they walked away for reasons other than merely the content of it.
The dissent attempts to rewrite this Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence announced in jWanes. The dissenting opinion states:
“An examination of the entire record reveals that Corporal Sperl’s orders unlawfully attempted to regulate Polk’s protected speech. First and foremost, the officer told Polk to “stop her profanity” and “stop her cursing.” These com*16mands unquestionably were aimed at controlling the words Polk used and not the volume of her voice. Although the record indicates that Polk also was instructed to “keep your mouth shut” and “keep you mouth quiet,” these phrases were always used in conjunction with the references to the content of Polk’s speech. Where an officer issues orders that attempt to restrict protected speech, those orders are “content-based” and must be narrowly drawn to achieve a compelling state interest. See Eanes, 318 Md. at 447, 569 A.2d at 609 (quoting Perry Education Assn. v. Perry Local Educators’ Assn., 460 U.S. at 45, 103 S.Ct. at 955, 74 L.Ed.2d at 804 (1983)). This is so even if the “content-based” orders are combined, as they were here, with other commands that, by themselves, might not raise constitutional concerns.
(Dissent at 34).
Such a broad claim is insupportable under Eanes, a case which repeatedly emphasized that “[e]ven protected speech is not equally permissible in all places and at all times.” Eanes, 318 Md. at 446, 569 A.2d at 609 (citation omitted). Each case the dissent uses to support its sweeping statement involves a facial constitutional challenge to a statute and therefore is inapposite to the case at hand. Polk does not challenge § 121 as unconstitutional on its face.
“[I]t is the statute, and not the accusation or the evidence under it, which prescribes the limits of permissible conduct and warns against transgression.” Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 98, 60 S.Ct. 736, 742, 84 L.Ed. 1093, 1100 (1940). See also Secretary of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 104 S.Ct. 2839, 81 L.Ed.2d 786 (1984) (statute properly subject to facial attack); Termiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 69 S.Ct. 894, 93 L.Ed. 1131 (1949) likewise. A facial challenge to § 121 would fail almost certainly because the statute is much more limited than the Kentucky statute upheld in Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 92 S.Ct. 1953, 32 L.Ed.2d 584 (1972), for. example. Compare § 121(b)(3) (“[a] person may not willfully fail to obey a reasonable and lawful order that a law enforcement officer makes to prevent a *17disturbance to the public peace”) with Ky.Rev.Stat. § 437.016(l)(f) (Supp.1968) (“[a] person is guilty of disorderly conduct if, with intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof, he ... [congregates with other persons in a public place and refuses to comply with a lawful order of the police to disperse”) (quoted in Colten, 407 U.S. at 108, 92 S.Ct. at 1956, 32 L.Ed.2d at 589). In the few cases where the Supreme Court has looked beyond the text of a valid statute to assess the “accusation or evidence under it,” the Court has limited its inquiry to the sufficiency of the evidence. See, e.g. Shuttleswoth v. Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 95, 86 S.Ct. 211, 216, 15 L.Ed.2d 176, 182 (1965) (“[tjhere was ... no evidence whatever in the record to support the petitioner’s conviction under this ordinance”), Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 311, 60 S.Ct. 900, 906, 84 L.Ed. 1213, 1221 (1940) (“the petitioner’s communication ... raised no such clear and present menace to public peace and order as to render him liable to conviction of the common law offense in question”). As demonstrated supra, the evidence in the present case is sufficient to support the convictions.8
The dissent not only ignores impermissibly the clearly erroneous standard and our precedents, but cherry-picks the evidence to support its view that Corporal Sperl’s orders were directed at the content of Polk’s speech. The dissent states that:
[a]n examination of the record reveals that Corporal Sperl’s orders unlawfully attempted to regulate Polk’s protected *18speech. First and foremost, the officer told Polk to “stop her profanity” and “stop her cursing.” These commands unquestionably were aimed at controlling the words Polk used and not the volume of her voice.
(Dissent at 34). To the contrary, upon close examination of the record, the facts are not nearly as “unquestionable” as the dissent portrays. Sperl testified that his first response to Polk’s outburst of “fuck you, asshole,” which occurred inside the hospital, was to request Polk to lower the volume of her voice:
I said just keep your mouth quiet and leave. Again [she said] fuck you asshole. I said I feel sorry for your child, she had a child with her. After I said I feel sorry for your child, she said fuck you, asshole. I said keep your mouth quiet and leave or I’m going to lock you up for disorderly conduct.”
(emphasis added).
Quixotically, the dissenting opinion points directly to facts it claims do not exist, and thus exposes its own error, by observing that:
[t]he majority makes a significant effort to highlight the volume of Polk’s speech. It pinpoints the testimony describing Polk’s behavior as ‘screaming,’
‘tirades of vulgarity,’ ‘yelling,’ and ‘loud.’ The emphasis on the actual volume of Polk’s speech, however, is only a diversion from the consequential issue.
(Dissent at 40). To the contrary, because it has been determined by the trial court that Corporal Sperl’s orders were directed at the volume of Ms. Polk’s voice, her volume is not a diversion, but is rather the consequential issue.
The second factor in the Eanes analysis requires an examination of both the time and place of the speech and the overhearing parties’ location. Eanes, 318 Md. at 455-56, 569 A.2d at 613. The physical circumstances surrounding an outburst influence the legality of a restriction on speech. In Eanes, we emphasized that because “the character of open public places may differ widely, one from another, only a *19flexible approach to volume control can adequately serve the myriad circumstances which the state can legitimately regulate.” 318 Md. at 454, 569 A.2d at 613. The restriction on speech in Eanes was permissible under the First Amendment because Eanes’s speech took place in a residential area, affecting a “captive audience,” who we defined as “unwilling listener[s] or viewer[s] who cannot readily escape from the undesired communication, or whose rights are such that [they] should not be required to do so.” Eanes, 318 Md. at 451, 569 A.2d at 611.
Eanes did not limit its holding to residential areas. Significantly, we noted that “[protection from unwanted speech] may be extended to any situation in which privacy interests [are] substantially threatened because individuals cannot escape bombardment of [their] sensibilities.” Eanes, 318 Md. at 452-53, 569 A.2d at 612 (alterations in original) (citations omitted). Hospitals and their immediate environs, in particular, share with residential areas a similarly heightened need for protection. As we pointed out in Eanes, “[a] sound level that a pedestrian on the sidewalk could not constitutionally object to might be impermissible with respect to a patient in an intensive care ward.” 318 Md. at 456, 569 A.2d at 613.
Similarly, in Radford v. State, 640 N.E.2d 90, 93 (Ind.Ct.App.1994), the Court of Appeals of Indiana recognized the compelling state interest in protecting its citizens from unwelcome disturbances at a hospital. The Radford court initially overturned Radford’s conviction for disorderly conduct for refusing to obey an officer’s lawful order to quiet down. Radford v. State, 627 N.E.2d 1331 (Ind.Ct.App.1994). The court then reversed itself, on rehearing, quoting from the original dissent:
Radford’s abusive and harmful speech invaded the privacy of those patients in the hospital and destroyed their right to a quiet and peaceful environment. Patients with heart conditions and patients with nervous disorders, among others, come to the hospital expecting quietude. The intrusiveness, harm, and abuse in Radford’s forum is a thousand times more sensitive than the forum [of a disorderly conduct *20case occurring in] — a residential alley at 3:00 in the morning.
Id. We agree with the reasoning of the Radford court and conclude here that Corporal Sperl had a compelling interest in maintaining peace and quiet in the environs of the Hospital.
The dissenting opinion in the present case claims Radford is “easily distinguishable” from the facts of the present case. The dissent is wrong. First, it states that while the officer in Radford never addressed the content of Radford’s speech, Corporal Sperl sought to regulate the content of Polk’s speech. (Dissent at 39). Again, this is a factual determination for which an appellate court cannot substitute its own finding for that of the trial court. As our analysis supra reveals, the trial judge’s factual findings were not clearly erroneous in this regard. Second, the dissent states that while the disruptive outburst in Radford occurred inside the hospital, Polk’s outbursts occurred near the Human Resources office and “reached its pinnacle” outside the actual hospital building. (Dissent at 39). Consequently, the dissent intimates that there is no legitimate interest in protecting hospital patients, visitors, or workers from disturbances under these circumstances. Id. In fact, Corporal Sperl initiated Polk’s arrest as she was leaving the budding, not after she exited. Furthermore, Polk’s location at the time of her arrest is irrelevant to the central question, whether she acted in a disorderly manner in and around the Hospital. The evidence shows that Polk acted in a disorderly manner while inside the Hospital, well before she was arrested. Thus, Corporal Sperl was legally entitled to arrest Polk for creating a disturbance in the Hospital, a situation identical to that in Radford.
The third prong in the Eanes test is whether there are alternative means of communication available to the speaker. In Eanes, we stated that “a speaker will usually have a number of less noisy ways of presenting his or her message: speaking at lower volume; individual contact; use of placards or leaflets. So the balance of reasonableness may rest differently depending on the circumstances.” 318 Md. at 456, 569 *21A.2d at 614. As in Eanes, Polk had other ways of expressing her discontent with the hospital and/or Corporal Sperl, such as speaking to a supervisor in Human Resources, writing a letter to the hospital stating her complaints, or speaking to Corporal Sperl’s supervisor.9
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court correctly found that Corporal Sperl’s orders were lawful under § 121(b)(3). This Court, therefore, agrees with the Court of Special Appeals that “because appellant’s challenge to her conviction for resisting arrest is based on the faulty premise that her arrest for disorderly conduct was unlawful, that challenge must fail as well.” Because the trial court’s findings of fact were not clearly erroneous, Polk’s convictions for disorderly conduct and resisting arrest are affirmed.
JUDGMENTS AFFIRMED, WITH COSTS.
. § 121(b)(3) has been recodified, without substantive change, at Md. Code (1974, 2002 Repl.Vol.), § 10-201(c)(3) of the Criminal Law Article. Throughout this opinion, we shall refer to the statute by its numeration as of the operative events of this case.
. Section 12A provides that "[a] person may not commit an assault.” Under Maryland Code, Art. 27 § 12, " 'assault' means the offenses of assault, battery, and assault and battery, which terms retain their judicially determined meanings.” Section 12A has been recodified, without substantive change, at Md.Code (1974, 2002 Repl. Vol), § 3-203 of the Criminal Law Article, and Art. 27 § 12 has been recodified without substantive change at § 3-201 of the Criminal Law Article.
. It is not clear whether Corporal Sperl, a state-commissioned special police officer employed by Peninsula Regional Medical Center, is a state actor for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment, but this issue is *9not relevant to this case. A conviction for violating § 121(b)(3) is predicated on the “law enforcement officer” issuing a “reasonable and lawful order.” An order that violates the First Amendment is no more reasonable or lawful if it is issued by a private police officer than if it is issued by a law enforcement officer employed by the State or a local governmental entity.
. It is not at all clear that, on its facts, Diehl would be decided today as it was in 1982. The Diehl majority observed that Officer Gavin "did not have any right to make his demand on Diehl” that Diehl re-enter the vehicle following the traffic stop. 294 Md. at 471, 451 A.2d at 118. In classifying Diehl’s response as protected speech, the majority’s analysis depended to a great extent on the conclusion that the officer’s conduct in ordering Diehl back into the car was "unlawful," id., constituted “police misconduct,” id., and "exceed[ed] the bounds of [the officer’s] authority,” id. at 478, 451 A.2d at 122. That this conclusion was important to the Diehl majority’s reasoning is manifest from its statement:
We conclude, therefore, that where, as here a person is acting in a lawful manner (a passenger getting out of a stopped car) and is the object of an unlawful police order, it is not usually a criminal violation for such person to verbally protest a police officer’s insistence upon submission to such an order. We hold that the State failed to make out a prima facie showing of a violation of § 121 and, therefore, the trial judge erred in not granting Diehl's motion for a judgment of acquittal at the conclusion of the State's case or at the close of all the evidence.
294 Md. at 479, 451 A.2d 122 (citation omitted).
Today there is no question as to the lawfulness vel non of an officer’s order, following a traffic stop, to the passenger of the stopped vehicle either to remain in or exit the vehicle. See, Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 117 S.Ct. 882, 137 L.Ed.2d 41 (1997) (holding that the rule of Pennsylvania v. Mimms, that while making a traffic stop a police officer constitutionally may require a motorist to get out of the car, 434 U.S. 106, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977), extends to passengers as well). For this reason, a major premise of the Diehl majority's analysis no longer is valid.
. Eanes was convicted under another version of the former § 121(b)(5) for "wilfully disturbing] any neighborhood in [Maryland] by loud and unseemly noises ...” Md.Code, Art. 27 § 121(b)(5)(iii) (1957, 1987 Repl.Vol). This version contained similar language to that version of § 121 for which Diehl had been convicted.
. In Earns, we stated that "the mechanical or electronic amplification of sound” may be another factor in the balancing test, 318 Md. at 456, 569 A.2d at 614, but noted that unamplified sound may still violate the statute: "[i]f the State is able to prove that, under the circumstances, the human voice is so unreasonably loud as to be unreasonably intrusive on a captive audience, that is enough.” 318 Md. at 456-57, 569 A.2d at 614.
. Eanes remains good law in Maryland, despite the announced views of' some of the dissenters here. See Galloway v. State, 365 Md. 599, 614 n. 10, 781 A.2d 851, 859 n. 10 (2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 990, 122 S.Ct. 1547, 152 L.Ed.2d 472 (2002).
. The dissent appears to adopt a "fruit of the poisonous tree” approach based on drawing a factual inference from some of the earlier of Corporal Sperl's orders and electing to carry over the perceived taint from that inference onto all of his orders. ("The orders required Polk to 'stop her cursing,' 'stop her profanity,' 'keep [her] mouth quiet.' The collective effect of these prohibitions embraced not only the volume of Polk's voice, but also the content of her message.”) (Dissent at 38). To adopt such an analytical model could lead to even more faulty and sweeping conclusions if applied in other cases calling for the assessment of the legal effect of a series of orders issued by law enforcement officers in similar circumstances or other dynamic situations.
. If Polk had maintained the same content of her speech, but changed the manner of its expression — if she had lowered her voice, but continued cursing — she could not have been convicted of disorderly conduct. Likewise, if she had changed the content of her expression, without changing its manner — if she had continued shouting in and about the Hospital, but without cursing — she still could have been convicted.