Cantarella v. Department of Corrections

DISSENTING OPINION BY

Judge FRIEDMAN.

I respectfully dissent. The majority agrees with the Department of Corrections (Department) that the doctrine of collateral estoppel did not preclude the Department from re-litigating issues of law and fact in this Act 6321 proceeding that already had been decided in the prior workers’ compensation proceeding. Unlike the majority, I cannot agree with the Department.

The doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, prevents the re-litigation of issues of law or fact in a subsequent action when the following factors are demonstrated: (1) the issue decided in the prior case is identical to the one presented in the later case; (2) there was a final judgment on the merits; (3) the party against whom the doctrine is asserted was a party or in privity with a party in the prior case and had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue; and (4) the determination in the prior proceeding was essential to the final judgment. Benginia v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (City of Scranton), 805 A.2d 1272 (Pa.Cmwlth.2002). When two pending actions involve the same issue, the final judgment first rendered in one of the actions becomes conclusive in the other action, regardless of which action was brought first. Restatement (Second) of Judgments 2d § 14 cmt. a (1982).

Here, Claimant filed a workers’ compensation claim and an Act 632 claim, seeking compensation for a psychic injury. In considering Claimant’s eligibility for benefits in the workers’ compensation claim proceeding, the workers’ compensation judge (WCJ) needed to determine whether Lynda Cantarella (Claimant) sustained a work-related injury in the course of her employment.2 Because Claimant alleged that she sustained a psychic injury, the WCJ also needed to determine whether Claimant proved by objective evidence that her injury is other than a subjective reaction to normal working conditions. See Martin v. Ketchum, Inc., 523 Pa. 509, 568 A.2d 159 (1990). On May 16, 2002, the WCJ decided that it is abnormal for a food service instructor to be touched on the buttocks by an inmate and awarded benefits.3

*876In considering Claimant’s right to Act 632 benefits, the Department needed to determine whether Claimant sustained a work-related injury in the course of her employment by the act of an inmate.4 An Act 632 claimant who alleges a psychic injury must prove by objective evidence that the injury is not just a subjective reaction to normal working conditions. See City of Pittsburgh v. Logan, 570 Pa. 500, 810 A.2d 1185 (2002); Roman v. Department of Corrections, 808 A.2d 304 (Pa.Cmwlth.2002). Thus, the Department needed to determine whether it is abnormal for a food service instructor to be touched on the buttocks by an inmate. Clearly, this issue is identical to the issue which the WCJ already had decided in Claimant’s workers’ compensation proceeding.5

Because the abnormal working conditions issue before the WCJ was identical to the abnormal working conditions issue before the Department, because there was a final judgment on the merits of this issue by the WCJ, because the parties in the two proceedings were identical and had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue, and because the determination was essential to the final judgment in the workers’ compensation proceeding, the Department was estopped from relitigating the abnormal working conditions issue in the Act 632 proceeding. Benginia.

Accordingly, I would reverse.

. Act 632 provides that any employee of a state correctional institution who is injured during the course of employment by an act of any inmate shall be paid by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania his or her full salary until the disability no longer prevents his or her return as an employee of the institution at a salary equal to that earned at the time of the injury. Section 1 of the Act of December 8, 1959, P.L. 1718, as amended, 61 P.S. § 951.

. See Sections 301(a) and 301(c) of the Workers’ Compensation Act, Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P.S. §§ 411, 431.

.The WCJ decided the abnormal working conditions issue as follows:

[C]laimant's testimony that she was sexually assaulted remains unchallenged. The sexual assault is, per se, an abnormal working condition. Even if that were not true, the evidence shows that this is [the only] such assault in 25 years on an individual holding [Claimant's position as a food service instructor. That fact is sufficient to establish that this assault is an abnormal working condition. The evidence also establishes that [Cjlaimant did not directly violate a work rule [by being alone with the inmate]. The defendant’s own witness ac*876knowledged that he acquiesced to the meeting between the [C]laimant and the patient/inmate and at no time did he instruct her not to meet with the patient/inmate. In fact, the employer’s witness, Mr. McDonnell, confirmed that such meetings were a part of a food service instructor's job.

(WCJ's op. at 2, Claimant’s brief, Attachment B.)

. 61 P.S. § 951. The majority states that the issue in an Act 632 proceeding is different from the issue in a workers’ compensation proceeding because, under Act 632, the Department must determine whether the injury is caused by the act of an inmate. (Majority op. at 7 n.8.) Although that is the ultimate issue in any Act 632 case, a sub-issue here, where Claimant alleges a psychic injury, is whether it is abnormal for a food service instructor to be touched on the buttocks by an inmate. That issue was decided in the workers’ compensation proceeding.

. In concluding otherwise, the Department stated that an Act 632 abnormal working conditions issue is not identical to a workers' compensation abnormal working conditions issue because a WCJ does not consider that Act 632 employees assume certain risks in taking dangerous jobs. (Hearing Examiner’s op. at 16-17.) The Department is incorrect. In determining whether abnormal working conditions exist in a workers' compensation case, the WCJ must consider the working conditions in the context of the claimant’s specific employment. Heath v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board (Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole), 811 A.2d 90 (Pa.Cmwlth.2002), appeal granted, 573 Pa. 700, 825 A.2d 1263 (2003). Thus, in a proceeding involving an Act 632 employee, a WCJ does consider the fact that the Act 632 employee has taken a job that involves certain risks.

The Department also concluded that, because the workers’ compensation decision had been appealed, collateral estoppel does not apply in this case. However, this is contrary to this court’s holding in Yonkers v. Donora Borough, 702 A.2d 618 (Pa.Cmwlth.1997) (stating that a pending appeal does not destroy the finality of a decision for purposes of collateral estoppel), and the Department concedes as much in its brief. (See Department's brief at 12 n.1.)