¶ 1 Joyce Stephen appeals the order denying her petition to strike judgment. We affirm.
¶ 2 On August 20, 1993, Triangle Printing Company filed a district justice complaint seeking payment for printing services, naming “Image Quest (Joyce Stephen)” as defendant. Trial was set for September 14, 1993. Neither party appeared and the district justice entered a default judgment. On December 13, 1993, the district justice certified the record and the transcript became the basis for entry of judgment in the prothonotary’s office of the common pleas court, where the judgment was indexed and entered against Joyce Stephen and Image Quest. Notice of the judgment was sent to Stephen on February 10, 1994.
¶ 3 On February 23, 1998, Stephen filed a petition to strike/open judgment, alleging she never received notice of the judgment from the district justice, and that the prothonotary was therefore without authority to enter judgment against her. She asserted she only became aware of the judgment when conducting a title search to sell her home. The trial court denied her petition. This appeal followed, wherein Stephen raises four questions for our consideration:
1. Is there a defect in the record when a judgment has been entered on the basis of a District Justice transcript that fails to confirm compliance with Pa.P.D.J. 324; more specifically, fails to disclose that notice of entry of the judgment was ever given to the defendant?
2. Is a judgment entered at the Court of Common Pleas without record compliance with notice requirements of Rule 324 void, making the passage of time between entry and challenge an irrelevant consideration?
3. Is the distinction between a void and voidable judgment less significant when the challenging party is the defendant, as opposed to a third party?
4. When the propriety of a judgment is otherwise doubtful, should the doubt be resolved in favor of striking when the individual defendant was not clearly identified as a defendant against whom judgment was entered (on the District Justice form)?
¶ 4 Our standard of review is clear. A petition to strike a default judgment operates as a demurrer to the record and may be granted only for a fatal defect or irregularity appearing on the face of the record. Cintas Corp. v. Lee’s Cleaning Servs., 549 Pa. 84, 700 A.2d 915, 917, 919 (1997). “A court may only look at the facts of record at the time judgment was entered to decide if the record supports the judgment.” Id., at 919. A petition to strike does not involve the discretion of the court. Id., at 918.
¶ 5 Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure (District Justice) 324 reads as follows:
The district justice shall promptly give or mail to the parties written notice of *1000judgment, dismissal or continuance. The notice shall be given to all parties, but if any party has an attorney of record named in the complaint form, the written notice shall be given to the attorney of record instead of to the party. Notice of judgment shall contain advice as to the right of the parties to appeal, the time within which the appeal must be taken, and that the appeal is to the court of common pleas. ■
Pa.R.C.P.D.J. 324. Stephen argues the district justice’s failure to indicate on the transcript that Rule 324 notice was given constitutes a fatal defect on the record, requiring the striking of the judgment entered by the common pleas prothonotary. We disagree.
¶ 6 The trial court’s reasoning of Stephen’s central complaint states:
First, [Stephen] complains that the judgment is defective on its face because the District Justice’s civil complaint form does not reflect that notice was given. The court agrees that there is no notation on the form indicating whether or not the District Justice actually sent out the notice as required. However, the District Justice did state that thirty days had passed since the date of judgment, and that no appeal had been taken. In addition, there is no requirement in Rule 324 that the District Justice complete all blanks on the civil complaint form.
Trial Court Opinion, 5/21/98, at 2.
¶ 7 The question before us is not whether there was notice from the district justice; the question is whether the pro-thonotary can enter judgment on a transcript, that does not contain on its face a date when notice of judgment was given. That is, the issues raised all turn on the facial contents of the transcript, not the question of whether the district justice actually gave notice.
¶ 8 There is no procedural rule requiring such an entry. The Rules require service, to be sure, but no rule requires service to be memorialized on the transcript. District Justice Rule 402D sets forth the procedure for a judgment to be entered in the county office; filing shall be of a certified “copy of the record of the proceedings containing the judgment,” namely, the transcript. The Rule does not prescribe what “proceedings” need be on that transcript, beyond the entry of judgment and the passage of 30 days; specifically, it does not require the copy of the record to include anything about compliance with Rule 324. As the only requirements of the Rule are present, there is no violation of the Rule, and no defect or irregularity appears on the face of the district justice transcript sufficient to preclude entry of judgment.
¶ 9 The transcript is a form with many blanks, intended to facilitate recordation of events relevant to most civil suits before the district justice. While it may be provided by the court system, the transcript form is not a Rule. Its contents are not prescribed by Rule. The existence of a space to memorialize the date of service may be helpful, but nothing demands its completion on pain of invalidating the clear authorization set forth in Rule 402D. If the rest of the form is sufficient to meet the requirements of the Rule, the prothonota-ry may enter judgment.
¶ 10 The prothonotary entered judgment on a proper transcript, sufficient under the Rules, and provided notice to Stephen pursuant to Rule 236. There being no fatal defect on the face of the record, the trial court properly denied Stephen’s petition to strike.
¶ 11 Order affirmed.
¶ 12 OLSZEWSKI, J., files a dissenting opinion.