State v. Cosby

Johnson, J.,

dissenting: I respectfully dissent on the hearsay *138issue. I would find that the law enforcement officer should have been permitted to testify that Cosby had asked the officer, “Did you find the gun on him?”

Citing to State v. Harris, 259 Kan. 689, 698, 915 P.2d 758 (1996), the majority acknowledges that a statement which is offered merely to demonstrate that it was made is not hearsay and, “[i]f relevant, such a statement is admissible through the person who heard it.” State v. Cosby, slip op. at 9; see also Boldridge v. State, 289 Kan. 618, 635, 215 P.3d 585 (2009) (not hearsay if “attempting ‘not to prove the truth of the matter asserted, but merely to show that the statements were said,’ as well as ‘the defendant’s state of mind’ ”). Recently, in Boldridge, we noted that this court has identified at least three types of out-of-court statements that do not constitute hearsay under K.S.A. 60-460, with one type being “ ‘those statements used circumstantially as giving rise to an indirect inference but not as an assertion to prove the matter asserted.’ ” 289 Kan. at 634 (quoting Harris, 259 Kan. at 699).

In my view, it is obvious that the principal reason that Cosby wanted the “statement” admitted was to show the jury that he had made it. Moreover, the statement was relevant (and thus admissible through the officer that heard it) because it was circumstantial evidence that Cosby believed Martin possessed a gun when Cosby shot him. The jury could draw an indirect inference from the statement that Cosby had a subjective basis for self-defense or defense of another. Moreover, in order for the “statement” to fulfill its inferential purpose, the jury did not have to believe in the truth of any aspect of the words spoken. It mattered not a whit whether the police actually found a gun on Martin or even whether Martin ever possessed a gun. What mattered is that Cosby asked about a gun.

Accordingly, I would find that the district court erred in refusing to admit the law enforcement officer’s testimony that Cosby asked him whether police had found a gun on the victim. In Boldridge, we found that the exclusion of admissible nonhearsay statements was not harmless error because it had significantly hindered the defendant’s ability to present her claim. 289 Kan. at 636. Similarly, the exclusion of Cosby’s query to law enforcement significantly *139hindered his ability to present a self-defense claim and to obtain the lesser included offense instruction discussed by the majority. Accordingly, I would grant Cosby a new trial.

Luckert, J., joins in the foregoing dissent.