Majority: SAUFLEY, C.J., and CLIFFORD, DANA, ALEXANDER, CALKINS, and LEVY, JJ.
Concurrence: LEVY, J.
Dissent: SILVER, J.
SAUFLEY, C.J.[¶ 1] Loi Ngo appeals from a judgment entered in the District Court (Portland, Beaudoin, J.) dismissing his motion, filed pursuant to M.R.Crim. P. 1(c), to vacate convictions for sexual abuse of a minor and criminal threatening. See 17-A M.R.S. *1225§ 209 (2005); 17-A M.R.S.A. § 254 (1998).1 Ngo argues that the District Court improperly determined that it lacked jurisdiction to decide his motion, and that in his case, the post-conviction review statutes are unconstitutional as applied. Because we agree that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to decide Ngo’s motion, we affirm the judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
[¶ 2] Ngo is a citizen of Vietnam and has been a resident of the United States since 1992. On February 3, 1998, while Ngo was represented by counsel, he pleaded guilty in the District Court to sexual abuse of a minor and the criminal threatening of a woman who, at the time, was his wife. The court sentenced Ngo to two consecutive terms of 364 days in jail and one year of probation, with the entire term suspended on the count for criminal threatening and all but ninety days suspended on the count for sexual abuse of a minor. Ngo apparently served his sentence without incident, and his probation was terminated early at the request of his probation officer on August 25, 1999. Several years later, in April of 2006, federal immigration officials took Ngo into custody after determining that he could be deported based on his criminal convictions.2 Ngo is now being held in custody, allegedly awaiting deportation.
[¶ 3] Ngo filed a motion to vacate his convictions in the District Court on June 12, 2006, pursuant to M.R.Crim. P. 1(c), which allows for a flexible process in criminal matters when the Rules of Criminal Procedure do not otherwise provide a specific procedure. Ngo argued that his conviction was obtained unconstitutionally because, in 1998, he was deprived of adequate assistance of counsel when his court-appointed attorney failed to alert him to the immigration consequences of a guilty plea.3 See Aldus v. State, 2000 ME 47, ¶¶ 18-21, 748 A.2d 463, 469-72; M.R.Crim. P. 11(h). Ngo argued that he “[did] not appear to be eligible” for the post-conviction review process in the Superior Court under 15 M.R.S. § 2124 (2005) because he was not under any restraint or impediment as required by the statute, and therefore Rule 1(c) was his sole remedy. The District Court dismissed the motion, reasoning that the Superior Court holds exclusive jurisdiction over post-conviction review and it, rather than the District Court, should determine whether that process is available. Ngo then filed his appeal.
II. DISCUSSION
[¶ 4] When the legality of a criminal conviction cannot be resolved by direct appeal or any “remedies that are incidental to proceedings in the trial court,” the post-conviction review process is the exclusive means for judicial review. 15 M.R.S. § 2122 (2005); see also State v. Trott, 2004 ME 15, ¶ 8, 841 A.2d 789, 791. Jurisdiction over the post conviction review process rests exclusively in the Superior Court. 15 M.R.S. § 2123(1) (2005); Trott, 2004 ME 15, ¶ 13, 841 A.2d at 793.
*1226[¶ 5] Ngo has not filed a post-conviction petition to have the Superior Court undertake a review of his challenge to the 1998 convictions. Instead, he relies on M.R.Crim. P. 1(c). Rule 1(c) provides that: “When no procedure is specifically prescribed the court shall proceed in any lawful manner not inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States or of the State of Maine, these rules or any applicable statutes.” M.R.Crim. P. 1(c).
[¶ 6] We have made it clear, however, that Rule 1(c) does not give the court the authority to act where a procedure or remedy has been specified by rule or statute. The fact that a party has not availed himself of the specified rule or statute in a proper and timely manner, or anticipates that the procedure may not provide complete relief or would be unconstitutional as applied, does not change the fact that a procedure has been made available. Cf. State v. Johnson, 2006 ME 35, ¶ 14, 894 A.2d 489, 492-93 (holding that Rule 1(c) cannot be used to correct an illegal sentence after the expiration of the remedy provided in M.R.Crim. P. 35, which allows for the correction of such a sentence within one year of imposition). Ngo’s motion under Rule 1(c), which seeks the relief that the post-conviction review process is intended to provide, cannot circumvent that process or defeat the procedural requirement that post-conviction review take place in the Superior Court. Cf. State v. Liberty, 2004 ME 88, ¶ 8, 853 A.2d 760, 762 (refusing to treat as a petition for post-conviction review an improper motion challenging a conviction in the District Court pursuant to M.R.Crim. P. 12(b)(2), which allows a defendant to object during a pending proceeding to a complaint that fails to charge an offense, because the motion was not filed in the Superior Court). Because Rule 1(c) does not provide a remedy to substitute for Ngo’s failure to challenge his conviction through the post-conviction process, we must affirm the District Court’s dismissal of his motion.
[¶ 7] Ngo argues to us that the post-conviction statutes are unconstitutional and violate his right to due process of law because they do not afford a remedy from an illegal conviction to someone who has served a sentence, but they do allow a person who refuses to pay a fine to challenge a conviction. See 15 M.R.S. § 2124(1)(E) (2005) (providing that an unpaid fine is a “present restraint” subject to post-conviction review). Ngo did not present his constitutional challenge to the District Court and, therefore, has failed to preserve it.4
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
. Title 17-A M.R.S.A. § 254 has since been amended. See P.L.2003, ch. 138, §§ 2 to 4 (effective Sept. 13, 2003) (codified at 17-A M.R.S. § 254 (2005)).
. Ngo alleges that the Department of Homeland Security became aware of his convictions when he applied for naturalization in 2005.
.Ngo does not argue that he was not guilty of the charges, but only that he would have negotiated differently with the District Attorney’s office had he been aware of the immigration consequences of the convictions.
. We do not suggest that Ngo’s failure to present his constitutional challenge in the context of his Rule 1(c) motion forecloses him from making the challenge in a post-conviction proceeding or other context.