OPINION
WEISBERGER, Chief Justice.This case came before a hearing panel of this court for oral argument on April 18, 1995, pursuant to an order that had directed all parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised by this petition for certiorari should not be summarily decided. After hearing the arguments of counsel and examining the memoranda filed by the parties, this court concluded that cause had not been shown and issued an order summarily deciding the issues raised by the petition with the indication that an opinion would follow setting forth the reasons for said order.
In that order we granted the petition for certiorari, quashed the decision of the State Board of Elections, and affirmed an earlier decision of the Jamestown Board of Canvassers that accepted nominations for town offices filed by the Democrat State Committee. The facts of the case insofar as pertinent to this petition for certiorari are as follows.
The town of Jamestown scheduled a general election for said town to be conducted on May 3, 1995. The election was to include members of the town council, members of the school committee, and the town moderator. Instructions were given by the board of canvassers that the deadline for nomination papers would be March 6, 1995 at 4 p.m.1 It is *731undisputed that the Democrat Party candidates did not meet the required deadline although the Republican Party candidates and an independent candidate did meet this deadline.
At a meeting of the board of canvassers which was held March 13, 1995, the board refused to certify the Democrat candidates but did accept a slate of Democrats for all positions that had been designated by the Democrat State Committee and signed by the chairman of the Democrat State Committee. This slate named each of the original Democrat candidates for the position sought in the townwide election. The board of canvassers accepted this slate on the same date and certified the list to the Secretary of State.
On March 17, 1995, the chairperson of the Republican Town Committee for the Town of Jamestown appealed to the State Board of Elections, challenging the decision of the board of canvassers. On Friday, March 24, 1995, the State Board of Elections in a “bench decision” held that the Jamestown Board of Canvassers had erred and instructed the Secretary of State to omit the names of the candidates of the Democrat Party from the election ballot. This had the effect of leaving only the Republican candidates and one independent candidate to be set forth on the ballot on election day.
From this decision of the board of elections, petitioners, all of whom were candidates for town offices from the Democrat Party, petitioned for review by certiorari. This court issued its writ and instructed all parties to appear for oral argument on April 18, 1995. Our order followed, and this opinion sets forth the reasons for said order.
The petitioners contend that clear authority is contained in G.L.1956 (1988 Reenactment) § 17-12-2 for the state committee to make a final nomination for any local office for which no nomination has been made. This statute reads as follows:
“Composition and powers of state committees. — The state committee of a political party shall be composed as determined by the party. It shall have (1) general oversight of all conventions of its party; (2) power to make rules not inconsistent with law for the guidance and control of all the political committees of its party; (3) power to make a final nomination for any state office for which no primary nomination has been made and any local office for which no nomination has been made by any authorized city, town, ward, or district committee or any duly authorized subcommittee; and (4) power to fill vacancies in its own membership and as provided in chapter 15 of this title.” (Emphasis added.)
Our reading of subsection (3) of § 17-12-2 clearly indicates to us that the state committee is granted the power that it purported to exercise in this instance. It is well-settled doctrine that when a statute is unambiguous and expresses a clear and sensible meaning, the work of construction is at an end and this meaning will be implemented in accordance with the plain language set forth. See, e.g., State v. Powers, 644 A.2d 828, 830 (R.I.1994); Kirby v. Planning Board of Review of Middletown, 634 A.2d 285, 290 (R.I.1993); Ellis v. Rhode Island Public Transit Authority, 586 A.2d 1055, 1057 (R.I.1991); O’Neil v. Code Commission for Occupational Safety and Health, 534 A.2d 606, 608 (R.I.1987); Moore v. Rhode Island Share and Deposit Indemnity Corp., 495 A.2d 1003, 1004 (R.I.1985). In the case at bar, the authority given to the state committee to make a final nomination for any local office for which no nomination has been made by any authorized city, town, ward, or district committee, or any duly authorized subcommittee, could not be more plain and unambiguous.
Nevertheless, the board of elections seemed to place emphasis upon the repeal of a prior statute that had also purported to give state committees the power to fill vacancies. That statute was G.L.1956 (1981 Reenactment) § 17-14-17.1, as amended by P.L. 1983, ch. 243, § 1, § 12, which was repealed by P.L.1987, ch. 389, § 7. The repeal of this statute became effective in 1988. There is no question that the repealed statute contained *732comprehensive directions for the filling of vacancies among candidates in respect to both general and special elections. However, the repeal of this statute did not affect the vitality or validity of § 17-12-2.
It is not possible for this court to determine the intent of the General Assembly in repealing one statutory provision that allowed for the filling of vacancies among candidates by the state committee and at the same time allowing another statute with similar effect to remain intact.2
The principal concern of this court is not the candidates who have missed a critical date in the nomination process but the voters of the town of Jamestown who should if at all possible have a choice among candidates endorsed by the major political parties. Any attempt to disenfranchise those voters of the town who might prefer the adherents of one particular major party over those of another would require the clearest and most specific of expression of intent on the part of the Legislature. It should also be noted that any such intentional disenfranchisement would raise serious constitutional issues and might well be subject to strict judicial scrutiny.3
In any event the plain language of § 17-12-2(3) precludes the necessity for our construing any such intent on the part of the General Assembly. We shall not reach a constitutional issue unless and until it is absolutely necessary to do so.
The petitioners have raised questions concerning the standing of the members of the Republican Town Committee to challenge the decision of the Jamestown Board of Canvassers. It is disputed concerning whether some of the respondents may have appealed from the board of canvassers in their capacity as voters as opposed to their capacity as members of the Republican Town Committee. We shall assume, without deciding, that they did have standing to invoke the jurisdiction of the board of elections.
For the reasons stated, the petition for certiorari was granted in our order dated April 20, 1995. The decision of the board of elections was quashed, and the decision of the Jamestown Board of Canvassers accepting nominations for town offices filed by the Democrat State Committee was affirmed.
The papers in this ease may be remanded to the State Board of Elections with our decision endorsed thereon.
SHEA and BOURCIER, JJ., did not participate.. Attorneys for petitioners challenge the correctness of this date, but in light of our disposition of the issues in respect to the petition, we shall *731assume without deciding that the board of canvassers selected the correct date.
. Our colleague, Justice Lederberg, quotes from a special legislative commission report that explains the reasons for the repeal of G.L.1956 (1981 Reenactment) § 17-14-17.1, as amended by P.L.1983, ch. 243, § 1. The report does not explain the reason for leaving G.L.1956 (1988 Reenactment) § 17-12-2 in full force and effect. The commission reports that candidates should genuinely intend to be candidates and that filings and withdrawals which amount to political games and serve no public purpose should be discouraged. Certainly in the case at bar the candidates were sincere and serious. The fact that they missed a filing deadline by one day was surely due to inadvertence and not in any way to bad faith or lack of sincerity.
In any event, we have relied upon the clear language of § 17-12-2(3). The General Assembly did not repeal this statute. Our colleague suggests that the State Board of Elections may have regarded this statute as having been repealed by implication and that no vacancy should be filled save in accordance with G.L. 1956 (1988 Reenactment) § 17-15-38, as amended by P.L.1991, ch. 173, § 1. Repeal by Implication is disfavored by the law and is not lightly to be construed. See, e.g., Blanchette v. Stone, 591 A.2d 785, 786-87 (R.I.1991); State ex rel. Thompson v. DeNardo, 448 A.2d 739, 740 (R.I.1982) (citing Berthiaume v. School Committee of Woonsocket, 121 R.I. 243, 248, 397 A.2d 889, 893 (1979)). It is undisputed that regardless of the opinion of the commission, the General Assembly in the exercise of its plenary power did not repeal § 17-12-2.
. Our colleague is unimpressed with the concept of disenfranchisement of voters who may desire to vote for members of a major political party. Without denigrating the role of independent candidates, it is nevertheless of significant importance that the adherents of major political parties be given an opportunity to select candidates of their choice. The right to refrain from voting at all or to write in the name of a candidate is scarcely a substitute for the ability to select such a candidate whose name has been placed upon the ballot.