Dissenting Opinion by
Justice MOSELEY.This case presents us with a circumstance in which a trial judge, in an effort to protect a defendant from any influence from a possibly tainted juror, dismissed (albeit erroneously) a seated juror after a trial had been commenced. The trial court then declared a mistrial. When the case *910was again set for trial, the defendant filed a pretrial application for writ of habeas corpus, alleging that to proceed once again to trial would violate his protections against being subject to double jeopardy pursuant to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and similar protection afforded in Article I, Section 14 of the Texas Constitution. See U.S. Const, art. 1, § 14.
The similarities between this case and Ex parte Fierro, 79 S.W.3d 54 (Tex.Crim.App.2002), are striking. In both this case and in Fierro, after a trial had been commenced, a juror who had been seated was discovered to have potential conflicts and was disqualified sua sponte by the trial court; in fact, in each case, there was no statutory disqualification of the juror which actually did apply. In each of these cases, it is quite likely that on voir dire, a challenge for cause would have been granted to exclude the juror. In both cases, the defendant’s case was then called for trial again and in both circumstances, the defendant has attempted to interpose a claim of double jeopardy.
However, one should also examine the dissimilarities. In Fierro, the disadvantage posed by having the disqualified juror remain seated would presumably have been the State’s and not the defendant’s; here, the damage would have certainly been to Hunter. In Fierro, although there is no mention in the opinion that the defendant lodged a formal objection to the dismissal of the juror, it is noted specifically that “the juror was acceptable to the defense”; quite understandably, Hunter made no objection to the dismissal of the juror and made no representation to the trial court that the juror was acceptable.11 Most importantly, the trial court in Fierro did not examine alternatives to the declaration of a mistrial; here, the trial court specifically sought the acquiescence of Hunter and the State to proceed with only eleven jurors, an alternative to mistrial which Hunter refused.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals indicated in Fierro that “[t]here is nothing in the record to demonstrate that the trial court considered any less drastic alternatives, as is required by Brown. One less drastic alternative would have been allowing that juror to serve on the jury.” Fierro, 79 S.W.3d at 57. Later, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals went further to explain that
[t]he judge is required to consider and rule out “less drastic alternatives” before granting a mistrial. The judge must review the alternatives and choose the one which best preserves the defendant’s “right to have his trial completed before a particular tribunal.” The judge need not expressly state his reasons in the record as long as the basis for his ruling is adequately disclosed by the record. When a trial judge grants a mistrial despite the availability of a less drastic alternative, there is no manifest necessity and he abuses his discretion.
Hill v. State, 90 S.W.3d 308, 313 (Tex.Crim.App.2002). Although the trial court *911here did not entertain the idea, of proceeding to trial with the apparently tainted juror,12 it did consider and propose a less drastic alternative to mistrial, an alternative which would have required the consent of both Hunter and the State. When Hunter objected to this alternative, there was not then another option known to or available to the trial court. Accordingly, quite extraordinary circumstances existed and there was a “manifest necessity” that a mistrial be declared. Ex parte Little, 887 S.W.2d 62, 65 (Tex.Crim.App.1994).
Granted, as the majority has very accurately explained, the trial court’s sua sponte dismissal of the juror was error. Since the juror was not patently disqualified by statute or rule from serving on the jury, the procedure to have been followed would have been to call this problem to the attention of both counsel, determine (if necessary) whether the juror’s grand jury service on Hunter’s matter would prejudice the juror sufficiently to warrant the juror’s dismissal, and then act accordingly. However, that error — standing alone — was not necessarily fatal, though it eventually led to the chain of events which precipitated the manifest necessity of the declaration of a mistrial.
With the circumstances at hand, one could likely presume that the trial court would have reasonably determined that proposing an agreement for the continuation of a trial with such a tainted juror would have been an exercise in futility; although no record was made of the discourse between the juror and the court to document the impact of prejudice on the juror, the practical effect could have been devastating to the object of conducting a fair trial. Under the circumstances, there is no evidence that the trial court did not consider the possibility of proceeding to trial with that juror and, considering the type of taint the juror had explained and the certain and reasonable reservations any competent defense attorney would voice, believed that posing such a proposal to Hunter would have been fruitless. Plainly, the actions of the trial court in dismissing the juror were motivated by a good-faith effort to protect Hunter’s right to an impartial jury and a fair trial. Hunter benefited from it. Had the trial court proceeded to trial with the tainted juror over the objection of Hunter and the trial resulted in a conviction, Hunter would probably be promptly before this Court arguing a perhaps strong case for reversal.
As the record before us reveals, the trial court did make the analysis it was required to perform in exploring the only alternative to mistrial: proceed with eleven jurors. When the defendant refused to accede to a jury of less than twelve, the sole option to mistrial was foreclosed. Unable to proceed further, mistrial was dictated by manifest necessity.
Looking at the fact that the motivation of the trial court in having dismissed the juror was obviously for the purpose of protecting Hunter’s rights and taking into account that he, indeed, explored the alternatives to the drastic remedy of mistrial, these two factors distinguish this case from Fierro.
The majority has a good, reasoned, comprehensive, and well-drafted opinion. However, I maintain that the interests of justice dictate a very narrow application of the precedent established by Fienro. When one places a narrow application of Fierro, it is not a precedent; it can be distinguished.
*912In a totally different context, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has recently repeated the maxim that “[t]he Constitution gives the defendant the right to a fair trial, not a perfect one.” Davis v. State, 208 S.W.3d 845, 849 (Tex.Crim.App.2006). The actions of the trial court to assure that Hunter was afforded a fair trial did not precipitate an injustice.
I would deny Hunter’s plea.
. Hunter, for the first time on appeal, indicates that he would, perhaps; have been willing to proceed to trial with the juror who had been disqualified by the trial court, an incredible proposition. When one considers that a grand juror hears a one-sided presentation of evidence (which does not necessarily meet the requirements of the Texas Rules of Evidence), almost any competent trial counsel representing Hunter would, of necessity, use every means possible to exclude such a potential juror from the panel. One imagines that a face-to-face representation by a defense counsel that he would have acquiesced to continuing with such a juror would almost necessarily be accompanied with an obvious wink and a broad smile or with eyes turned toward the ceiling and two fingers crossed behind the back.
. The record does not definitively state whether the questionable juror was still in attendance or not; the trial court said, “Let the record reflect that we’re outside the presence of the jury. At this time, the Court has determined that one of the jurors that is seated during this case was on the grand jury that originally indicted Mr. Hunter....”