dissenting.
In Commonwealth ex rel. Specter v. Freed, 424 Pa. 508, 228 A.2d 382 (1967), six of the seven Justices agreed that the court of common pleas could not enforce an order to compel testimony for a district attorney investigation. Mr. Justice Roberts, speaking for himself and two of the Justices, concluded that the district attorney’s power to obtain the production of witnesses was “by court issued subpoenas, at preliminary hearings, grand jury proceedings and trials” (424 Pa. at 519, 228 A.2d at 387). Mr. Justice Cohen stated quite positively: “I concur with the majority’s decision that the District Attorney of Philadelphia does not possess the power to issue subpoenas” (424 Pa. at 519, 228 A.2d at 388). Mr. Justice Musmanno, using some of his more moderate language, concluded: “What the district attorney is arguing for, in effect, is that we allow him to make himself a one-man grand jury. Obviously this is constitutionally impossible.” (424 Pa. at 525, 228 A.2d at 390). There were alternative bases for the conclusion reached by the court, i. e., whether the district attorney of Philadelphia should be viewed as a state official or as a municipal official. On either basis the answer was the same — the district attorney does not have the power to subpoena for general investigative purposes and the court may not enforce any such alleged power.
In disregard of this lack of power the court below acted on a petition filed by the district attorney that merely alleged a police shooting and made no reference to a case or contro*72versy. The petition prayed for a finding that the pleading of the Fifth Amendment by police officers would be improper and prayed for an order to police officers to answer questions, concerning the shooting, as put to them by the district attorney. After an argument and briefs of counsel the court below ordered and decreed that the district attorney can subpoena the officers.
The order and decree was not final nor appealable. Counsel for the policemen seek in this Court a writ of prohibition on the ground that the court below lacked power or abused its discretion in sustaining the assertion of power by the district attorney.
The ancient history of the writ of prohibition and its modern purpose are well described in Carpentertown Coal & Coke Co. v. Laird, 360 Pa. 94, 97-98, 61 A.2d 426, 428 (1948), as follows:
“Prohibition is a common law writ of extremely ancient origin, — so ancient, indeed, that several forms for its use are set forth in Glanville, the earliest known treatise on English law (1187); in the following century it was recognized by Bracton as an established part of the common law. Being a prerogative writ of the king it was originally employed exclusively by the Court of King’s Bench, but subsequently issued out of the Courts of Chancery, Common Pleas and Exchequer as well. Its principal purpose is to prevent an inferior judicial tribunal from assuming a jurisdiction with which it is not legally vested in cases where damage and injustice would otherwise be likely to follow from such action. It does not seek relief from any alleged wrong threatened by an adverse party; indeed it is not a proceeding between private litigants at all but • solely between two courts, a superior and an inferior, being the means by which the former exercises superintendence over the latter and keeps it within the limits of its rightful powers and jurisdiction.”
Blackstone, in his Commentaries, Book III, Ch. 7, p. 112, described the writ in terms of keeping a court within its proper bounds:
*73“A writ issuing properly out of the court of king’s bench, being the king’s prerogative writ . . . directed to the judge and parties of a suit in any inferior court, commanding them to cease from the prosecution thereof, upon a suggestion that either the cause originally, or some collateral matter arising therein, did not belong to that jurisdiction . . ..”
The vital importance of the writ for the due administration of justice is emphasized in Schlesinger Petition, 367 Pa. 476, 483, 81 A.2d 316, 319 (1951), as follows:
“That this Court has power to issue a writ of prohibition under the circumstances here present cannot be questioned seriously: Carpentertown Coal & Coke Co. v. Laird, 360 Pa. 94, 61 A.2d 426. ‘Such a writ is proper not only wherever a court acts outside of its jurisdiction but also when there is an abuse of jurisdiction. As stated in High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies (2d ed.) 604, “The object of the writ being to restrain subordinate judicial tribunals of every kind from exceeding their jurisdiction, its use in all proper cases should be upheld and encouraged, since it is of vital importance to the due administration of justice, that every tribunal vested with judicial functions should be confined strictly to the exercise of those powers with which it has been by law entrusted” ’; McNair’s Petition, 324 Pa. 48, 64, 187 A. 498. See also Commonwealth v. Mellon Nat. Bk. & Tr. Co., 360 Pa. 103, 61 A.2d 430.”
It is important to keep in mind that the specific issue here involved is the jurisdiction of a trial court to enter an order or decree relating to testimony concerning a matter which is not before it directly or indirectly, other than as a bare petition to get the testimony. There is no statutory provision or any common law basis for litigation of the bare issue, disassociated from an actual case or legal controversy, of whether a person can be compelled to testify. Courts have inherent and statutory powers as to controversies and litigation and, in addition, have been given statutory jurisdiction to enforce investigative powers of diverse agencies. In this instance, however, we have the acknowledged lack of statu*74tory or inherent power in the district attorney and, by reason thereof, a lack of jurisdiction in the court to confer such a power on the district attorney.
Although the case conceivably might be heard on a subsequent appeal, that is open to many conjectures. There could be a question of whether a police officer could or should risk contempt in order to have an appealable order. Even more serious is that the use of the assertive power and compliance, or the abandonment of the investigation, might well render the issue moot. This would mean that the issue could not be tested. In any event, this appears to be a classical case for this Court to assert its supreme power to prevent an inferior court from going out of its bounds in disregard of a prior holding of this Court. “The extraordinary Writ of Prohibition is issued as a matter of discretion to prevent a lower court from acting outside its jurisdiction and to prevent it from abusing its discretion. McNair's Petition, 324 Pa. 48, 187 A. 498 (1936). It is often used where the trial judge has acted in a blatantly unlawful manner. [Citations omitted].” Pirillo v. Takiff, 462 Pa. 511, 519, 341 A.2d 896, 899-900 (1975).
It is the function of courts in proper circumstances to exercise their sound discretion in commanding testimony in actual cases before them, in either preliminary or final hearings, in grand jury proceedings, in trials and in administrative matters to enforce subpoenas pursuant to statutory authority. If this were only an ordinary question of possible abuse of discretion, prohibition might well be inappropriate. Yet, public concern, particularly in the criminal law field, with respect to the inadequacy of an ordinary appeal as well as proper order and regularity in judicial proceedings calls for the use of the writ of prohibition. Commonwealth ex rel. Specter v. Shiomos, 457 Pa. 104, 320 A.2d 134 (1974). The due administration of justice calls for a prompt blocking of an attempt of a lower court to exercise jurisdiction which it does not have. If a judge or the district attorney is to assert the bare power to question persons under oath for any purpose, it is for the legislature to say so. The Court could *75then consider the constitutionality of such action. This Court, however, should not sanction the assertion of such a power which the legislature has not granted. It is incumbent upon this Court under its general supervisory authority over all the courts to prohibit in no uncertain terms the assertion of jurisdiction by the court below in a novel non-litigation proceeding which this Court had already clearly held is outside the jurisdiction of the court.