concurring.
Although I agree with the Court’s disposition of this matter, I disagree with its conclusion that our plenary jurisdiction should be invoked on the ground that this is a matter of “immediate public importance,” Appellate Court Jurisdiction Act of July 31, 1971, P.L. 673, No. 223, art. III, § 205, 17 P.S. § 211.205 (Supp.1977-78). In my opinion, this *632characterization of the case is an exaggeration; I have serious doubt that the case properly qualifies for plenary jurisdiction treatment under Section 205.
I agree however, that we can and should appropriately hear the case. In my view, the proper bases for our jurisdiction are either the original jurisdiction which we have to issue writs of prohibition, see Appellate Court Jurisdiction Act, supra, § 211(2) which is here invoked by the petition for a writ of prohibition presented to us by appellants1 or, as seems more likely, the King’s Bench power of superintendency over lower courts vested in this Court by Article V, Section 10(2) of the Pennsylvania Constitution2 and Section 13 of the Act of May 22, 1722, 1 Sm.L. 131.3 Here the decisions of the courts below4 were arguably in conflict with Pa.R.Crim.P. 141(c)(4). Since these decisions were of considerable import but would likely be unreviewable by the normal appeal route, the original jurisdiction of this Court was properly invoked, and the Court’s grant of plenary jurisdiction was “superfluous.” Pirillo v. Takiff, 462 Pa. 511, 519 n. 3, 341 A.2d 896, 899 n. 3 (1975).
. See Commonwealth ex rel. Specter v. Shiomos, 457 Pa. 104, 107-09, 320 A.2d 134 (1974); id. 457 Pa. at 110 n. 1, 320 A.2d 134 (Pomeroy, J., concurring); Pirillo v. Takiff, 462 Pa. 511, 519-20, 341 A.2d 896, 899 (1975). On the propriety of a writ of mandamus, compare Commonwealth v. Caplan, 411 Pa. 563, 567-79, 192 A.2d 894 (1963).
. That section provides in pertinent part: “The Supreme Court shall exercise general supervisory and administrative authority over all the courts and justices of the peace . . . ”
. See Carpentertown Coal & Coke Co. v. Laird, 360 Pa. 94, 99-100, 61 A.2d 426 (1948).
. Of particular importance is a memorandum from the President Judge of the Municipal Court of Philadelphia to all judges of that court advising that defendants were not permitted to make a mechanical or electronic record at Municipal Court trials or preliminary hearings. The memorandum is reproduced as Exhibit C in the brief of appellant Wilson.