DISSENTING OPINION BY
Judge-FRIEDMAN.I respectfully dissent. The majority holds that the motor vehicle owner in a vehicle registration suspension appeal may collateraby attack the underlying cancebation of insurance coverage and that, in such cases, the Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing (DOT) has the burden of proving that the owner received proper notice of the cancebation. Although I would like to agree with the result reached by the majority, I must dissent because I bebeve that the result is inconsistent with the law as enacted by the legislature.
Section 1786(e)(3) of the Vehicle Code states that an insurer shall notify DOT if motor vehicle babibty insurance has been “canceled or terminated by the insured or by the insurer.” 75 Pa.C.S. § 1786(e)(3). Here, the insurance company notified DOT *45that the insurance was canceled or terminated by either the insured or the insurer.1
Section 1786(c) of the Vehicle Code states that, upon registering a motor vehicle, the owner “shall be deemed to have given consent to produce proof, upon request, to [DOT] ... that the vehicle registrant has the financial responsibility required.... ” 75 Pa.C.S. § 1786(c) (emphasis added). Here, DOT presented evidence showing that, prior to the registration suspension, DOT requested proof of the required financial responsibility.
Section 1786(d) of the Vehicle Code authorizes DOT to suspend the registration of a motor vehicle for three months if DOT determines that the vehicle owner failed to secure the required financial responsibility. 75 Pa.C.S. § 1786(d). Here, when the motor vehicle owner failed to produce proof of the required financial responsibility, DOT suspended the registration. Although DOT fulfilled its obligations under the law, the owner filed an appeal.
In O’Hara v. Department of Transportation, 691 A.2d 1001 (Pa.Cmwlth.1997), this court held that, when appealing a vehicle registration suspension, a vehicle owner cannot collaterally attack the cancellation or termination of insurance coverage. We explicitly stated that DOT is not required to prove that the owner was at fault or that the owner actually received notice of the imminent lapse in insurance coverage. Id. at 1004 (quoting Stone v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 166 Pa.Cmwlth. 643, 647 A.2d 287, 288 (1994)). Nevertheless, the owner in this case challenged the cancellation of the insurance coverage, specifically asserting that there was no notice.2
Clearly, under the Vehicle Code and O’Hara, DOT must prevail here. However, because I see great injustice in allowing DOT to suspend a motor vehicle registration despite alleged insurance company errors, I would hope that the legislature would review the existing law and remove the inequities from it.
Judge PELLEGRINI joins in this dissent.
. The majority states that the insurer's notice to DOT is not sufficient to make, a prima facie case that a vehicle owner's insurance coverage has been canceled or terminated; in support of this statement, the majority suggests that the insurer's statement might be untrue. (Majority op. at 43 n. 11.) However, I see no reason for DOT to assume in every case that the notice is untrue or that the vehicle owner will raise the notice's veracity as an issue in a statutory appeal. If the owner were to raise such an issue, it would constitute a collateral attack on the underlying cancellation or termination.
In that regard, I note that the majority frames the issue in this case as whether DOT established a lapse in the registrant's insurance coverage. (Majority op. at 41.) However, I believe the issue in this case is whether, in a vehicle registration suspension appeal, the vehicle owner may collaterally attack the underlying cancellation or termination of insurance coverage. As indicated below, our court has addressed this issue clearly in O’Hara v. Department of Transportation, 691 A.2d 1001 (Pa.Cmwlth.1997).
. The majority states that this court's holding in O’Hara is limited to cases involving a lapse that occurs at the expiration of a twelvemonth insurance policy. (Majority op. at 44.) However, the O’Hara case did not involve a lapse that occurred at the expiration of a twelve-month insurance policy. In O’Hara, the insurer cancelled the policy for nonpayment of premiums; when the insurer did not send a normal quarterly premium bill, the owner neglected to pay the premium.