(dissenting in part).
I think that under the terms of the Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947, 41 U.S.C.A. § 151(b), the plaintiff had an interest which that law was designed to protect. The principal purpose of laws relating to bidding, and of the statute here under consideration is, of course, the protection of the public treasury. But the background of this statute seems to me to show that another purpose of the statute was to give small business men the right to get Government contracts if their bids were more advantageous to the Government than competing bids. I would treat the plaintiff’s claim as one founded upon an Act of Congress. If, upon trial, the plaintiff proves that the Act has been violated by the agents of the Government, to his damage, I would give him a judgment for the damage.
I am not unmindful that in administering the business affairs of the Government, a wide discretion, within the stated legal limits, should be allowed to the responsible agents. But no one would claim, and the Government does not claim, that conduct such as that alleged in the plaintiff’s petition is within the allowable discretion of any Government officer.
The opportunity to expose such conduct as that alleged in the petition, in a judicial proceeding, and the awarding to the victims of such conduct of compensation for their losses resulting therefrom, would be good for public morals. I would let the plaintiff prove, if it can,what it has alleged, and if it does prove it, let the normal legal consequences follow.