concurring in part and dissenting in part:
Although I agree with a considerable part of what Judge Mack has written in her opinion — especially in part III-D, ante at 26-30 — I cannot join in that opinion because it does not go far enough. I see no meaningful difference between the tangible and intangible benefits which these appellants are seeking from the university. To sustain the granting of the former without the latter would be, as Judge Ferren suggests, a regression to the unlamented days of “separate but equal” access to public facilities. I am not willing to give the appellants only half a loaf when they are entitled to a whole one.
Furthermore, I find no basis in the record for concluding that “University Rec*75ognition” includes, even by implication, any kind of “endorsement” of the views and activities of its recipients. Anyone who considers that “University Recognition” is simultaneously granted to “such diverse bodies as the Jewish Students Association, the Organization of Arab Students, the Young Americans for Freedom, and the Democratic Socialist Organizing Committee,” groups which “occupy a broad range of the political, social and philosophical spectrum,” ante at 17, cannot rationally conclude that the university is somehow “endorsing” the goals of any group on which it bestows such “recognition.” If the university believes this is not self-evident, it may accompany any grant of “University Recognition” with a public statement of its position, but it may not withhold “recognition” on grounds which are forbidden by law, such as sexual orientation. The university’s violation of the Human Rights Act is clear. Because the Act does not compel it to “endorse” anything, and because “University Recognition” does not constitute an “endorsement,” its free exercise defense is unavailing. See Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 103 S.Ct. 2017, 76 L.Ed.2d 157 (1983).
I would therefore hold that the Human Rights Act requires Georgetown to grant to these appellants “University Recognition” as well as tangible benefits; accordingly, I join in Judge Ferren’s separate opinion. I also join in part VI of Judge Newman’s opinion.