Dissenting Opinion by
Judge Mencer:I respectfully dissent. The majority opinion is unquestionably sound when measured by another era’s realities where receiving actual payment for a personal check was an involved and time-consuming undertaking. Thus, it is not surprising that the six cases cited in the majority opinion span the time period of 1859 to 1901 and five of the cases were decided before 1880.
Today’s banking practices, combined with twentieth-century transportation facilities and techniques, result in checks being presented for payment to the bank upon which they are drawn within 24 to 48 hours after being deposited in any other bank. If the two banks involved are within the same community or county, actual payment of the check will likely be accomplished the same day the check is deposited in the drawee’s bank. Therefore, we ought to take judicial notice of the present-day reality of check clearing procedures, since even unsophisticated users of banks are fully cognizant that there is now scant time to deposit funds in a bank account to cover a check issued without adequate funds in the account upon which it was drawn.
The law has always been reluctant to permit valuable property to be taken from owners for a failure to pay taxes, the amount of which constitutes a minimal fraction of the property value. Accordingly, we have redemption statutes, and the one here provides for “payment” of the taxes, together with interest, costs, and a fifteen per centum penalty. The undisputed facts in this case disclose that the appellants, within the allowable period for redemption, tendered a personal uncertified check to the treasurer in the exact amount necessary to effectuate *180the redemption. The treasurer returned the check to the appellants “some seven days prior to the close of the redemption period.”1
Admittedly, a personal check is simply a promise to pay. However, the mere query as to what would have happened in this instance if the treasurer had, seven days before the close of the redemption period, deposited appellants’ check, provides the certain and crucial answer: The treasurer would have received payment, all that is required by the redemption statute, prior to the close of the redemption period.
I do not advocate that the presentation of a personal check to the treasurer at any time prior to the close of the redemption period accomplishes payment. However, I would contend that, when a personal check is deposited in the normal course of the treasurer’s duties and is paid by the drawer’s bank prior to the close of the redemption period, then, under such facts, payment has been made as the statute requires.
Such a rule would protect all interested parties and avoid certain harsh results. If the Legislature desires to limit redemption to cash, money order, or certified check, it can do so in lieu of the present statutory requirement of “payment” of redemption money. Although the appellants’ neglect here, relative to their tax obligations and property interests, nearly destroys one’s sympathy for their plight, it remains clear to me that timely payment of redemption money would have been made in this case if the treasurer had deposited appellants’ personal check rather than rejected it and returned it to appellants. Accordingly, I would reverse.
Judge Kramer joins in this dissent.. It is not disputed here that there were sufficient funds in appellants’ bank account on which the personal cheek was drawn to insure payment by the drawers’ bank.