dissenting:
Upon my constitutionally mandated independent appraisal of the record, I am persuaded that John Edward Jones was denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial. I respectfully dissent.
I. Length of Delay
Two and one-half years elapsed between Jones’ arrest and trial. I agree with the majority that this delay was long enough to require scrutiny of the interrelated factors involved in the sensitive balancing process of determining whether an accused has been denied his right to a speedy trial.
II. Reasons for Delay
On 12 July 1972, Jones was arrested and taken to the Baltimore County Jail. Almost immediately he escaped. Upon the advice of F. Lee Bailey, an attorney, Jones surrendered himself within a matter of days. On 27 July, Jones, Kevin Darby, a/k/a Kevin Jones, Brenda Lou Pinkett and Andrew Strickland were jointly indicted for narcotics *207violations (No. 44607) allegedly committed on 12 July. In a separate indictment (No. 44609) Jones was charged with escape. On 21 August, Stephen L. Miles, a local attorney, entered his appearance for Jones. On 13 October, F. Lee Bailey and his associate, Gerald Alch, out-of-state attorneys, ana Gerald Kroop, a local attorney, also filed their appearances.
By 17 October, the prosecutor had made the tactical decision to try the escape charge first. A trial date of 29 November was suggested. Alch objected to trial of the escape charge before trial of the narcotics charges because such action “would illegally prejudice the defendant.” He asserted Jones’ desire for an immediate trial by asking that the narcotics charges be tried first. He requested a change in the suggested trial date, explaining that Bailey would be unavailable.
On 25 October, the court, after setting deadlines for pretrial motions, ordered that “trial of this case will be scheduled no later than December 15, 1972.” No explanation was offered as to why a trial date was not then set. On 6 November, after extending the deadlines for pretrial motions at Bailey’s request, the court reiterated that trial of the narcotics charges would be scheduled no later than 15 December. No trial date was set. No explanation was offered. By 1 December, Jones filed a flurry of timely motions. No trial was held and no trial date was set on 15 December 1972. No explanation was offered.
The five month delay between 12 July and 15 December 1972 was not excessive and is attributable to the orderly processes of the law, a “neutral reason” for delay. By 15 December the case was ready for trial, and the responsibility to bring it to trial rested upon the State.
On 2 January 1973, Jones filed a motion for speedy trial with respect to the narcotics charges, invoking his constitutional right to speedy trial, entitling his case to special attention which is something more than that accorded by the “orderly processes of the law,” Nevertheless, the orderly processes of the law moved on.
*208On 11 January, Jones then represented by Bailey, pled guilty to the escape charge and was sentenced to a term of 13 months. No trial date for the narcotics charges was set. No explanation was offered. On 15 January, William H. Murphy, Jr., a local attorney, entered his appearance and on 22 January, Miles struck his appearance. Notwithstanding the fact that Jones was at all times represented by counsel, no trial date was set. No explanation was offered. On 5 April, Bailey indicated that because of his other commitments, “the defense does not demand an immediate trial until such time as [the court is] notified to the contrary.”
The three and one-half month delay from 15 December 1972 to 5 April 1973 resulted first from the prosecutor’s tactical decision, made over Jones’ objection, to try the escape charge before the narcotics charges, and thereafter, from the State’s indifference and neglect in failing to set a trial date, despite Jones’ motion for speedy trial. All of this delay must be attributed to the State. While indifference and neglect are more neutral reasons than a deliberate attempt to delay the trial, delays caused by either must be attributed to the State.
On 3 May, Jones was indicated for violation of federal narcotics laws (C.A. No. 73-0268, D.C. Md.). No date was set for trial of the narcotics charges pending in the State court. No explanation was offered. On 25 May, notwithstanding that Jones was then represented by Bailey, Alch, Kroop and Murphy, a hearing was held, according to the court, to determine who represented him. Miles, Kroop and Murphy were present. The following colloquy ensued:
“THE COURT: Now, who is your attorney that is going to represent you in this case?
“MR. JONES: Steve Miles on that.
“THE COURT: Mr. Miles is to be your attorney?
“MR. JONES: Yes.
“THE COURT: Is he the only attorney that you want to represent you?
*209“MR. JONES: Yeah.
“THE COURT: Also Mr. F. Lee Bailey’s appearance has been entered. Do I understand that you don’t want Mr. Bailey to represent you?
“MR. JONES: No.
“THE COURT: Have you advised Mr. Bailey of that election on your part?
“MR. JONES: Yes.
“MR. MILES: Your Honor, I have just shown the State a copy of a letter Mr. Jones wrote in my presence on the 22nd of May discharging him from the case. I also spoke to Mr. John Truman of his office yesterday and informed him of the provisions of the letter and these proceedings.
“THE COURT: Mr. Truman was down here for the hearing on the motions earlier, but the appearance entered is Mr. Bailey and Gerald Alch.
“MR. MILES: I understand they were both unavailable because they’re both hither and dither.
“THE COURT: But both of them are discharged as counsel by Mr. Jones; is that correct?
“MR. JONES: Yes.”
Jones, having discharged Bailey and Alch because he “didn’t want [them] to keep holding this case up,” stated that he did not want to be represented by Murphy and Kroop. Motions made by Kroop and Murphy to strike their appearances, were granted, but the appearances of Bailey and Alch were not stricken. As a practical matter, thereafter Jones was represented only by local counsel.1 Because Jones had then revoked his consent to further delay, the responsibility for *210bringing the case to trial once again rested upon the State. The one and one-half month delay from 5 April to 25 May 1973 is attributable solely to Jones.
At the 25 May hearing, the prosecutor announced that co-defendant Kevin Darby had recently been killed. He estimated that the narcotics trial would require only three days. After determining that trial of the federal case had not yet been scheduled, the court set the trial of the State narcotics case for 25 June. No explanation was offered why an earlier date was not chosen. On 7 June, Robert H. Frank, a local attorney, entered his appearance as co-counsel with Miles.
The trial set for 25 June did not take place. On 18 June, only 46 days after Jones’ federal indictment, his federal trial began. The trial ended on 21 July. Jones, who had been represented at this trial by Miles, was convicted and sentenced to a term of 30 years.
The nearly one month delay which occurred between 25 May and 18 June 1973 was an unexplained delay attributable to the State. The one month delay from 18 June to 21 July 1973, caused by the federal trial, was caused by a neutral reason. On 21 July, the obligation to bring Jones to trial was once again placed on the State. The orderly processes of the law ground on. No trial date was set. No explanation was offered.
On 6 September, Miles struck his appearance. Frank remained counsel of record. On 14 November, Jones made another motion for speedy trial. The orderly processes of the law continued. No trial date was set. No explanation was offered.
A new trial date was set 26 December 1973, when the prosecutor and Frank agreed upon a tentative trial date of 26 February 1974, subject to confirmation by the court. The unexplained five month delay from 21 July to 26 December 1973 must be attributed to the State.
On 7 January 1974, Frank reasserted Jones’ desire for speedy trial in writing, and said that his agreement did “not waive any speedy trial motion that was filed in behalf of the *211Defendant and that, of course, we would like an earlier trial date if at all possible.” On 9 January, the prosecutor stated in writing that in view of the “possible length of the Jones case” (previously estimated by the State to be three days), the 26 February trial date should be retained to prevent interference or delay in disbarment proceedings against Frank, then set for hearing on 18 February. With respect to speedy trial, the prosecutor said that from recollections of conversations, he thought Frank was “not necessarily concerned with the trial of the Jones case but only in plea negotiations,” that he would, under appropriate circumstances, “accept a stet in the case of Mr. Jones,” and that his only request was that “the State Nol Pros the proceeding against Mr. Strickland. . . .”
On 10 January, Frank reminded the prosecutor in writing that he had filed a motion for speedy trial, which meant that he “would like a trial at the earliest possible date,” and that the prosecutor should not concern himself about possible interference with Frank’s disbarment. He pointed out that previous plea negotiations and requests for stet or nol pros had no relevance to Jones’ right to speedy trial.
The two month delay from 26 December 1973 to 26 February 1974 must be attributed to the State. The prosecutor’s desire not to interfere with disbarment proceedings against Frank, then set for 18 February, is not a satisfactory explanation for the choice of 26 February, in the absence of an explanation why Jones’ three day trial could not have been held between 26 December 1973 and 18 February 1974. Under these circumstances the State’s failure to accord Jones the earlier trial date he requested is evidence of the State’s indifference and neglect with respect to his right to a speedy trial.
On 7 February, Jones refused to agree to a postponement requested by the prosecutor. The orderly processes of the law continued. On 8 February, the court removed Jones’ case from the trial assignment for 26 February, stating in writing:
“Sometime ago I scheduled the above captioned *212case for trial commencing on February 26, 1974, at that time anticipating that there would be no problem in making a Judge available for the trial of this case.
“However, with the trials of cases resulting from the investigation of the State’s Attorney’s Office, it has been necessary for us to send a Judge into Baltimore City, in exchange for the Judge from the Supreme Bench who must come out to Baltimore County, to preside at the trial of such cases. This, of course, leaves us shorthanded for the trial of cases in the regular assignment. In addition to this, at the time you made your request, Judge Walter R. Haile, who is handling the Criminal Jury assignment this term, had already scheduled cases to the end of March, so that I could not assign him to the trial of the above captioned case.
“For these reasons the above captioned case will have to be removed from the trial assignment for February 26 and rescheduled for sometime during the April Term of Court.”
No new trial date was set for the April Term. No explanation was offered.
The reasons offered by the court are unsound. No attempt was made to show the status of any of the defendants in the cases assigned on the criminal jury docket and whether any such defendants had requested a speedy trial. No reason was offered why one of those cases could not have been removed from the docket so that the instant case could be tried. Even assuming that the court was shorthanded, no reason was offered why, in a judicial circuit composed of 12 trial judges, Jones’ case could not be set before a judge assigned to civil cases. In short, the reasons given unequivocally added up to no more and no less than the time-honored excuse of “overcrowded dockets.”2 Any delay resulting from *213postponement of the 26 February trial must be attributed to the State.
On 27 February, the court took action. Once again the orderly processes of the law were set into motion. Although Jones had asked to have the narcotics trial before the escape trial; had moved for speedy trial on 2 January 1973; had his 25 June 1973 State trial preempted by his federal trial; had moved for speedy trial on 14 November 1973; had vigorously asserted his desire for speedy trial in January, 1974; and had his 26 February 1974 trial aborted because of “overcrowded dockets,” the court did not set a trial "date. Instead, it scheduled an arraignment for 11 March 1974, at which “a firm trial date” would be set. On 1 March 1974, Frank, unable to attend the arraignment because of previous court commitments, waived his and Jones’ right to be present in order to avoid delay of the trial. He emphasized that he had “been pressing for a trial date in this case for some time and would appreciate it if [he] would be notified as soon as one is set.” No trial date was set. No explanation was offered.
On 22 April, the court ordered that motions be filed by 1 May and heard on 15 May. No trial date was set. No explanation was offered. The two month delay from 26 February to 22 April 1974 must be attributed to the State.
At a hearing on 15 May, the court considered a number of motions filed by Jones, many of which duplicated motions previously filed and decided, and others of which could have been filed earlier. The court, among other things, granted Jones’ motion for severance and reserved ruling on his motion to dismiss for lack of speedy trial, in which he claimed substantial prejudice from the death of Kevin Darby, who allegedly would have been able to prove his innocence. A trial date of 4 June was set. No explanation for this delay was offered. On 21 May, Jones prayed a jury trial, and filed notice that there would be no stipulations. On 29 May, after a hearing, Jones’ motion to dismiss for lack of speedy trial, among other things, was denied. Essentially all other pending motions were resolved. Because most of Jones’ motions were duplicative or could have been filed earlier, the *214resulting one and one-half month delay from 22 April to 29 May 1974 must be attributed to him.
The trial set for 4 June did not take place. No explanation was offered. By 14 June, trial was set for 26 June. The one month delay from 29 May to 26 June 1974 must be attributed to the State.
On 19 June, Frank struck his appearance. Jones was without local counsel and apparently resorted to Alch. The trial set for 26 June did not take place. Alch was ill and did not appear. He notified the court that Bailey had authorized him to enter an appearance; that Bailey would be available 18 November to defend the case; that William Carrier would enter his appearance that day as local counsel for Jones; and finally that “Jones has agreed to waive his right to a speedy trial . .. until requested date of November 18, 1974.” Trial was set for 18 November. This five month delay from 26 June to 18 November 1974 must be attributed to Jones.
On 14 October, Bailey acknowledged that he once again had been retained to handle the matter, and that due to other court commitments, he was unavailable for trial on 18 November. He reiterated Jones’ desire for an immediate trial, and requested a postponement of about two weeks, subject to Jones’ consent. On 25 October, Jones wrote to Bailey expressing his dissatisfaction with any postponement. On 12 November, Bailey replied to Jones that: “I cannot believe that since your freedom does not at the moment hinge on the outcome of this litigation that the inconvenience of a couple of weeks is the real purpose behind your letter of October 25, 1974.” On 25 October, the court wrote Bailey that:
“The above captioned case, as you know, is scheduled for trial commencing on Monday, November 18, 1974.. Your client has been pressing for a speedy trial for sometime, and in fact has filed a written motion to that effect. Accordingly, the trial cannot be postponed without his consent in writing.
“As you were committed to this trial date *215sometime ago by a member of your firm, unless Defendant consents in writing to a delay in the trial, it must proceed as scheduled.” (Emphasis added.)
On 5 November, Bailey wrote Jones seeking his consent to the delay. On 11 November, Jones wrote the court that he did not want a postponement of his 18 November trial, but his letters were not received by 18 November. On 12 November, Carrier moved to strike his appearance because, among other things, there had “been little communication with Mr. Bailey concerning the case and no factual preparation for trial.” His appearance was not stricken.
In the meantime, on 13 November, the court wrote Bailey that, despite the failure to secure Jones’ consent, trial was reset for 2 December. Finally, on 21 November, the court, having received Jones’ letter of 11 November 1974, wrote to Jones that:
“Not having heard from you previously, I assumed that you agreed to the postponement of this case to December 2.”
On 21 November, Jones’ pro se motion for speedy trial was filed. For unexplained reasons, trial did not begin until 4 December.
The two week delay between 18 November and 4 December 1974, was a flagrant example of the persistent lack of concern for Jones’ constitutional right to speedy trial, which characterized this case. This delay must be attributed to the State.
On 4 December, Jones, represented by Bailey and Carrier, was brought to trial. A motion for a change of venue was granted and trial began in the Circuit Court for Calvert County on 11 December. The consequent five day delay is not attributable to the State. Jones’ motion to dismiss for lack of speedy trial was immediately denied. On the second day of trial, Jones’ renewed motion to dismiss for lack of speedy trial, made pro se, was denied. On the third day, Jones was found guilty.
*216Approximately two and one-half years had transpired between Jones’ arrest and his trial. Six and one-half months of delay are attributable to neutral reasons, eight months are attributable to Jones and 14.5 months of delay are attributable to the State. The only reasons for the State’s delay, affirmatively shown by the record, were its election to try cases other than Jones’ narcotics charges, overcrowded dockets, and a total indifference to and neglect of Jones’ right to speedy trial, exhibited at virtually every step of the proceeding, even after Jones, on 2 January 1973, had invoked the protection of the Constitution. Since the 14.5 month delay was not caused by sound or legitimate reasons, the State failed to meet its responsibility to bring Jones to trial.
The majority relies upon six factors, none of which alone would condone delay, but all of which together, they conclude, may permit that the delay be excused. They first point out that:
“A substantial part of the delay related to the indictments and trials of appellant’s attorneys and the State’s Attorneys, part was occasioned by other trials of appellant, and part was at the behest of appellant’s counsel. All of these were in large measure beneficial safeguards helping to assure appellant of obtaining a fair trial. The investigation of the prosecutors, as well as his own counsel, would provide a degree of assurance that he would be fairly tried and fairly represented. Whether or not that is what appellant wanted, it is that only to which he was entitled.”
As set forth above, I agree that the one day of 11 January 1973, required for Jones’ escape trial, the month from 18 June to 21 July 1973, required for Jones’ federal trial, the one and one-half months between 5 April and 25 May 1973, and the five months between 26 June and 18 November 1974, set aside at the behest of Jones’ counsel, are not attributable to the State.
I do not agree with the majority’s assertion that Bailey’s *217failure to strike his appearance and his failure to notify the court that he was withdrawing Jones’ waiver of his right to speedy trial, constituted, between 25 May 1973 and 26 June 1974, a “waiver” of Jones’ right to speedy trial, or a “representation” that Jones did not want a speedy trial, or a “siren song luring the State to founder upon the rocks of delay.”
On 5 April 1973, Bailey did waive Jones’ right to speedy trial until the court was notified to the contrary. On 22 May, Jones, in the presence of Miles, discharged Bailey and Alch. Miles himself confirmed the discharge by a telephone call to Bailey’s office. On 25 May 1973, in open court, Jones asserted that he had discharged Bailey and Alch, stating that he wanted Miles alone to represent him. In open court Miles confirmed the discharge. The prosecutor, then present in court, heard these assertions. The judge, also present, heard these assertions, and, without consulting Bailey and Alch further, set trial for 25 June 1973. Subsequently, Bailey himself confirmed that he had been discharged.
Between 25 May 1973 and 26 June 1974, Bailey and Alch did not participate in any activities affecting Jones. During that period all motions were filed by local counsel, all negotiations involving pleas and the setting of trial dates were conducted between the prosecutors and the court on the one hand, and local counsel on the other, without reference or consultation with Bailey and Alch. The case was set for trial on 25 June 1973, 26 February 1974 and 4 June 1974 without consultation with or notice to Bailey and Alch. The trials set for those dates were aborted without notice to or consultation with Bailey and Alch. Moreover, it was Miles, not Bailey and Alch, who represented Jones in his federal trial held between 18 June and 21 July 1973. Finally, during this entire period Jones’ right to speedy trial was repeatedly asserted.
Based on this record I am persuaded that despite Bailey’s failure to strike his appearance in accordance with the rules, and to notify the court that he had withdrawn his waiver of Jones’ right to speedy trial, Jones, local counsel, Bailey, *218Alch, the prosecutor and the court were all aware of and accepted the fact that Bailey and Alch did not represent Jones between 25 May 1973 and 26 June 1974, and that on 25 May 1973, Bailey’s waiver of Jones’ right to speedy trial had been revoked and terminated. In concluding that Bailey’s failure to strike his appearance and withdraw his waiver of Jones’ right to a speedy trial, misled the State and thereby caused or excused the delay from 25 May 1973 to 26 June 1974, the majority, despite its own admonitions, permits the sirenic lure of “legal fictions to obscure our common sense.”
Nor do I agree with the majority’s conclusion that, underlying a substantial part of the delay, was the “congestion and confusion” resulting from a “cloud of corruption” allegedly caused by activities of Jones’ attorneys, which, in the majority’s view, had to be eliminated in order to assure Jones a fair trial and fair representation. No prosecutor or trial judge ever articulated any such reason for any of the delays. Nor did the State suggest such an explanation in its brief or oral argument. Moreover, the facts do not support such a conclusion.
The majority takes a myopic view of the facts surrounding the “cloud of corruption” by limiting its inquiry to “that which is recorded for posterity in our own opinions and in those of the Court of Appeals.” A more complete, and therefore more intelligible, view of the “cloud of corruption” is achieved by an examination of matters of which judicial notice may be taken, including court records in other cases, a Special Report of the Grand Jury,3 and various items of common knowledge, derived from extensive media coverage.4 Those sources indicate that on 25 September 1972, Frank, who had not yet entered his appearance, was indicted for an attempt to bribe Stuart E. Hirsch, then Deputy State’s Attorney for Baltimore County, to procure acquittals *219or probation without incarceration for Jones in his escape and narcotics cases. Frank’s trial was removed to Kent County on 20 October 1972, and was held there between 29 January and 7 February 1973. At the trial, Frank admitted he paid $3,000 to Hirsch to influence his actions in matters which Frank insisted were totally unrelated to Jones. He explained that the payment was a “shakedown” with respect to a matter which had been referred by the State’s Attorney for Baltimore County to the State’s Attorney for Baltimore City, which might result in indictment and prosecution of Frank in the Criminal Court of Baltimore, on a charge of illegal wiretapping in connection with a murder case totally unrelated to Jones. Frank was acquitted.
On 17 May 1973, Frank appeared before the Grievance Committee of the Maryland State Bar Association, where he took the same position. On 7 June 1973, he entered his appearance in Jones’ case. On 12 September, the Maryland State Bar Association instituted disciplinary proceedings in the Court of Appeals alleging that Frank attempted to bribe Hirsch in order to influence unlawfully Hirsch’s actions with respect to either Jones’ cases or his own possible indictment and prosecution in Baltimore City. A three judge panel of the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City took evidence on 19 February 1974, and concluded that:
“The evidence in this matter is clear and convincing that Respondent was guilty of professional misconduct. He attempted to bribe a public prosecutor by paying said prosecutor $3,000.00 in order to influence said prosecutor unlawfully and unethically in either (a) the criminal indictments then pending against Jones, Everson and Pinkett wherein Respondent was either counsel or advisor to said defendants and/or (b) a charge against Respondent himself for a violation of Article 27, Section 125(a) of the Annotated Code of Maryland which had been referred by the State’s Attorney for Baltimore County to the State’s Attorney for Baltimore City *220for possible indictment and prosecution of Respondent himself.” 5 (Emphasis added.)
Thus, without specifically finding that Frank had bribed Hirsch with respect to Jones’ cases, the court determined that Frank’s action constituted a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and on 9 May, recommended Frank’s disbarment. On 19 June Frank struck his appearance. On 7 October 1974, he was disbarred.
On 13 November 1972, Governor Marvin Mandel directed the Attorney General to investigate:
“[T]he allegations of corruption of public officials in connection with the arrest pending prosecution and escape of one, John Edward Jones, from the Baltimore County jail, and to pursue any evidence of criminal violations or administrative irregularities resulting from your investigation.
“In the event your investigation of the above discloses acts or conduct in other areas which warrant further investigation, grand jury action or prosecution, you are hereby directed to pursue the same, and you and the members of your staff designated by you shall have all of the same powers with respect thereto that have been conferred by me as to the above.” (Emphasis added.)
As a result of this investigation, indictments against the State’s Attorney for Baltimore County (Samuel A. Green, No. 47552, 25 October 1973,) the Chief Investigator assigned to the State’s Attorney’s Office (Louis Irvin, No. 47466, 12 October 1973,6) an attorney (Miles, No. 46921-22, 20 July 1973,) and a bondsman (Herman Kimmelman, No. 46923-26, 20 July 1973,) were returned. The charges against Green, Irvin and Kimmelman all centered around illegalities related to the expungement of an arrest record after *221gambling charges erroneously placed against the owner of an automobile service station were dismissed. All of these charges were totally unrelated to Jones. None of them can be considered part of a “cloud of corruption” caused by Jones or his attorneys.
The only indictment related in any way to Jones or his attorneys, was the indictment on 20 July 1973 of Miles, who had represented Jones since 21 August 1972, but struck his appearance on 6 September 1973. The charges against Miles, including conspiracy with Jones to bribe-Hirsch, centered around the allegation that on 15 July 1972, he appropriated to his own use approximately $72,000 given to him by Jones’ mother to “fix” or “postpone” Jones’ escape trial. In effect, he was charged with failing to bribe a public official. He was tried in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County between 25 February and 11 March 1974, and was acquitted.
The Frank case and the Miles case constitute the entire “cloud of corruption” allegedly caused by Jones’ attorneys, which, in turn, allegedly created the “congestion” of the court calendar, which, in turn, allegedly justified the State’s delay of Jones’ trial.
In light of these facts, the amount of court congestion which can be “traced back to defendant’s doorstep,” is insignificant. The Green trial, held from 10 January to 6 February 1974; the Irvin trial, held from 31 October to 21 November 1973; and the Kimmelman trial, held from 26 to 28 November 1973, contributed to court congestion but were not traceable to “defendant’s doorstep.” Frank’s criminal trial was held in Kent County. His disbarment proceeding was held in Baltimore City. Frank’s activities did not contribute to court congestion in Baltimore County. Miles’ trial, held in Baltimore County, occupied a maximum of 15 days. A single trial of this length cannot be used as justification for a delay of 14.5 months.
In light of the cold hard facts, “the investigation of the prosecutors, as well as [Jones’] own counsel” was not necessary to “provide a degree of assurance that he would be fairly tried and fairly represented.” By 7 September 1973, *222the investigation authorized by the Governor was complete and the Grand Jury report was filed. No prosecutor was charged with corruption directly related to or arising from Jones’ cases so that after 7 September 1973, neither investigation nor trial of the prosecutors was required.
Nor was there a need for investigation and trial of Jones’ own counsel. Miles, who had been indicted on a charge which did not involve corruption of any public official, as of 6 September 1973, no longer represented Jones. There was no need thereafter to try Miles before Jones to assure that Jones would be fairly tried and fairly represented. After 7 September 1973, Frank was the only lawyer representing Jones. He had admitted giving Hirsch money for purposes unrelated to Jones’ cases, had been acquitted of all charges, and was awaiting the resolution of a disbarment proceeding. Frank was then a licensed attorney who had not been suspended or disbarred.7 He was entitled to represent Jones or any other client. Jones was entitled to a lawyer of his own choice. Therefore, the State was not required to do anything to assure Jones of a fair trial and fair representation. Indeed, to prejudice Jones’ right to a speedy trial because he was represented by an attorney who might one day be disbarred for having bribed a single public official, Hirsch, who was not involved in Jones’ prosecution, constitutes a substantial, unwarranted interference with Jones’ right to counsel. In addition, if the State’s reason for delaying Jones’ trial was, in fact, to await the outcome of the disbarment proceedings against Frank, it should have at least expressly so notified him, so that he might choose other counsel and obtain a speedy trial.
*223The record shows that such considerations were not, in fact, the reasons for the delays. Throughout the period encompassing Frank’s indictment, the special investigation ordered by the Governor, Miles’ indictment and acquittal, and Frank’s disbarment, Jones was tried on the escape charge, and his trial on the narcotics charges was set on at least four different occasions. When it set those dates or aborted them, the State was not concerned with “clearing out the corruption contributed to by his own lawyers,” nor with providing “a degree of assurance that he would be fairly tried and fairly represented.”
On 11 January 1973, despite Frank’s indictment and the gubernatorially directed investigation, trial on the escape charge was held. On 25 May, although disciplinary action had been instituted against Frank, trial of the narcotics case was set for 25 June. On 7 June, Frank, whose disbarment was pending, was permitted to enter his appearance. The trial scheduled for 25 June wa,s postponed because of Jones’ federal trial and not because of Frank’s pending disbarment.
On 26 December 1973, the prosecutor and Frank, then the only attorney representing Jones, agreed to a tentative trial date of 26 February 1974. On 9 January, the prosecutor rejected Jones’ request for an earlier trial, to avoid interference with Frank’s disbarment hearing, then set for 18 February in Baltimore City. The prosecutor never did specifically state that Jones’ trial was to be delayed until the matter of Frank’s disbarment could be resolved. Tie offered no explanation as to why Jones’ trial, previously estimated to require three days, could not be set between 9 January and 18 February 1974. Moreover, the authority of the three judge panel scheduled to hear the disbarment proceeding was limited to finding facts and making recommendations to the Court of Appeals, which alone has the power to impose sanctions.8 Had the prosecutor genuinely believed it necessary to obtain a resolution of all charges relating to Jones’ attorneys, to assure Jones a fair trial and fair representation, he would have insisted that Jones’ trial not *224be set until final resolution of Frank’s disbarment proceedings, or indeed until any possible disciplinary action against Miles had been resolved.
Jones’ trial, scheduled for 26 February 1974, was aborted because of overcrowded dockets, and not out of a desire to assure Jones a fair trial and fair representation. Because Miles was not charged with bribing a public official, and no longer represented Jones, there was no need to try Miles, indicted 20 July 1973, ahead of Jones, indicted 27 July 1972.
I am not persuaded that Jones’ attorneys were responsible for creating a cloud of corruption, congestion and confusion, which had to be eliminated to assure Jones a fair trial and fair representation. I am persuaded that the corruption investigation and resulting trials did no more than overcrowd the dockets. I find nothing in the investigation and resulting trials which either caused or excused the State’s delay.
Nor do I agree with the majority that confusion by repeated hiring and firing of counsel caused or excused any of the delay which I have attributed to the State. At all times, except for one week between 19 June and 26 June 1974, Jones was represented by local counsel so that trial could have been set at any time. Moreover, between 25 May 1973 and 4 June 1974, Jones was represented only by Miles and Frank. No delay in the setting of a trial was ever requested by them, nor was any trial ever aborted because of their unavailability. Indeed, with the exception of the delays caused by Bailey and Alch, no delay of trial was ever occasioned by the hiring and firing of counsel. I do not understand how Jones’ exercise of his right to counsel, in and of itself, and without more, can be regarded as having caused or excused any portion of the delay which I have attributed to the State.
In addition, I do not agree with the majority that plea negotiations caused or excused any of the delay which I have attributed to the State. The majority relies upon two pieces of evidence to support its conclusion. The first is a motion filed by Jones alleging that a plea bargain, agreed upon at the time of his escape trial, was violated because the State *225failed to drop the narcotics charges against him. The second was a letter dated 9 January 1974, in which the prosecutor charged that Frank was not concerned with the speedy trial of Jones’ case but only with plea negotiations and a nol pros for a co-defendant. The record in fact shows that on 10 January 1974, Frank vigorously denied the prosecutor’s allegations, forcefully reasserted Jones’ right to a speedy trial, and pointed out that plea negotiations had no relevance whatsoever to the motion for speedy trial.
Plea negotiations are an ongoing part of every defense which often continues until the moment of trial, and sometimes beyond. Although plea negotiations can, on occasion, be used by an accused for the purposes of delay, and can, in fact, result in delay, the evidence relied on by the majority shows only that plea negotiations did occur. There is no evidence here, other than a conclusionary characterization by a prosecutor, which had been denied, that these negotiations were undertaken for purposes of delay or resulted in delay. I will not infer from the bare fact that plea negotiations were conducted, that their purpose or result was delay. The right to negotiate for a plea need not be relinquished to avoid an inference either that a delay was caused by the accused or that a delay otherwise attributable to the State should be excused.
Finally, while I believe that because Jones’ motions filed in May, 1974, were duplicative and could have been filed earlier, and the one and one-half month delay from 22 April to 29 May 1974, must be attributed to Jones, I am not persuaded, as is the majority, that the resolution of other motions either caused or excused the delay which I have attributed to the State. As evidence to support their conclusion, the majority points to a motion for a change of venue in the escape trial, filed on 5 January 1973, characterized by the prosecutor as a delaying tactic; “intermittent hearings” on the “plethora of motions filed by his attorneys from time to time;” and an “avalanche of motions” made on 4 December 1974, including a successful motion for change of venue, which resulted in removal of the case to Calvert County.
*226The record shows that on 11 January 1973, only six days after the 5 January motion for change of venue, the escape trial was held. The plethora of motions, other than those for speedy trial and those which resulted in delay which I have not attributed to the State, consisted of a motion for discovery and inspection on 25 January 1974, and the only intermittent hearing not otherwise accounted for, was held on 9 April 1973 to resolve Jones’ 1 December 1972 motion to suppress evidence. No explanation for the delay in deciding this motion was offered by the State. The “avalanche of motions” made on 4 December 1974, consisted of a motion for disqualification, a motion to dismiss because a prosecutor had threatened prospective witnesses, and a motion for psychiatric evaluation. The motion for disqualification was denied. The other motions were not ruled upon. In any event, trial was held on 11 December 1974, only six days after the motions were filed.
The majority presents nothing to support an inference that these motions caused or excused any significant delay which I have attributed to the State. Indeed, I am deeply distressed at the notion, implicit in the majority’s opinion, that the mere filing of a motion or motions is sufficient, in and of itself, without more, to raise such an inference. I simply do not believe that an accused must forego his right to make motions to avoid such an inference.9
Upon the record before me, I am persuaded that the underlying reasons for che 14.5 month delay which I attribute to the State, were the State’s election to try cases other than Jones’ narcotics charges, overcrowded dockets, and a total indifference and neglect of Jones’ right to speedy trial. So far as I am concerned, none of the six factors relied on by the majority is sufficient, standing alone, to excuse *227that delay. Moreover, when all of these factors are considered together, they remain insufficient to excuse that delay. Six times zero still equals zero.
III. Assertion of the Right.
As early as 17 October 1972, Jones objected to the prosecutor’s election to try the escape charge before the narcotics charges and requested that the narcotics charges be tried first. On 2 January 1973, he filed a motion for speedy trial. On 5 April, in order to obtain the services of his then attorney, Bailey, he affirmatively waived his right to a trial. On 22 May, he discharged Bailey for the sole reason that Bailey’s continued unavailability was delaying the trial.
On 25 June, Jones’ State trial did not take place because of his federal trial. On 14 November, Jones made another motion for speedy trial. On 7 January 1974, Frank, in confirming an agreement to a tentative trial date of 26 February, requested an earlier trial date and specifically stated that “his agreement did not waive any speedy trial motion.” On 10 January, Frank vigorously denied the prosecutor’s insinuation that Jones did not desire a speedy trial and forcefully reiterated that Jones wanted a speedy trial. On 7 February, Frank refused to agree to the prosecutor’s request for a postponement because of Jones’ desire for speedy trial. On 1 March, Jones waived his right to be present at an “arraignment” scheduled for 11 March, at which a trial date was to be set, rather than suffer the delay which might have been occasioned by the unavailability of Frank. Reiterating that he was pressing for an immediate trial, he asked to be notified of the new trial date as soon as one was set. On 15 May, Jones made a motion to dismiss for lack of speedy trial.
By 26 June, Bailey and Alch were again representing Jones. Once again, to assure representation by Bailey, Jones affirmatively waived his right to a trial for the period between 26 June and 18 November upon which date he was then scheduled to be tried. When Bailey subsequently indicated his unavailability for trial on 18 November, he requested only a brief postponement because Jones wanted a *228speedy trial. The court, recognizing Jones’ repeated demands for a speedy trial, refused to grant a continuance without his written consent. On 25 October and 11 November, Jones expressed his desire to forego representation by Bailey and to proceed to trial on 18 November as scheduled. On 21 November, Jones made a pro se motion for speedy trial.
This record shows a persistent and unequivocal pattern of conduct on the part of Jones designed to obtain a speedy trial. The only delays for which Jones was responsible came from his desire to be represented by Bailey and, indeed, on two occasions when he was required to choose between Bailey and, a speedy trial, he opted for the trial in preference to Bailey. Jones’ assertion of his right to a speedy trial is “entitled to strong evidentiary weight in determining whether [he] is being deprived of the right.” 10
The majority concedes that “[t]he record is replete with demands for a speedy trial and motions to dismiss for lack thereof.” They assert that “[t]he only evidence contradicting those express demands is of a subtle nature.” At the conclusion of their consideration of this evidence of a “subtle nature” they .not only accord Jones’ assertions no weight, but find, in fact, that the record “rings out the message that Jones did not want to be tried.”
As part of the “subtle” evidence establishing that Jones “did not want to be tried,” the majority first points to a “procession of attorneys, hired and fired at random,” and to “suspicion” raised by Jones’ “apparent manipulation of the legal counsel representing him.”
Jones was initially represented by Bailey and Alch, Miles and Kroop. Frank, indicated on 25 September 1972, did not then represent Jones. On 11 January 1973, Jones, then represented by Bailey, was tried for escape. Miles was summonsed by both the prosecution and the defense to testify. Jones regarded his testimony as damaging. Miles struck his appearance and Murphy entered his. On 25 May 1973, Jones, having discharged Bailey and Alch for causing inordinate delay, indicated he wanted Miles to represent *229him. Murphy and Kroop struck their appearances. On 7 June, Frank, having been tried and acquitted, entered an appearance as co-counsel with Miles. Miles, indicted on 20 July 1973, struck his appearance on 6 September 1973, leaving Frank, for all practical purposes, as sole counsel. On 9 May 1974, a three judge panel recommended Frank’s disbarment, and on 19 June, Frank struck his appearance. By 26 June, Bailey and Alch were again representing Jones, along with Carrier, a local attorney. These attorneys continued to represent Jones until his trial on 11 December.
The facts in this case readily explain the turnover of attorneys. I see nothing suspicious in the order in which counsel entered and struck appearances. Nor do I see any “apparent manipulation” of counsel by Jones. At all times, except for one week between 19 June and 26 June 1974, Jones was represented by local counsel, so that trial could have been set at any time. Moreover, with the exception of the delays occasioned by Bailey, due to his other commitments or the illness of his associate, matters over which Jones had no control, no delay in trial was over occasioned by the “procession of attorneys.” The majority’s suspicions, are, in my view, unfounded.
As further “subtle” evidence that Jones did not want to be tried, the majority relies upon his participation in plea negotiations and filing of a number of motions. I will not infer from these bare facts that Jones was not prepared and did not intend to go to trial. I do not believe that an accused must forego his right to engage in plea negotiations and make motions to avoid an inference that his insistent, formal demands for speedy trial are insincere.
“But even more compelling” evidence of Jones’ desire not to be tried is found by the majority in “the correspondence from [Bailey] expressly negating demands for speedy trial.” Originally, Jones’ sole motivation for waiving his right to speedy trial was to assure his representation by Bailey, which he was willing to forego when the delay became inordinate. When Miles withdrew because of his indictment, and Frank withdrew because of his recommended disbarment, Jones again resorted to Bailey, and waived his *230right to speedy trial to accommodate Bailey’s schedule. On this occasion as well, he was willing to forego representation by Bailey when the delay became inordinate. The evidence that during two discrete periods of time, Jones waived his right to speedy trial to secure adequate representation at his trial, does not support an inference that he did not want to be tried during the 14.5 month period of delay attributable to the State.
As the final piece of evidence to establish that Jones did not want to go to trial, the majority relies on Jones’ “own proclamation when he eventually came to trial that he was not yet ready for it even then.” The record shows that on 11 December 1974, Jones had wanted to present evidence on his motion to dismiss for lack of speedy trial and to present several other motions supported by evidence at the beginning of his trial. A motion to dismiss for lack of speedy trial was argued. During the prosecutor’s recounting of the facts, Carrier, Jones’ local counsel, interrupted and requested that Jones be permitted to hear the prosecutor’s proffer and be given a chance to respond. The court refused because “I am only concerned here with what the State’s Attorney demonstrated from his records.” Without permitting the prosecutor to conclude his summary of the facts, or Jones to present any facts, the court denied the motion to dismiss for lack of speedy trial. While Bailey had argued the motion to dismiss for lack of speedy trial, he had not called Jones to testify. Moreover, Bailey made no effort to present Jones’ other motions, or to summon witnesses to testify concerning them. The relations between Bailey and Jones became strained. Carrier attempted to ease the rapidly developing friction. He failed. The conflict escalated and ended in Jones’ explosive statement, set forth in the majority opinion, and his attempted discharge of Bailey. It was Jones’ loss of confidence in Bailey’s conduct of the trial which precipitated his unruly behavior and led to his removal from the courtroom.
In this context, Jones’ statement that he was not prepared to go to trial meant only that he did not want the trial to proceed until his motions had been properly presented, *231heard, and ruled upon. His discharge of Bailey was occasioned by a totally unanticipated inability to reach a modus operandi with him on the day of trial. Under these circumstances, I do not agree with the majority’s conclusion that Jones’ assertions that he was unprepared to go to trial on 11 December 1974, indicated that he had not desired and was not prepared to go to trial at any previous time.
The majority, having determined that the record here “rings out the message that Jones did not want to be tried,” also concludes that the record “ ‘strongly suggests that [Jones] hoped to take advantage of the delay’ to which his actions and the actions of his lawyers had contributed.” The facts on which this conclusion rests are neither articulated by the majority nor discernible from the record. Based on this conclusion, the majority reaches for “the Barker result,” which it offers as a solution. I find Barker to be totally inapplicable to the facts of this case.
In Barker v. Wingo,11 the accused and his co-defendant, Manning, were both indicted on a charge of homicide. The State had a stronger case against Manning than it did against the accused and believed that the accused could not be convicted unless the co-defendant testified against him. In order to conclude Manning’s trial before trying Barker, thereby removing the barrier of Manning’s unwillingness to incriminate himself, the State sought a series of continuances. On 11 occasions between 21 October 1958 and 12 February 1962, Barker agreed to the continuances sought by the State. During that period, no action whatever was taken that could be construed as the assertion of a speedy trial right. On 12 February 1962, Barker made a motion to dismiss for lack of speedy trial. The ground for the motion was not stated and no alternative motion for speedy trial was made. At oral argument counsel conceded that Barker definitely did not want to be tried, and that Barker was gambling on Manning’s acquittal, because he thought that since the evidence was not very strong against Manning, if Manning were acquitted, he would never be tried. The *232Conclusion that Barker was gambling on Manning’s acquittal was also supported by his failure, following his pro forma motion to dismiss filed in February, 1962, to object to the Commonwealth’s next two motions for continuance. In addition, it was not until March of 1963, after Manning’s conviction was final, that Barker, having lost his gamble, began to object to further continuances. Finally, there was no serious prejudice. Indeed, there was not even a claim that any of Barker’s witnesses were dead or unavailable at the time of trial. On these facts the court found that Barker was not deprived of his right to a speedy trial, despite a five year delay between his arrest and trial.
In the instant case, Jones never agreed to a postponement proposed by the State. He objected to delays and repeatedly asserted his desire for a speedy trial. There is no evidence that he was gambling on the acquittal of co-defendants. There is no evidence here that he did not want to be tried. Finally, as will be set forth below, there is evidence of actual prejudice of a substantial nature, in that Jones’ major alibi witness, Kevin Darby, had died in the interim. Under these circumstances, Barker v. Wingo is inapplicable to the instant case.
IV. Prejudice.
In Epps v. State,12 the Court of Appeals considered the question of prejudice from a delay which creates an impairment of an accused’s defense. There the court pointed out that as a result of a delay attributable to the State, a witness who had been in attendance on 28 December 1972 when the case originally came to trial, who was then “apparently prepared to testify that the appellant was not at the .scene of the robbery,” was inducted into the Armed Forces and was serving in Korea at the time of the trial.
At the trial, there was evidence to show that the victim was robbed at about 2 a.m., on 9 August 1972, by three men, one of whom carried a knife and another a stick. Immediately following the incident, the victim ran down the *233street. He encountered a policeman to whom he reported the robbery. Cruising with the officer in a police car, the victim, within a brief interval, observed the trio, one of whom was carrying a radio, and another a stick. When the police officer ordered them to “halt,” one of the group took flight. The victim was unable to identify the accused as his assailant. Another witness, however, identified the accused as the fugitive.
The accused elected not to testify. Thus, the missing witness would have been the only witness in the accused’s behalf. The Court of Appeals said:
“Although admittedly speculative, the testimony of David Epps might have been sufficient to have generated a ‘reasonable doubt’ as to his guilt.
“For all practical purposes, any possible defense which the appellant had was obliterated when by reason of the postponement on December 28th he was denied the opportunity of presenting the testimony of his alibi witness. It seems to us that the appellant has demonstrated not only ‘the possibility that [his] defense will be impaired,’ but has shown, to his prejudice, an actual impairment of his defense.” (Citations omitted.)
Here Jones was ultimately tried on four counts of a nine count indictment.13 At the trial, a police officer testified that on 12 July 1972, at about 5:25 a.m., the police, armed with a valid search warrant, entered a semi-detached home, located at 3703 Trent Road, owned by Jones and his then girlfriend, co-defendant Brenda Lou Pinkett, in which Pinkett lived and which Jones visited on occasion. Substantial quantities of heroin and narcotics paraphernalia were found. Some items were hidden in various places throughout the house. Some were found in “bedrooms.” Strainers were found in the *234kitchen sink. Confectioner’s sugar and two packages of Scotch tape, as well as some plastic bags, were found “in the kitchen.” At the time of the search, co-defendant Pinkett was present on the premises. Jones was not.
While there was evidence to show that Jones had engaged in narcotics transactions before 12 July 1972, only three witnesses gave testimony which tended to link Jones to the Trent Road premises, and to show that he was in joint possession of the narcotics and paraphernalia found there on 12 July. A police officer said that on 23 May 1972, he saw Jones enter those premises and heard him say to an accompanying male: “Hurry up with that stuff, I want to have it whacked up before daylight.” Jessie Parker, a felon with a record of convictions for narcotics related offenses as well as grand larceny, assault and manslaughter, testified that about 7:30 p.m. on 11 July 1972, at the Trent Road house, Jones exchanged narcotics with him for $6,700 in small bills.14 Finally, another police officer testified that at about 4:20 a.m. on 12 July 1972, he saw Jones, co-defendant Pinkett and an unidentified male come out to the front porch of that residence. Through starlight binoculars, which he felt it necessary to use because he “had never come in contact with Miss Pinkett or Mr. Jones and I had no idea who they were,” he saw Jones, carrying a brown paper grocery bag, get into a car and drive off. The police officer “hit the high beams on [his] vehicle to get a good view of the operator.” He followed Jones to 18 Kitridge Court, a single family dwelling owned by Jones’ brother. After seeing Jones enter the residence, the police officer drove to a location about four or five miles away, waited approximately 30 minutes, returned to 18 Kitridge Court at about 5:25 a.m., where he joined several other police officers armed with a valid search warrant, who forcibly entered the premises. Jones was arrested. Two other unidentified men were then present in the house. No narcotics were found.
*235At his trial, Jones proffered, with respect to his motion for speedy trial, that co-defendant Kevin Darby, who bore a strong physical resemblance to him,15 would have testified that he, Darby, and not Jones was at 3703 Trent Road at 4:20 a.m. on 12 July 1972, and that it was he, not Jones, who was observed by the police officer leaving that address and driving to 18 Kitridge Court. This alibi witness was killed in May, 1973.16 Jones also proffered that another alibi witness, one Joseph Perry, was killed in 1973. Bailey proffered that co-defendant Andrew Strickland, whom Jones had planned to call as a witness in his behalf, had disappeared.
At trial, Jones elected not to testify in his own behalf. No alibi witness did, in fact, appear. The evidence presented to establish Jones’ dominion and control over the heroin and narcotics paraphernalia found at 3703 Trent Road on 12 July 1972 was exceedingly thin.17 Although admittedly speculative, the testimony of alibi witnesses might have been sufficient to generate a reasonable doubt as to Jones’ guilt. Thus, for all practical purposes, here, as in Epps, Jones’ only possible defense was obliterated by the State’s delay, particularly by its election to try the escape charge first and its concomitant failure to set a trial betweenl5 December 1972, when the case was ready, and 5 April 1973.
I disagree with the majority’s analysis that even assuming Jones had shown actual prejudice, the majority would not consider the factor of prejudice because the delay was not “the fault of the State.” Based upon the record before me, I am convinced that Jones has shown, to his prejudice, an actual impairment of his defense which must be taken into *236account as a factor in determining whether he was denied a speedy trial.18
Y. Conclusion.
I agree with the majority that because the remedy of dismissal is so severe “we must be especially careful not to permit legal fictions to obscure our common sense.” I also believe that an overzealous concern that whenever a court incorrectly finds a denial óf the right to a speedy trial, “a criminal fairly convicted on abundant evidence . . . will be freed,” should not blind us to the elemental truth that our judicial process requires that legal questions, particularly constitutional questions, be determined only on facts which can be articulated and discerned, and upon the legitimate inferences adduced therefrom. This requirement is not met in the majority opinion.
The process used by the majority involves first, finding that the facts in the record were inadequate; then supplementing the record with another set of facts arbitrarily limited to those in “our own opinions and in those of the Court of Appeals;” then supplementing the inadequacy of those facts by impermissible inferences; and then failing to make requisite assessments with respect to the length of delay attributable to the State and to Jones, and with respect to prejudice to Jones’ defense. On these deficient premises, the majority determines an individual’s constitutional rights. I cannot join with my brothers in such a process.
The issue in this case is simple and uncomplicated. The State had the obligation to bring Jones to trial. The facts and inferences legitimately deducible are insufficient to show that .the State has met this obligation. Instead, those facts and inferences show that the trial of Jones, who had repeatedly asserted his right to a speedy trial, was delayed for a period of 14.5 months because of the State’s election to try cases other than Jones’ narcotics charges, the existence of overcrowded dockets, and a total indifference to his *237asserted right to speedy trial. This 14.5 month delay, which was not caused by sound or legitimate reasons, resulted in actual prejudice to Jones.
John Edward Jones was not convicted on “abundant evidence.” Because of the prejudice he suffered as a result of the inordinate delay caused by the State, he was not fairly convicted. He is entitled to be freed. Jones’ motion to dismiss should have been granted. Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the court below. In view of this result, I would reach no other question.
. On 14 October 1974, Bailey acknowledged that he had been discharged by Jones. The record shows that from 25 May 1973 through 26 June 1974, Bailey and Alch were inactive in this case. All activities relating to it, including the setting of trial dates, were conducted by the prosecutor and the court exclusively with local counsel, and without consultation or participation by Bailey and Alch.
. Jones v. State, 241 Md. 599, 611, 217 A. 2d 367, 375 (1966).
. Special Report of the Grand Jury for Baltimore County, April Term 1973. The Daily Record (Baltimore), 14 September 1973, at 2, col. 1.
. Indeed, some of the newspaper articles relating to these matters are attached to Jones’ motion for change of venue, made 5 December 1974, and appear in the record of this case.
. Maryland State Bar Association v. Frank, 272 Md. 528, 530, 531, 325 A. 2d 718, 719, 720 (1974).
. Other indictments of Irvin were dropped before trial.
. At the time of Frank’s disbarment, Maryland Rules BV1-10 governed disciplinary proceedings. Under Rule BV8, an attorney was authorized to practice law until the Court of Appeals determined his guilt and imposed a sanction. In February, 1975, new rules BV1-18 were promulgated, which reflect, among other things, the consideration of whether an attorney should practice law during the pendency of disbarment proceedings. Even under the new rules, which provide that an attorney convicted of a crime can be summarily suspended by the Court of Appeals, pending a disbarment proceeding, an attorney acquitted of criminal acts cannot be prohibited from practicing law until final disbarment. Maryland Rule BV16.
. Maryland Rule BV11 b5, formerly Rule BV5 b5.
. The majority’s reliance upon Jones’ motion for change of venue, granted on 5 December 1974, which resulted in a five day delay, is particularly inappropriate. Jones’ motion for a change of venue was based on allegations of pretrial publicity which identified Jones as a “narcotics kingpin,” not only a week before trial, but also on the very morning of trial. The fact that it was granted, graphically illustrates that it was not made for the purpose of delaying trial but was made for the purpose of assuring a fair trial. The fact that trial was held on 11 December 1974 indicates that the motion neither caused nor excused a significant delay.
. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U. S. 514, 531-32, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 2192-93 (1972).
. 407 U. S. 514, 92 S. Ct. 2182 (1972).
. 276 Md. 96.
. These four counts charged that on 12 July 1972, Jones unlawfully possessed heroin; unlawfully possessed heroin with intent to distribute; and unlawfully possessed controlled paraphernalia of two different kinds, with intent to use such items for the illegal distribution of heroin.
. A later witness, William W. Carrier, co-counsel for Jones, impeached Parker’s testimony by testifying to prior inconsistent statements made by Parker and by specifically testifying that on 11 June 1974, Parker told him that he would testify that he had never engaged in a narcotics transaction with Jones.
. To show the resemblance, Jones described the modus operandi of his escape in July of 1972. He stated that Kevin Darby, a/k/a Kevin Jones, was also arrested on 12 July 1972 and taken to the Baltimore County jail. Bail was set and posted for Darby/Jones. When the institution personnel called the name “Jones,” appellant presented himself and was released in place of Darby/Jones.
. Jones’ proffer in this respect was corroborated by the fact that in open court on 25 May 1973, the prosecutor informed the judge that he had learned that Darby had recently been killed. The indictment of Darby was abated by death on 22 October 1974.
. See Garrison v. State, 272 Md. 123, 321 A.2d 767 (1974).
. Epps, supra, at 26.