District Judge (concurring):
The majority opinion of the Court in this case, prepared by Honorable Ben F. CAMERON, United States Circuit Judge, very forcefully and correctly decided this case, and I unconditionally joined in that opinion and in executing the consequent judgment of the Court, but wish to add my concurrence therein as herein expressed.
Initially, and as a fundamental proposition of universal application, the United States had no authority to institute or maintain this suit in the absence of express statutory authorization therefor. That position was readily admitted by counsel at the bar, but it is contended that 42 U.S.C.A. § 1971 expressly provided such necessary authorization for this suit. A careful analysis of that section of the statute will reveal the fallacy of that contention. Indeed, the United States was expressly granted authority to bring certain suits against certain persons for preventive relief against violation of certain Civil Rights of others. The State of Mississippi is simply not such a person as was envisioned by that statute. It was not designed, or intended to grant the national sovereign any carte blanche authority to arbitrarily and capriciously select any law, or package of laws of a state which it desired invalidated, and to have declaratory relief by a test in such manner of the constitutionality thereof.
The suability of the sovereign State of Mississippi by the United States in this case presents that serious question at the very threshold of this suit. Contrary to the dissent herein, no question is presented, or relied on by anybody in this case as to any immunity afforded a state by the 11th Amendment to the Federal Constitution. It is perfectly clear in this case that the United States must find express authority in 42 U.S.C.A. § 1971 (c) to bring this suit, or it is without authority in this case to sue the State of Mississippi. This Congressional Act very carefully limited the right of the United States to bring a suit under the act against a person offending another person by depriving him of a right under the act, and for preventive relief. Ordinarily, the term “person” does not include a state or a municipal corporation, unless the statute itself makes the intention to do so very clear. Significantly, the last paragraph of § 1971(e) contains its own lexicon. Congress made it clear that the word “vote” meant all things prerequisite to voting, including registration where necessary to vote, and casting the ballot and having it counted. Other well known words and phrases were specifically defined to comply with the legislative intent. The Congress *959knew that a state is ordinarily not considered a person within the purview of legislation of this character, and it did not deem it proper to carry out the legislative intent to make this act specifically to extend to a sovereign state as a person. This act clearly provides that: “Whenever any person has engaged, or there are reasonable grounds to believe that any person is about to engage in any act or practice which would deprive any other person of any right or privilege secured by subsection (a) or (b) of this section,” then the Attorney General may institute the civil action in the name of the United States for preventive relief under this act. Then Congress provided that in such a suit the United States shall be liable for costs the same as a private person. The act provides that if a state official has violated either paragraph (a) or paragraph (b) of that section that the state may be made a party to the suit (not for any relief against it) but as a mere conduit or procedural vehicle to preserve jurisdiction where oifending officials have died, or resigned as happened in the Alabama situation which was met by this provision in the act. But the state of Mississippi is simply not a person within any concept of this act, and is not suable in this case. In Sims v. U. S., 359 U.S. 641, 79 S.Ct. 641, 3 L.Ed.2d 667, it is said that “[w]hether the term ‘person’ when used in a federal statute includes a State cannot be abstractly declared, but depends upon its legislative environment, State of Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 360, 370 [54 S.Ct. 725, 727, 78 L.Ed. 1307;] State of Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159, 161 [62 S.Ct. 972, 973, 86 L.Ed. 1346.]” In Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492, the Court held that a municipal corporation was not within the ambit of a statute which related to a person who might deprive a citizen of a civil right under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. That same rule was followed by the Court in Egan v. City of Aurora, 365 U.S. 514, 81 S.Ct. 684, 5 L.Ed.2d 741; where the Court held that a municipality is not a person within the meaning of said act. Then in United States v. State of Alabama, D.C., 171 F.Supp. 720, the district court in speaking of the 1957 Civil. Rights Act, said that a person did not include or mean a sovereign state. On. appeal of that decision in United States v. State of Alabama, (5CA) 267 F.2d 808, the Court very strongly reiterated, and amplified that same view. The Court-in that case said that the state of Alabama was not a person within the purview of the 1957 Civil Rights Act appearing as 42 U.S.C.A. § 1971(c). Yet, almost a year later when the present act-was amended in 1960, no attempt was-made by Congress to make any change in the first two sentences of this act which' appeared exactly in the same verbiage as-ín the 1957 Civil Rights Act.
A statutory intent to authorize the-United States to sue a sovereign state is not to be lightly inferred. Such authority must be found in a statute in the. very clearest terms before a Federal Court will assume jurisdiction of a sovereign state. In United States v.. Alabama, supra, Judge Hutcheson as-chief judge, speaking for the Court 267 F.2d at page 811, said: “Absent such specific conferring of jurisdiction, a federal court would not, indeed could not-assume jurisdiction over a sovereign state without a precedent determination that, though the jurisdiction had not-been expressly conferred, the language of the invoked statute carried the necessary, the unavoidable implication that-the congress upon the gravest considerations and after the utmost thought and deliberation had intended to and did confer it.”
The State Board of Election Commissioners (composed of the Governor, the-State Attorney General and the Secretary of State) are assigned statutory duties in connection with the preparation of forms of applications which the-registrars use in testing the qualifications of an applicant to register to vote.These commissioners are thus acting in: a legislative capacity in the discharge of such function and are, therefore, not: ordinarily amenable to suit. But their *960duties have been discharged when they release these forms of applications for use by the registrars in the counties; and the Mississippi State Board of Election Commissioners thereafter have absolutely nothing to do with the registration of voters, or the conduct of any election. The complaint as to the State of Mississippi, and as to said State Board of Election Commissioners is, therefore, clearly without any possible merit on its face. The complaint does not aver that the State Board of Election Commissioners have done anything, or threatened to do anything other than prepare those official registration blank forms exactly as directed by the Mississippi Legislature.
The gravamen of this complaint in its entirety is that two sections of the Mississippi Constitution, and six state statutes implementing those constitutional sections are all unconstitutional and void in the opinion of the United States. The acts and laws under attack in this case are Mississippi Constitution 1890, § 241-A1 and § 244 2 and six state statutes (all referred to herein as statutes) designated as H.B. 900 (Chapter 570, Mississippi Laws 1962),3 H.B. 901 (Chapter 574, *961Mississippi Laws 1962),4 H.B. 905 (Chapter 569, Mississippi Laws 1962),5
H.B. 904 (Chapter 573, Mississippi Laws 1962),6 H.B. 822 (Chapter 572, Missis*963sippi Laws 1962),7 and H.B. 903 (Chapter 571, Mississippi Laws 1962) 8 set out in the footnotes for ready access thereto and analysis thereof.
*964The complaint as to the registrar of Amite County, the registrar of Claiborne County, the registrar of Pike County (all within the Southern District of Mississippi, but in different divisions of this district; and against the registrar of Co-ahoma County, the registrar of LeFlore County and the registrar of Lowndes County, all in different divisions of the Northern District of Mississippi), presents a much more difficult question. Surely, § 1971(c) authorized the United
States to bring a suit against a registrar for any violation, or any threat of violation of the Civil Rights of a citizen through discrimination against that citizen in any manner, or to any extent by any sort of device however clever or concealed it may be.
It must be remembered that this is not a voting case. It is a registration case, but registration is a condition precedent to voting in Mississippi and the United States, as plaintiff, may seek preventive relief against a registrar as a person (as an official, indeed, but not as a private individual) under § 1971(c) on the basis that such registrar is doing or is threatening to do something in violation of 42 U.S.C.A. § 1971(a). It is not stated in the complaint that either one of these registrars ever did, or threatened to do anything in violation of that statute, but it is stated that these registrars were *965literally administering and enforcing, as written, this package of eight laws which this suit was filed to invalidate. Significantly, at the bar, counsel for the government disavowed any intention, or purpose by the suit to charge any discrimination whatsoever in the administration of these statutes by either one of these registrars. But paragraph 5 of the prayer in the original complaint requested the Court to: “Make a finding that the defendant county registrars have deprived negro citizens of the right secured by 42 U.S.C.A. § 1971(a); and that such deprivations have been and are pursuant to a pattern and practice of racial discrimination.” Nowhere in the complaint is to be found any charge, or statement of any ultimate fact to the effect that either one of the sections of the Mississippi Constitution (§ 241-A and § 244) or either one of the statutes implementing said sections (Mississippi Laws 1962, Chapters 569, 570, 571, 572, 573 and 574) were wrongfully, or erroneously or discriminatorily applied in any manner to any colored person. The gravamen and sole basis of the action and claim against these registrars is that they very properly administered and applied these laws which are alleged to be unconstitutional, and that thereby a claim has accrued to the United States. The plaintiff accordingly asserts a demand, not for preventive relief, but for relief which could only be provided by a Mississippi legislative enactment as the opinion in chief sets forth and demonstrates.
Precisely, the claim against these registrars is that they are alleged to be engaged in administering these constitutionally invalid laws. The claim being more specifically that since only 5% of all adult negroes are registered, and since approximately 67% of all adult white citizens are registered, that the disparity and imbalance resulting from such circumstance will necessarily operate with discrimination against negroes. The fallacy of that claim is readily apparent. The law and its application and enforcement with an even hand, and completely without regard to race or color, simply defies any tenable criticism of its constitutional validity.
The case of Darby v. Daniel, D.C., 168 F.Supp. 170, was a carefully studied and prepared opinion of a three judge court composed of three distinguished Federal jurists from Mississippi. That decision settled the law as to the constitutionality of § 244, Mississippi Constitution 1890 and implementing statutes and decided it correctly and no appeal was taken. There, the Court said: “We hold, therefore, that plaintiffs have wholly failed to establish that the amendment to Section 244 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 is void on its face, or because it was the product of base motives. We hold, on the other hand, that said amendment and the statutes passed in connection with it are valid on their face and in fact, are a legitimate exercise by the State of its sovereign right to prescribe and enforce the qualification of voters.” That decision is decisive of most of the constitutional questions again presented here.
It is suggested that the literacy test in Mississippi is invalid because of the sweep of discretion thereby afforded a registrar in giving a test to an applicant. It will be noted that § 244 2 and the implementing statute 3 do not vest a registrar with any naked, unbridled power for arbitrary action on any application. Common sense, honesty, and fair play are the guiding stars of any genuine interpretation such as is contemplated here. In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220, in referring to this laundry ordinance of the county which was designed to put the Chinese laundryman out of business, the Court in condemning it said: “The power given to them is not confided to their discretion in the legal sense of that term, but is granted to their mere will. It is purely arbitrary, and acknowledges neither guidance nor restraint.” Likewise in Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 81 *966S.Ct. 125, 5 L.Ed.2d 110, the Court condemned a state statute which was designed and intended to change the boundary of Tuskogee so as to exclude substantially all negroes from the municipality. The Court said: “The complaint amply alleges the claim of race discrimination. Against this claim the respondents have never suggested, either in their brief or in oral argument, any countervailing municipal function which Act 140 [was] designed to serve.” There is nothing in any statute before this Court which has any such intent, purpose or effect. Section 702, Mississippi Code 1942, captioned: “Rules — how words to be construed: All words and phrases contained in the statutes are used according to their common and ordinary acceptation and meaning; but technical words and phrases according to their technical meaning.” The term good moral character requirement for citizenship is not a vague and meaningless term. It must be understood and construed according to the common acceptation of that phrase. It does not mean to define or require prudery or matchless excellence in moral conduct and behavior. It must be construed in its context as a requirement and qualification for suffrage that the applicant possess the commonly accepted standard of the average citizen for good moral character. A negro applicant need not measure up to the standard of the highest class citizen in his community, but the statutory standard would not be met by measuring up to the lowest standard of person who might enjoy the privileges of citizenship. The term does not lend itself readily to precise definition or exact standards. No comprehensive definition of good moral character has ever been attempted by any legislative body or judicial tribunal. Likewise, no court has ever comprehensively defined due process, probable cause, or due care, but down through the ages the courts and juries of this country have resolved thousands of controversies depending upon the meaning of those terms without a suggestion that the laws containing such nebulous terms were themselves invalid because of lack of standards and guide lines in such laws for the application of such terms. The standard of fairness and reasonableness of an honest person in properly applying such test has been accepted generally by the judiciary as a full compliance with all of the requirements of due process and fair play.
The vagueness doctrine does not condemn the phrase even if it appeared in a criminal statute. Words like “moral turpitude,” “good behavior,” and other such ambiguous and nebulous phrases have appeared in our statutes for almost a century. The courts have understood them and applied them according to the common understanding and practices with respect thereto. In Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223, 71 S.Ct. 703, 95 L.Ed. 886 it is said: “We have several times held that difficulty in determining whether certain marginal offenses are within the meaning of the language under attack as vague does not automatically render a statute unconstitutional for indefiniteness. United States v. Wurzbach, 1930, 280 U.S. 396, 399 [50 S.Ct. 167, 168, 74 L.Ed. 508]. Impossible standards of specificity are not required. United States v. Petrillo, 1947, 332 U.S. 1 [67 S.Ct. 1538, 91 L.Ed. 1877]. The test is whether the language conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices. Connally v. General Construction Co., 1926, 269 U.S. 385 [46 S.Ct. 126, 70 L.Ed. 322].”
In Brukiewicz v. Savoretti, (5CA) 211 F.2d 541. This Circuit in affirming the findings of the examiner as to the good moral character of a petitioner for naturalization said: “A wide discretion is vested in the trial judge in determining whether or not ‘good moral character’ exists. It is to be determined as that term is generally understood, but petitioner’s character must measure up to that of the average citizen in the community in which he resides before he is entitled to citizenship by naturalizaton.”
In Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498, the ques*967tion before the Court was the constitutionality of a criminal obscenity statute said to violate due process because too vague to support conviction for crime. “Many decisions have recognized that these terms of obscenity statutes are not precise. This Court, however, has consistently held that lack of precision is not itself offensive to the requirements of due process. ‘ * * * [T]he Constitution does not require impossible standards’; all that is required is that the language ‘conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices * * *.’ United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 7-8 [67 S.Ct. 1538, 1542, 91 L.Ed. 1877]. These words, applied according to the proper standard for judging obscenity, already discussed, give adequate warning of the conduct proscribed and mark ‘ * * * boundaries sufficiently distinct for judges and juries fairly to administer the law * * *. That there may be marginal eases in which it is difficult to determine the side of the line on which a particular fact situation falls is no sufficient reason to hold the language too ambiguous to define a criminal offense * * *.’ Id., 332 U.S. at page 7 [67 S.Ct. at page 1542], See also United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 624, note 15 [74 S.Ct. 808, 815, 98 L.Ed. 989]; Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 340 [72 S.Ct. 329, 330, 96 L.Ed. 367] ; United States v. Ragen, 314 U.S. 513, 523-524 [62 S.Ct. 374, 378, 86 L.Ed. 383]; United States v. Wurzbach, 280 U.S. 396 [50 S.Ct. 167, 74 L.Ed. 508]; Hygrade Provision Co. v. Sherman, 266 U.S. 497 [45 S.Ct. 141, 69 L.Ed. 402] ; Fox v. State of Washington, 236 U.S. 273 [35 S.Ct. 383, 59 L.Ed. 573]; Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373 [33 S.Ct. 780, 57 L.Ed. 1232].”
In Marie Posusta v. United States, (2 CA) 285 F.2d 533, an applicant was denied citizenship for want of good moral character and the Court said: “Much has been written as to the scope of that phrase, and, as was inevitable, there has been disagreement as to its meaning. However, it is settled that the test is not the personal moral principles of the individual judge or court before whom the applicant may come; the decision is to be based upon what he or it believes to be the ethical standards current at the time. United States ex rel. Iorio v. Day, 2 Cir., 34 F.2d 920, 921; Repouille v. United States, 2 Cir., 165 F.2d 152, 153; United States v. Francioso, 2 Cir., 164 F.2d 163; Schmidt v. United States, 2 Cir., 177 F.2d 450, 451, 452; Johnson v. United States, 2 Cir., 186 F.2d 588, 590, 22 A.L.R.2d 240.”
In Kahm v. U. S., (5CA) 300 F.2d 78, in answer to an attack on a statute for vagueness it was said: “Nothing is more common than for a jury in a case involving charges of negligence, as for example negligent homicide, to determine whether the proven conduct measures up to the standards of a reasonably prudent man.” United States v. Levine, (2CCA) 83 F.2d 156, says: “Thus ‘obscenity’ is a function of many variables, and the verdict of the jury is not the conclusion of a syllogism of which they are to find only the minor premise, but really a small bit of legislation ad hoc, like the standard care.”
In Gundling v. City of Chicago, 177 U.S. 183, 20 S.Ct. 633, 635, 44 L.Ed. 725, an ordinance of the city of Chicago submitted to the mayor the question of the fitness of a party to have a license to sell cigarettes. This question was submitted for the exercise of discretion of a judicial nature. No standards are contained in the ordinance to guide the mayor in his decision. The Court in upholding that ordinance against Federal attack said: “Regulations respecting the pursuit of a lawful trade or business are of very frequent occurrence in the various cities of the country, and What such regulations shall be and to what particular trade, business, or occupation they shall apply are questions for the state to determine, and their determination comes within the proper exercise of the police power by the state, and unless the regulations are so utterly unreasonable and extravagant in their nature and purpose that the *968property and personal rights of the citizens are unnecessarily, and in a manner wholly arbitrary, interfered with or destroyed without due process of law, they do not extend beyond the power of the state to pass, and they form no subject for Federal interference. As stated in Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U.S. 86 [11 Sup.Ct.Rep. 13, 34 L.Ed. 620], ‘the possession and enjoyment of all rights are subject to such reasonable conditions as may be deemed by the governing authority of the country essential to the safety, health, peace, good order, and morals of the community.’ Whether there is or is not a delegation of power by the common council to the mayor is not in this case a Federal question. We have no doubt that the ordinance, so far as the objection above considered is concerned, was clearly within the power of the state to authorize, and must be obeyed accordingly.” Again in Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277, 58 S.Ct. 205, 82 L.Ed. 252, “The privilege of voting is not derived from the United States, but is conferred by the state and, save as restrained by the Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments and other provisions of the Federal Constitution, the state may condition suffrage as it deems appropriate.”
It has been repeatedly held that a state may properly require a literacy test as a condition precedent to suffrage. It is significant that in paragraph (e) of this same 42 U.S.C.A. § 1971 in the fourth unnumbered paragraph of that subpara-graph, provision is made for a literacy test wherein the act provides: “Where proof of literacy or an understanding of other subjects is required by valid provisions of State law, the answer of the applicant, if written, shall be included in such report to the court; if oral, it shall be taken down stenographically and a transcript included in such report to the court.” The United States cannot reconcile its complaint in this case with the announcement of the Supreme Court of the United States in Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162, 88 U.S. 627, 22 L.Ed. 627, which held: “The United States has no voters in the states of its own creation. The constitution of the United States does not confer the right of suffrage upon anyone.” The sole function of the United States in this voting area is to prevent discriminations under the 14th, 15th and 19th Amendments, but the general prerogative of a state is to condition suffrage as it sees fit. Mississippi has seen fit and deemed it proper to require a voter (regardless of his color, race or origin) to be possessed of good moral character. That requirement was inserted in the organic law of the state by its insertion in § 241-A of the state constitution. It is complained that the term good moral character is not defined, and that no guide lines are supplied for its application, and that it is, therefore, a mere naked power subject to the capricious will of some irresponsible registrar. An examination of Chapter 573, Mississippi Laws 1962,6 will demonstrate to anybody that arbitrary action in the application of such test as to good moral character cannot exist in any administration of such law. A full hearing is provided for. The entire hearing must be recorded by a reporter. Quick and inexpensive appeal procedure is written into this act in addition to the general sections for appeals from the administrative rulings of the registrar. His rulings have no finality or conclusiveness and has no binding effect upon the election commissioners, or upon the circuit court on the second successive appeal.
Chapter 569, Mississippi Laws 19625 is next assailed as being unconstitutional as being in conflict with 42 U.S.C.A. § 1974 which requires a registrar to preserve and retain certain records and papers coming into his possession relating to the registration processes for a period of twenty-two months. Section 1974 of that volume makes it a crime punishable by a fine and imprisonment for the destruction, concealment, mutilation or alteration of any such records. The pertinent part of the Mississippi act assailed provides that when no appeal has been taken by an applicant from a ruling of *969the registrar upon his application or when his application is waived or abandoned by making another application for registration before final judgment or decision is rendered on any prior application, then “the registrar is not required to retain or preserve any record made under the provisions hereof.” Clearly, the state act does not require a destruction of such records but provides that they need not be kept for any state purpose. The Federal act simply intervenes and supersedes and overrides the state enactment to require the preservation of such records even under those circumstances for twenty-two months after an election to enable the Attorney General of the United States to investigate such records within said time after an election to determine and resolve any question therefrom relating to that election. The constitutionality of that state enactment under such circumstances cannot be gainsaid.
Actually, a suit against a registrar is basically a local action. It cannot be treated as in this case as a joint and several action against these six defendant county registrars for their entirely separate and distinct and disconnected activities done in the performance of their duties done solely in their respective counties. That is necessarily so in this ease where no registrar in one of the counties has ever done any official act in any other county and could not legally do so. But if any fallacy in law exists in that observation, then every registrar in each of the eighty-four counties in this state would be necessary and indispensable parties to this suit, and for lack of jurisdiction of anyone of whom, this Court could not proceed in their absence under Civil Rule 19.
This is not a diversity suit, and under the general venue statutes in this Court an action which is local in nature can be instituted only in the district of the residence of the defendant. The important considerations here, however, lie in the fact that the complaint nowhere charges that anyone of these registrars ever wrongfully did anything to deprive any negro of the right to register to vote in Mississippi. This is not a case wherein relief is sought against a registrar for discrimination. These registrars are charged with having applied the election laws of this sovereign state with an even' hand to all citizens alike. It does not state a right of action of any kind against either one of these registrars. We are, therefore, undeniably faced with a complaint which fails to state a claim upon which any relief can be granted.
It is the clear and positive duty of the Court to consider and act upon motions like these before the Court in this case in limine to forestall any unnecessary delay or expense in protracted litigation. That is the unmistakable teaching of such cases as Flanders v. Coleman, 250 U.S. 223, 228, 39 S.Ct. 472, 63 L.Ed. 948; Kvos v. Associated Press, 299 U.S. 269, 278, 57 S.Ct. 197, 81 L.Ed. 183; State of Rhode Island v. Com. of Mass., 12 Pet. (37 U.S.) 657, 718, 9 L.Ed. 1233; Walmac Co. v. Issacs, (1CA) 220 F.2d 108, 111; Battaglia v. General Motors Corp., (2CA) 169 F.2d 254, 256, cert. denied 335 U.S. 887, 69 S.Ct. 236, 93 L.Ed. 425. This Court in its exercise of a sound judicial discretion received and considered the motions of the defendants for lack of jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim against the defendants upon which relief could be granted, as provided by Civil Rule 12(b), and properly sustained those motions for the reasons indicated when it became perfectly apparent to the Court that there was no possible substance in the complaint.
Civil Rule 8(a) requires a complaint to set forth “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” and “a demand for judgment for the relief to which he deems himself entitled.” That rule permits the full application of the Notice Pleading Doctrine to any complaint filed under this rule in a Federal Court. Nevertheless, a pleader must state enough of the ultimate facts and circumstances relied upon to give the adversary some reasonable notice under the rules of fair play to apprise him of the claim asserted *970against him. Mere conclusions of the pleader without some ultimate factual basis, and bare statistics without some causal connection assigned thereto other than shallow insinuations or unsupported inferences does not satisfy the Rule 8(a) requirement for a short and plain statement of the claim. The complaint contains thirty-five legal cap pages, arranged in seventy paragraphs, so it is not short and is equally and as certainly not plain. The Court in McGuire v. Todd, (5CA) (1952) 198 F.2d 60, affirmed a dismissal of a Civil Rights suit by the trial court for such infirmity and Jack of substance as here. Cf: Haley v. Childers, (8CA) 314 F.2d 610, 613, where it is said: “But a mere conclusion of law or, as here, a naked conclusory allegation that a bargaining contract violates a f ed-erl statute, has no efficacy and is wholly insufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the federal court where such allegation is unwarranted by the asserted facts and is conti’adictory to well pleaded facts.” Stripped of such conclusions and deductions of the pleader, the complaint in this case simply seeks a declaratory judgment to have this court declare that two sections of the Mississippi Constitution 1890, and six statutes enacted in 1962 to implement those constitutional provisions as being invalid. United States counsel at the bar readily admitted in questions from the bench that discrimination was not involved in this suit; that the plaintiff relied upon § 1971(c) as its sole authority for this suit, and that there was no authority for this suit unless expressly found in that act. There is an absolute dearth of any notice to be found anywhere in this complaint that any one of the defendants ever violated § 1971(a), except by enforcing those state laws exactly as written. Attacks on those laws constituting the backbone of the entire election machinery of this state are predicated upon alleged constitutional weaknesses and infirmities in such laws themselves. It is not asserted that the State of Mississippi as a sovereign entity ever, did anything to or against any citizen in the execution of such laws. Similarly, it is not asserted that the State Election Commissioners (composed of the Governor, Secretary of State and Attorney General) ever did anything other than prepare the form of application for use of the applicants to register, and it is not asserted that their legislative action was not performed exactly as directed by the Legislature (Chapter 569, Laws 1962).5 Likewise, it is not asserted that any one of the six county registrars in this suit ever did anything, or threatened to do anything other than administer those laws exactly as written.
A state has the right to declare all of the qualifications for voting within the state. The Federal government has no power, or authority whatever in this field, except to prevent any discrimination among voters and any denial of the right of any citizen to vote on account of his race or color. Any extension of such power or authority of the Federal government would be an usurpation of state authority and an encroachment upon its sovereign domain. “[T]he privilege to vote in a state is within the jurisdiction of the state itself, to be exercised as the state may direct, and upon such terms as to it may seem proper, provided, of course, no discrimination is made between individuals, in violation of the Federal Constitution. * * * The question whether the conditions prescribed by the state might be regarded by others as reasonable or unreasonable is not a Federal one.” Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621, 24 S.Ct. 573, 48 L.Ed. 817. Speaking of the 15th Amendment, the Court in Guinn & Beal v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 35 S.Ct. 926, 930, 59 L.Ed. 1340, the Court said: “Beyond doubt the Amendment does not take away from the state governments in a general sense the power over suffrage which has belonged to those governments from the beginning, and without the possession of which power the whole fabric upon which the division of state and national author*971ity under the Constitution and the organization of both governments rest would be without support, and both the authority of the nation and the state would fall to the ground. In fact, the very command of the Amendment recognizes the possession of the general power by the state, since the Amendment seeks to regulate its exercise as to the particular subject with which it deals.”
The United States answered interrogatories propounded by the defendants and took some depositions out of which the gossipy and irrelevant material found in the last half of the dissenting opinion herein was lifted. This material came from the thesis of a political science student at Ole Miss who was writing for his Master’s Degree, probably with no thought of playing such an important and prominent role in a court opinion. It is my firm conception of the law that statements subsequently or even precedents made by a member of a constitutional convention as to its purpose and intent could have no possible legal effect upon the validity of the convention product. What some state Supreme Court judge said in a book on the Mississippi Constitution as to the problems before the convention and its solution of the race problem in the state, certainly could not claim relevancy for its production.
The meaning, intent and purpose of an unambiguous act must be obtained from the act itself and not from the expressions of legislators or their committees. Marche v. United States, (5CCA) 126 F.2d 671. United States v. Ogilvie Hardware Company, (5CCA) 155 F.2d 577. It is never permissible to allow the discussions and views of legislators, friendly or unfriendly to such legislation, to disparage the validity of the ultimate work product of the legislative body. Any such impeachment in such manner of an unambiguous enactment would violate every principal of estoppel. The speeches of a legislator and the discussions of an enactment in committee, or even explanations of a witness before the committee as to the meaning, or intention or purpose of a statute is universally considered a very poor and impoverished source on which to rely to glean the legislative intent. A legislative body is presumed to say what it means, and to mean what it says. It is not within the province of any legislator or member of a constitutional convention to disparage the validity of an enactment of such legislative body by materials of such source. That does not mean to say that a Court should close its eyes and ears to facts and circumstances surrounding an enactment when clarity of expression makes it necessary to resort to extraneous evidence to determine the meaning and intent of an ambiguous statute, or constitutional section. But there is nothing hidden, or concealed or built-in to either of these statutes which would affect its validity. These statutes and constitutional sections here contain nothing invidious, or insidious, as in Gomil-•lion, and in Yiek Wo, so strongly relied on in the dissent. These election statutes are paragons of equity of treatment of all citizens of both races alike.
According to the universal rule of statutory construction, there is the very strongest presumption in favor of the validity of each of these statutes. It is a strange philosophy which seizes upon every charge of discrimination and every claim of unconstitutionality in a statute as affording an opportunity if not an open invitation to invalidate such statute rather than sustain it. That presumption of validity must attend every statute throughout the trial of any case and be overcome only by the clearest and most convincing evidence to the contrary. In this case we are met with the extremely tenuous claim that these statutes in this case were bred and born in an atmosphere of inequity and invalidity and such evils inhere therein to invalidate them regardless of the fairness and impartiality with which such laws function and are administered. In Fleming v. A. H. Belo Corporation, (5CCA) 121 F.2d 207, in speaking of Congressional debates as reflecting upon the intent of Congress in an enactment, it is said: “It is just because of this fact, that legislation is *972compromise, that the views of the proponents and of the opponents, as to the purposes and effect of the legislative act, are never regarded as of value in a construction of it, and that it is settled law that statutes must be construed in accordance with the intent of the legislature as expressed in the language of the act as a whole. Its meaning may not be sought by the courts in the vague penumbrae of the wishes and desires of its proponents or its opponents as these are ^expressed in debates.”
In United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n., 166 U.S. 290, 17 S.Ct. 540, 550, 41 L.Ed. 1007, the Court said: “There is, too, a general acquiescence in the doctrine that debates in congress are not appropriate sources of information from which to discover the meaning of the language of a statute passed by that body. U. S. v. Union Pac. R. Co., 91 U.S, 72, at page 79 [23 L.Ed. 224] ; Aldridge v. Williams, 3 How. 9-24 [11 L.Ed. 469], Taney, C. J.; Mitchell v. [Great Works Milling &] Manufacturing Co., 2 Story, 648, at page 653, Fed.Cas.No.9,662; Reg. v. Hertford College, 3 Q.B. Div. 693, at page 707. The reason is that it is impossible to determine with certainty what construction was put upon an act by the members of a legislative body that passed it by resorting to the speeches of individual members thereof. Those who did not speak ma5r riot have agreed with those who did, and those who spoke might differ from each other; the result being that the only proper way to construe a legislative act is from the language used in the act, and, upon occasion, by a resort to the history of the times when it was passed.”
Section 244, Mississippi Constitution 1890 was before the United States Supreme Court in 1898 in Williams v. State of Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213, 18 S.Ct. 583, 42 L.Ed. 1012, where it was complained that this 1890 convention by this § 244 discriminated against the characteristics and the offenses to which negro members are prone; and that the section contained no standards for use by the registrar in applying his test to a citizen desiring to register to vote and that such discretion was thus unlimited and unreasonable and invalid. Yet, the Federal Supreme Court said that the Mississippi Constitution and laws passed pursuant thereto prescribing the qualifications of the voter and investing administrative officers with a large but sound discretion in determining what citizens have the necessary qualifications, cannot be held repugnant to the 14th Amendment merely on a showing that they operate as a discrimination against the colored race. As the complaint states [paragraph 50(b)] that § 241-A, providing the good moral character requirement provided “an additional device with which registrars could discriminate against negro citizens who seek to register to vote.” Such an averment is merely a suggestion of a possibility and nothing more which was discarded by the Court as ineffectual in Williams v. State of Mississippi, supra, to assail the validity of an act. Unless all of these eight state laws are facially invalid, the entire suit must fail. Environment of a legislative body, even an evil intent of its membership and an unlawful purpose cannot serve to invalidate its legislation because thereof. It is not contended or even suggested that all unregistered white people who apply for registration do not have to comply with all of the requirements of this entire package of laws and satisfy and demonstrate to the registrar that they possess all of the qualifications and none of the disqualifications to register to vote. The fact that such laws may discommode or inconvenience a negro citizen or even work a hardship upon him to comply with such requirements to entitle him to register to vote, does not present any constitutional infirmity in such laws. The sovereign State of Mississippi has the right to declare the qualifications of its citizens to register to vote, and every one of the qualifications in this state therefor have been repeatedly approved as valid. Substantially all requirements of the State of Mississippi for registration to vote have been uniformly approved without exception. *973United States v. Atkins, (5CA) 323 F.2d 733; Trudeau v. Barnes, (5CCA) 65 F.2d 563; cert. denied 290 U.S. 659, 54 S.Ct. 74, 78 L.Ed. 571; Lassiter v. Northhampton County Board of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 79 S.Ct. 985, 3 L.Ed.2d 1072.
This is not a school case. It is not a public accommodations case. These collateral questions may not be desperately drawn into this ease to confuse the sharp and clear issues as to the validity vel non of these Mississippi election laws. Statistics are resorted to frequently by those advocates who find themselves without substantial factual support in the genuine issues at hand. Here, much is made in the complaint and in the dissent about only 5% of the adult negro citizens being registered while 67% of the adult white citizens are registered. This Court judicially knows that negroes never manifested any substantial interest in registering or voting in Mississippi prior to a direct appeal to them from President Kennedy to do so. The weakness of such statistics is more apparent when it is realized that the complaint in this case does not undertake to link the registrars with any responsibility therefor and actually assigns no causal reason therefor; doubtless because it could not be truthfully said and certified that very many qualified negro citizens (possessing all of the qualifications and none of the disqualifications) had applied to some registrar to register and had been rejected. Surely, a qualified colored citizen who did not care to register and had never bothered about voting, could not expect to find his name on a registration roll unless he had exerted himself to do the necessary to put it there.
Since the registrars are thus parties to this suit instituted for the sole purpose of having these eight laws in a package declared unconstitutional, and since this case, therefore, does not involve an instance where anyone of these registrars has done anything to wrongfully deny any negro the right to register to vote in his county, it must follow that this Court has no jurisdiction of the sovereign state, and that the complaint fails to state a claim against the other defendants upon which relief can be granted. If this suit were not an attack on the validity of these election laws, but only an attack on the enforcement thereof by these registrars, it would not be a three judge case as it is. It is said in Sealy v. Department of Public Instruction of Penn., et al., (3CA) 252 F.2d 898; cert. denied 356 U.S. 975, 78 S.Ct. 1139, 2 L.Ed.2d 1149, “Mere attack on regulations or method of enforcement of a statute is not sufficient to justify the interposition of a three-judge court. Ex parte Bransford, 1939, 310 U.S. 354 [60 S.Ct. 947, 84 L.Ed. 1249], William Jameson & Co. v. Morgenthau, 1938, 307 U.S. 171 [59 S.Ct. 804, 83 L.Ed. 1189].”
The election machinery in this state contains every constitutional safeguard against any possible invalidity, including that of due process. Under § 3217-03, Mississippi Code 1942, the registrar “who is an administrative officer of the county in which he serves as registrar” is vested with the full power and authority to conduct administrative hearings and render his decision upon any application to register at the time or he may take the matter under advisement as a court may do. Under § 3217-04, Mississippi Code 1942, provision is made for hearings in the county on such applications to register. He may issue subpoenas for witnesses under § 3217-05. Section 3217-07, Mississippi Code 1942, requires the registrar to have all testimony taken before him to be taken down by a competent reporter and a transcript thereof filed with and retained by him in his office. Section 3217-09, Mississippi Code 1942, provides that an applicant may appear in person or by counsel at such a hearing and may examine or cross-examine witnesses as in the circuit court. Section 3217-10, Mississippi Code 1942, provides for an appeal from any decision of the registrar to the Board of County Elections Commissioners. A general section of the Code provides for a further appeal to the circuit court and even to the Supreme Court of the state. Chapter 573, Mississippi Laws *9741962 provides for an appeal to the circuit judge in term time or in vacation on the good moral character requirement of the act. Liberal provision for hearings and quick decisions on appeals differentiate this entire election system from others which have been condemned because a registrar’s acts were unlimited as to discretion and contained naked powers for arbitrary and capricious actions which were final and conclusive.
These Mississippi election laws at bar fairly demonstrate upon their face the recognition and application of all of the rules of fair play and impartial treatment of all citizens of both races alike. The majority opinion and ensuing judgment in this ease in its entirety is irre-fragably correct and I concur therein.
. “Section 241-A. In addition to all other qualifications required of a person to be entitled to register for the purpose of becoming a qualified elector, such person shall be of good moral character. The Legislature shall have the power to enforce the provisions of this section by appropriate legislation.”
. “Section 244■ Every elector shall, in addition to the foregoing qualifications be able to read and write any section of the Constitution of this State and give a reasonable interpretation thereof to the county registrar. He shall demonstrate to the county registrar a reasonable understanding of the duties and obligations of citizenship under a constitutional form of government. The person applying to register shall make a sworn, written application for registration on a form to bo prescribed by the state board of election commissioners, exhibiting therein the essential facts and qualifications necessary to show that he is entitled to register and vote, said application to be entirely written, dated and signed by the applicant in the presence of the county registrar, without assistance or suggestion from any person or memorandum whatever; provided, however, that if the applicant is unable to write his application by reason of physical disability, the same, upon his oath of such disability, shall be written at his unassisted dictation by the county registrar. Any new or additional qualifications herein imposed shall not be required of any person who was a duly registered and qualified elector of this state prior to January 1, 1954. The Legislature shall have the power to enforce the provisions of this section by appropriate legislation.”
. “Section 1. Person not to register unless he can read and write. A person shall not be registered unless he be able to read and write any section of the constitution of this state and give a reasonable interpretation thereof to the county registrar. He shall demonstrate to the county registrar a reasonable understanding of the duties and obligations of citizenship under a constitutional form of government; he shall also demonstrate to the county registrar that he is a person of good moral character. The person applying to register shall make a sworn, written application for registration on a form prescribed by the state board of election commissioners, exhibiting therein the essential facts and qualifications necessary to show that he is entitled to register and vote, said application to be entirely written, dated and signed by the applicant in the presence of the county registrar, without assistance or suggestion from any person or memorandum whatever; provided, however, that if the applicant is unable to write his application by reason of physical disability, the same, upon his oath of such disability, shall be written at his unassisted dictation by the county registrar. As originally enacted each provision is and it is further declared to be mandatory and not directory; no application should have been and shall not be approved or the applicant declared qualified to register to vote unless all blank spaces in the application and the oath are properly and responsively filled out by the applicant; and the oath, as such, shall be signed by the applicant; and the application, as such, shall be signed separately by the applicant at the places thereon provided for applicant’s signature. Provided, however, the provisions herein imposed shall not be required of any person who was a duly registered and qualified elector of this state prior to January 1, 1954; except *961tliat from and after the effective date of this act no person shall be permitted to register unless he demonstrates to the county registrar that he is of good moral character as required by the provisions of Section 241-A of the Constitution of Mississippi. Section 2. Should any provision of this act be held to be unconstitutional or otherwise invalid for any reason, such holding shall not be construed to affect the validity of any other part or portion of this act.
. “Section 1. That Section 3232, Mississippi Code of 1942, Recompiled, be and the same is hereby amended to read as follows: 3232. Form of poll book. The poll book of each election district shall have printed or written at the top of each page words to designate the election district for which it is to be used, and shall be ruled in appropriate columns, with printed or written headings, as follows: Date of registration; name of electors; age; and a number of blank columns for the dates of elections. All who register within four months before any regular election shall be entered on the poll books immediately after such election, and not before, so that the poll books will show only the names of those qualified to vote at such election. When election commissioners determine that any elector is disqualified from voting, by reason of being delinquent for poll tax, removal from the precinct, or other cause, that fact shall be noted on the registration book and his name shall be erased from the poll book. After disqualification for delinquency has been removed in subsequent years, the name of such elector shall be reinstated on the poll book without re-registration, and that fact shall be noted in the registration book.”
. “Section 1. The state board of election commissioners shall, as soon as practicable and thereafter at such times as it may deem advisable, consistent with the Constitution, prepare a series of application blanks, including the oath of the person offering to register, in compliance with Section 242 of the Constitution of this state, and including blank forms for furnishing of information, showing date of application, which shall be the date of registration if such applicant be approved for registration; name of applicant; age; occupation ; where business carried on; if employed, by whom; place of residence; date such residence began; previous place of residence; what oath applicant takes; if more than one person of the same name in precinct, by what name applicant wishes to be called; whether applicant has been convicted, and if so, when and where, of any of the crimes referred to in Section 241 of the Constitution of Mississippi, which are bribery, theft, arson, obtaining money under false pretenses, perjury, forgery, embezzlement and bigamy, and the moral character of applicant; all designed to test the ability of applicants for registration to vote to read and write any section of the Constitution of this state and give a reasonable interpretation thereof, and demonstrate to the county registrar a reasonable understanding of the duties and obligations of citizenship under a constitutional form of government; and to demonstrate to the county registrar that applicant is a person of good moral character as required by Section 241-A of the Constitution of Mississippi. Such applications shall be designed to exhibit the essential facts and qualifications necessary to show that such person is entitled to register and vote. Copies of such application blank forms shall be delivered to the county registrar of each county, and such copies shall be supplied to each county registrar as needed. The oath required by Section 242 of the Constitution shall be administered by the registrar. The board of supervisors is authorized to make proper allowances for office supplies reasonably necessary by this act. If no appeal has been or is taken as provided by law from the ruling of the registrar upon any application for registration, or if any application for registration is abandoned or waived by the applicant therein by making another application for registration before any final judgment or decision has been rendered on any prior application, or otherwise waived or abandoned same, the registrar is not required to retain or preserve any record made under the provisions hereof. Section 2. * * * Registrar to register voters. The registrar shall register on the registration books of the election district of the residence of such person anyone appearing before him, and being, upon examination found, in compliance with Section 244 of the Constitution, as amended, and in compliance with Section 241-A of the Constitution of Mississippi to be entitled to be registered as an elector, upon such person taking *962and subscribing the oath required b3' Section 242 of the Constitution of Mississippi; but persons who may be entitled to register under the provisions of Section 251 of the Constitution of Mississippi, who would be otherwise disqualified by reason of age, may take the oath as modified by that circumstance, and the subscription of the oath shall be by the elector writing his name in the proper column in the registration book. Section 8. * * * Form of registration books. The registration books are to be in the following form: They shall have printed at the top of the pages the oath prescribed by Section 242 of the Constitution of Mississippi, and beneath shall be ruled appropriate columns, the headings of which shall be printed respectively, as follows, viz: date of registration; names of electors; age; occupation; where business carried on; if employed, by whom; place of residence in the district; what oath does elector take? If more than one person of same name in district, by what appellation does elector wish to be called? Has the elector met all of the requirements of Section 244 of the Constitution of Mississippi, as amended? Has the elector met all of the requirements of Section 241-A of the Constitution of Mississippi? Signature of elector; remarks. In the column headed ‘What oath does elector take?’ the registrar shall write the word ‘general,’ if the elector take the general oath prescribed, the word ‘minister’s,’ or ‘minister’s wife,’ if he or she take the oath as modified by the parenthetical sentence thereon; and the words ‘special as to age,’ if the elector will, as provided in Section 251 of the Constitution of Mississippi, become of age before the election next after he proposed to register; and in the column headed, ‘Has the elector met, etc?’ if he has mot all the requirements-of Section 244 of the Constitution, as amended, and Section 241-A of the Constitution of Mississippi, the word ‘yes’ shall be entered. And provided further, that when a new registration is ordered in a county that new registration books shall be purchased to comply with the form prescribed herein. And provided further, that persons registering in any such new registration books who were duly registered and qualified electors of this state prior to January 1, 1954, shall be entitled to register in such new registration books in accordance with the requirements of law in existence on said date; except that all persons registering after the effective date of this act shall bo of good moral character as required by Section 241-A of the Constitution of Mississippi. Section Jf. Should any provision or section of this act be held to be unconstitutional or otherwise invalid for any reason, such holding shall not be construed to affect the validity of any other part or portion of this act.
. See Note 6 on Page 962.
*9626. “Section 1. The sufficiency and the truthfulness of the statements made in the application to register to vote, and the contents thereof, and the good moral character of an applicant to register to vote are material, and this act is-adopted to further enforce the requirements to register to vote as set out in the Constitution and laws of the State of Mississippi. Section 2. Any qualified elector of the county may challenge the good moral character of any applicant and any other requirement of any applicant to vote within fourteen (14) days after the date of the last publication of the name and address of such applicant by filing with the registrar an affidavit in duplicate setting forth facts upon which the challenge is based. Upon the filing of any such challenge the registrar shall within seven (7) days thereafter, exclusive of the date of the filing of such challenge, send to applicant by certified mail, addressed to him at the address shown on the application, one copy of such affidavit, and notice of the date, time and place where the registrar will hold an administrative hearing to determine the sufficiency of the application or challenge. Section 8. The registrar, 3vlio-is au administrative officer of the county in which he serves as registrar, is hereby vested with full power and authority to hold and conduct such administrative hearing and render his decision thereon; he may render his decision at the completion of the hearing or may take the matter under advisement just as a court may do. Section •£. Such hearing shall be held in the office of the registrar or at some other place designated by the registrar in the county courthouse, and shall be set within a reasonable time after the date of the mailing of said notice. If there be two (2) judicial districts in the county, then the hearing shall be had in the courthouse of the judicial district in which the application to register is made. On his own motion or for good cause shown, the registrar may change the date and time of suck hearing. At such hearing by the registrar he may hear oral and documentary evidence in support of, in challenge of, or denial of, the sufficiency of the application, the good moral character of the applicant, and as to any other require*963ment which applicant must meet in order to be qualified to register to vote. Section 5. The registrar may issue subpoenas to be served by the Sheriff of the county to secure their attendance as witnesses and the production of documents at such hearing. Obedience to any such subpoena 'may be secured by the registrar by filing with the Circuit Judge, in term time or in vacation, a petition seeking enforcement, and the person subpoenaed shall obey the order of the Circuit judge made therein. The Circuit Judge, in vacation or in term time, is hereby vested with jurisdiction to hear and determine such petition, make proper orders thereon and issue appropriate process, and said petition shall be heard at such time and place as he may specify on five (5) days’ notice to all parties. Section 6. The registrar shall administer to the witnesses who testify in said administrative hearing the same oath as is used in the trial of cases in the Circuit Court. Section 7. The registrar shall require all testimony taken before him to be taken down by a competent stenographer or reporter, and a transcript thereof shall be filed with and retained by the registrar as a record of his office. AE costs of such proceedings may be taxed by the registrar in accord with the manner and practice pertaining to costs in the Chancery Court under the laws of this State. Section S. If the decision of the registrar be that the appEcant is qualified to register under the Constitution and laws of the State of Mississippi, he shaE be forthwith registered; but if the registrar finds that appEcant is not qualified under said Constitution and laws to be registered, he shaE not register the applicant but shaE mark his ap-pEcation ‘faEed’; but if he finds that appEcant is not of good moral character he shaE so endorse the application and state the facts upon which the finding of lack of good moral character is based. Section 9. At such hearing held by the registrar, appEcant and any person or persons chaUenging the truthfulness or sufficiency of the appEcation may be represented by counsel, but applicant and any chaEenger may appear pro se in and on his own behalf if they choose. AVitnesses may be examined or cross-examined as in trials in the Circuit Court. Section 10. An appeal may be taken to the Board of County Election Commissioners by any persons against whom the registrar may decide within the same time and in the same manner as is now provided for an appeal from registration or denial of registration by the registrar. Section 11. If the appEcant or any challenger does not appear at the time and place set by the registrar for the hearing of any challenge, the registrar may, in his discretion, reset the hearing or may proceed and determine whether ap-pEcant is or is not, as the case may be, quaEfied under the Constitution and laws of the State of Mississippi to register to vote. The person or persons against whom the registrar decides may appeal as above provided just as if a hearing had been held. Section 12. Strict rules of evidence shaE not be enforced at the hearing herein provided for. AAEtnesses may be examined by the applicant or his attorneys, and by the challenger or challengers or their attorneys. Section IS. The provisions of this act are intended to provide an additional administrative method whereby third parties may chaEenge the sufficiency of any application to register and the good moral character of an applicant, and are not intended to affect the right, duty and authority of the registrar to determine such qualifications, as now provided by law, if no chaEenge is made by any third party.
. “Section 1. AYithin ten (10) days after the receipt by the registrar of any application to register to vote and before consideration is given to the sufficiency of the appEeation, the registrar shaE de-Ever for pubEcation in a newspaper hereinafter described the name and address of such appEcant as stated in said application and shall cause same to be published once each week for two (2) consecutive weeks in a newspaper having general circulation in the county where such appEcant has appEed to register, but if no such newspaper is pubEshed in such county, then pubEcation shaE be made in some newspaper pubEshed in an adjoining or other county but of general circulation in the county of the residence of the applicant. Section 2. The said name and address shaE be pubEshed in said newspaper under a heading entitled: ‘Applicants for registration to vote.’ AVhen said pubEcation shaE have been completed, proper proof of pubEcation shaE be furnished to the registrar and same shaE be preserved *964as a record of Ms office. The cost of the publication and proof thereof shall be paid by the county out of its general fund at the rate for legal notices. Section 8. If within fourteen (14) days, exclusive of the date of the last publication of the name or names aforesaid, after the date of the last publication, no qualified elector of the county, other than the registrar, shall have challenged, in the manner prescribed by law, the good moral character of applicant and any other requirement which applicant must meet in order to be qualified to register to vote, the registrar shall within a reasonable time, under the circumstances, determine whether applicant has complied with the Constitution and laws of the State of Mississippi to entitle him to register to vote.
. See Note S on Page 964.
*9648. “Section 1. When the registrar shall have determined that an applicant to register to vote has qualified to register under the Constitution and laws of the State of Mississippi, he shaE endorse upon the application the word ‘passed,’ or a word or words of equivalent meaning, and the applicant shall be entitled to register upon his request for registration made in person to the registrar, or deputy registrar, if a deputy registrar has been appointed. As is now required by law, no person other than the registrar or a deputy registrar shaE register any applicant. It shall be the responsibility of an applicant for registration to make inquiry of the registrar, or the deputy registrar, if a deputy registrar has been appointed, to determine whether such applicant has passed and is qualified to register. Section 2. If appEcant be of good moral character, but has not otherwise complied with the Constitution and laws of this state to entitle him to vote, then the registrar shall endorse upon the appEcation the word ‘faEed,’ without specifying, the reason or reasons therefor, as so to do may constitute assistance to the appEcant on another application. Section S. If applicant is otherwise qualified to register, but fails to demonstrate to the registrar that applicant is of good moral character and the registrar so finds, the registrar shaE endorse upon the application the words ‘not of good moral character,’ and shall state the facts or reasons why he finds appEcant not to be of good moral character. Section J¡. If applicant is not otherwise qualified under said Constitution and laws and fails to demonstrate that he is of good moral character, then the registrar shaE endorse upon the appEcation the word ‘failed,’ and may endorse thereon the words ‘not of good moral character,’ but if he endorses the latter on the application he shall state the facts and reasons why he finds applicant not to be of good moral character.”
NOTE: The foregoing footnotes and this opinion refers to the House BiEs under attack as set out in the complaint by reference to the Chapter in the Session Laws where they appear and are the same as those referred to as being sections of the Mississippi Code 1942 as contained in the majority opinion. Each section of the Session Acts now appears as a separate section of the Code though such references are to the same laws.
. Seo Note 2 on Page 9C0.
. See Note 3 on Page 9G0.
. Seo Note 6 on Page 962.
. See Note 5 on Page 961.
. See Note 5 on Page 961.