dissenting. The only issue here is whether the obviously ambiguous language of the statute should be construed to give the hearing board jurisdiction on appeal to determine de novo an application for a license to hold racing on certain dates. If it is so construed then there are two licensing authorities over racing and the hearing board is the more important of the two because its action in denying or granting an application is final since such action can only be reviewed by this court on certiorari which raises only questions of law. The majority frankly concede that the effect of their opinion is to transfer the right of finality in the assignment or fixing of racing dates to the hearing-board and that the legislature thus intended to make the board a super licensing authority.
With that conclusion I cannot agree. Of course, the legislature could so legislate, and if the statute under consideration were clear and unambiguous to that effect I would be constrained to apply it in accordance with its plain intent. But here the troublesome language is anything but unambiguous when it declares that the commission shall have the right to reject any application for a license for any reason it deems sufficient and that such action shall be final and then adds “subject to the right of appeal.”
The latter words were apparently incorporated in G. L. 1956, §41-3-4, by the statute consolidation commission and *199I am not satisfied from the' commission's report or from the editorial notes appended to the section in explanation of the interpolation that it was expressly called to the attention of the legislature, as is required, when the revised consolidation of the general laws was approved.
Robert A. Gentile, for petitioners. Sherwood and Clifford, Raymond E. Jordan, William A. Curran, for intervenor Burrillville Racing Association. J. Joseph Nugent, Attorney General, for respondents Maxwell W. Waldman et al. Aram A. Arabian, for amicus curiae Narragansett Racing Association.In the circumstances grave doubt is cast upon the validity of such new matter in §41-3-4, and therefore it cannot be safely relied upon as the expression of the true intent of the legislature. Much more might be said against the conclusion to which the majority has come but no useful purpose would be served thereby, hence I rest upon the foregoing statement as one reason for this dissent.
Paolino, J. concurs in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Condon.