The sole issue under consideration in this appeal is whether appellant, a non-indigent male,1 was denied due process when the lower court ordered him to proceed, without the benefit of representation by counsel, at a paternity hearing which resulted in a finding of paternity by the court and the entry of an order of support against him. We conclude that, under the circumstances set forth herein, the due process rights of appellant were violated and we reverse the order of the Common Pleas Court.
Appellee originally commenced this action by filing a petition for support on October 27, 1978. The docket reflects events of the seven subsequent listings:
12/8/78 Petition. Harris, J. Both present. Petitioner’s attorney present. Defendant denies paternity for Anjela Nikkole (order entered by judge) Blood Studies granted. Defendant to pay for Blood tests. List February Trial, Civil Non-Jury.
*1873/1/79 Civil Non-Jury Trial. Meade, J. Defendant absent. Defendant’s attorney present. Petitioner absent. Petitioner’s attorney present. Defendant’s attorney to accept service for Defendant. Continued to 4/18/79 for Civil Non-Jury Trial.
4/18/79 Civil Non-Jury Trial. Meade, J. Both present. Represented by Counsel. Continued next available list by agreement of Counsel. Attorneys will notify the court.
5/23/79 Civil Non-Jury Trial. Meade, J. Both present. Petitioner’s attorney present. Continued Next Available List. Continued to 6/4/79 by agreement of Counsel pending possible agreement of parties. Court Room “E”.
6/4/79 Civil Non-Jury Trial. Meade, J. Both absent. Continued next available list. Personal Service on both parties. Later: Petitioner’s attorney appeared late. Request date certain to 7/24/79, Courtroom E.
7/24/79 Civil Non-Jury Trial. Zaleski, J. Both present. Defense attorney present. Petitioner’s attorney present. Continued to 9/21/79 for C.N.-J.T.
9/21/79 Cvil Non-Jury Trial. Zaleski, J. Both absent. Petitioner’s attorney present. At request of Petitioner’s attorney, Petition withdrawn without prejudice.
The record indicates that when the petition was finally withdrawn at the seventh listing of the case counsel for appellee did so as a result of an informal agreement by appellant to make certain payments to appellee.
Appellee subsequently filed a new complaint for support on August 13, 1980, almost one year after she had withdrawn the first petition, in which she alleged that appellant had “failed to comply with an informal promise to support the child.” Both parties appeared in court before the learned Philadelphia Common Pleas Court Judge Jerome A. Zaleski on January 8, 1981, at the initial listing of the case after the new complaint for support had been filed. At that time, appellant denied paternity and the court scheduled the case for trial without a jury on February 4, 1981.
*188Appellant appeared in court on that date, but without an attorney, despite a warning from the hearing judge at the previous listing that the matter would proceed to trial at the next listing whether or not appellant was represented by counsel. This admonition was delivered in an attempt to avoid any further delay in the conclusion of the case that had been listed for court on eight separate occasions. When the case was called for trial on February 4, 1981, appellant advised the trial judge that his counsel had withdrawn from the case and he had been unable to secure another attorney. The court, nonetheless, ordered the case to proceed to trial and, at the conclusion thereof, the trial judge entered a finding of paternity and imposed an order of support in the amount of $40.00 per week plus an additional $10.00 per week for the arrearage that had accumulated since the filing of the second complaint. New counsel filed this appeal on March 5, 1981 from the order of the Common Pleas Court which determined paternity and fixed the amount of support to be paid. New counsel also filed a petition for reconsideration on March 6, 1981 and, following a hearing on the petition, the petition was denied by order dated May 7, 1981.2
This court, in a fine opinion by our distinguished colleague Judge James R. Cavanaugh, recently recognized that denial of counsel for indigent defendants in civil paternity actions in Pennsylvania is inconsistent with due process and, held that “the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires the appointment of; counsel for indigent defendants in civil paternity actions in Pennsylvania”. Corra v. Coll, 305 Pa.Superior 179, 193, 451 A.2d 480, 488 (1982). The court reached this conclusion after it had carefully balanced the three due process factors enunciated in Mathews v. El*189dridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 903, 47 L.Ed.2d 18, 33 (1976), against the presumption that court appointed counsel is constitutionally required for indigent defendants in a paternity proceeding,
The Corra court rejected the contention that a defendant in a paternity suit has no presumed right to counsel since an adjudication of paternity cannot directly result in the deprivation of physical liberty and reasoned:
As we have noted, the civil/criminal distinction is unavailing in determining whether counsel is constitutionally required. Thus it is of no moment that paternity actions, once governed by criminal statutes, are now civil in nature. This jurisdiction does not make criminal, and hence punishable by incarceration, the fathering of a bastard child. An adjudication of paternity may, however, result in the future loss of liberty. Once paternity has been established, and a support order entered, a defendant who wilfully fails to comply with said order when he has the financial ability to do so, shall be guilty of a summary offense punishable by up to 90 days imprisonment. We cannot agree with the Public Defender’s position that this threatened deprivation of liberty is too remote to justify the appointment of counsel at the hearing at which paternity is established. Corra v. Coll, supra, 305 Pa.Superior at 186-187, 451 A.2d at 483-485. (citations and footnotes omitted.)
The instant appeal differs somewhat from the issue addressed by the Corra court since the paternity defendant there was indigent, while the paternity defendant in the instant case is not. It appears clear, however, that a potential deprivation of liberty confronts any paternity defendant, whether or not indigent, and, since this court has determined that indigent paternity defendants have a right to counsel, non-indigent paternity defendants must, at least, be afforded a reasonable opportunity to secure representation by counsel to assist in the defense of such claims. Therefore, we conclude that appellant here, although not indigent, should have been granted, under the circumstanc*190es hereinbefore detailed, a reasonable opportunity to retain counsel of his choice to represent him for the trial of the case.3 Accordingly, we reverse the order of the Common Pleas Court and remand the case to that court for disposition of the paternity proceeding after appellant has been afforded a reasonable opportunity to retain counsel to represent him. Jurisdiction is relinquished.
So ordered.
JOHNSON, J., files a concurring and dissenting opinion.. The record discloses that appellant was employed full-time as a computer systems analyst manager at the time of the paternity hearing and was receiving a gross weekly income of approximately $250.00 from his employment.
. It appears that the Common Pleas Court was without jurisdiction to render a decision on the petition for reconsideration at the time the order of denial was entered, since more than 30 days had passed from the date of the filing of the notice of appeal to this court. See Pa.R.A.P. 1701(b)(3) and Comment thereto. This action would, of course, have no effect upon the issue presented for our review in this appeal.
. The distinguished trial judge did not have, at the time of these proceedings and his decision in 1981, the benefit of the recent decision of this court in Corra.