dissenting: I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the district court did not have an obligation to inquire about appointed counsel’s potential conflict of interest at the hearing on the motion to withdraw plea.
The majority’s heavy reliance on State v. Williams, 290 Kan. 1050, 236 P.3d 512 (2010), is misplaced because of a significant distinguishing factor: There is no indication that Williams had previously accused her counsel of being ineffective. In contrast, in this case Brandon Hulett had previously asserted that he had been deprived of conflict-free counsel and that his appointed counsel, Charles Lamb, had failed to effectively represent him. Some of Hulett’s complaints related to a breakdown in communication between Hulett and Lamb. With this background in mind, several statements at the hearing on the motion to withdraw plea are particularly noteworthy and, as Hulett aptly states, should have been “red flags” prompting an inquiry from the court.
First, Lamb stated: “In the letter he says that it was a mistake. I don’t know any other basis for that other than that, but pursuant to his wish, I did file [the motion to withdraw plea].” Lamb also stated: “I think what we ought to do is let Mr. Hulett explain why he thinks that’s justified because I don’t know the reasons other than what he said that it was a mistake.” Plulett, forced to present his own argument, suggested he should be allowed to withdraw his plea because there was an insufficient factual basis for the plea and he did not understand the rights he was waiving, particularly his right to appeal. Both grounds were legitimate legal grounds for seeking to have a plea withdrawn. See K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 22-*3243210(a)(3), (4); Williams, 290 Kan. at 1053 (basis for plea withdrawal includes grounds that plea was not fairly and understandingly made). Because they were legitimate grounds for seeking to set aside the plea, it seems a short conversation between Lamb and Hulett would have been all that was necessary for Lamb to have been able to represent his client and present any supporting legal arguments. If Lamb disagreed factually, he could have left the factual explanation to his client. The important point, however, is that these circumstances suggest there had been no attempt by Lamb to communicate with his client or that there was such a complete breakdown in their relationship that Hulett had refused communication. Unfortunately, because the district court did not make any inquiry, we do not know whether there had been an attempt to communicate, a breakdown in communication, or absolutely no attempt to learn the reasons.
Second, Hulett began his comments to the district court by stating:
“First of all, after the first hearing I asked to withdraw the plea then. My lawyer said you can’t. Bottom line. I asked to speak to you and I asked to speak to my father. He said — he said when he came back, he said that you said I could do neither.”
These comments suggest that Lamb took the position immediately after the plea hearing that he would not assist Hulett’s efforts to withdraw the plea. Even though Hulett’s comments were not phrased in legal terms such as “conflict of interest” or “ineffective assistance of counsel,” the statements were an explicit allegation of problems with Hulett’s counsel. Further, the comments suggest a deterioration in the relationship between Hulett and Lamb from the time of the hearing on the motion for substitute counsel. The potential for a conflict of interest is not static, and under circumstances where there was new evidence of a breakdown in the attorney-client relationship, it was not appropriate to rest on findings made before trial.
Consequently, I would find that State v. Vann, 280 Kan. 782, 127 P.3d 307 (2006), and State v. Taylor, 266 Kan. 967, 975 P.2d 1196 (1999), do apply, and under those cases the district court had *325a duty to inquire about a possible conflict of interest that prevented Hulett from receiving effective assistance of counsel at the hearing on the motion to withdraw plea and at the plea hearing itself. I would remand for appointment of new counsel and a hearing on the motion to withdraw plea.
Johnson, J., joins the foregoing dissenting opinion.