Opinion of the Court by
Justice JOHNSTONE.The central issue in each of the captioned cases is whether KRS 160.345(2)(h) requires a site based decision making council to select a school principal from among those applicants whom the local superintendent recommends. Because the primary issue is common to both cases, we will address it in a single opinion. We will also address the issue of whether the gender discrimination claim asserted in Back v. Robinson is barred by the election of remedies doctrine.
The Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, heard the issue concerning the construction of KRS 160.345(2)(h) in Robinson v. Back, Ky.App., — S.W.3d -, 2001-CA-001933-MR (May 16, 2003). In an 8-5 decision, the Court reversed the summary judgment of the Greenup Circuit Court and concluded that the statute requires the local superintendent to forward all applications meeting statutory standards to the school council upon its request, regardless of whether the candidate bears the superintendent’s recommendation. A three-member panel considered the dismissal of the appellee’s gender discrimination claim in Robinson v. Back, determining that the doctrine of remedies did not bar the claim and, therefore, summary judgment was improper. We affirm the Court of Appeals on both issues.
In Young v. Hammond, the movant sought interlocutory relief before the Court of Appeals, claiming that the Adair Circuit Court abused its discretion in granting two temporary injunctions. Incorporating by reference its en banc opinion in Robinson v. Back, the Court of Appeals in Young v. Hammond denied the motion for interlocutory relief. We affirm.
I. Young v. Hammond
The movant, Keith Young (Young), is Superintendent of the Adair County School District. On May 3, 2002, Young demoted Michael Akin (Akin) from his position as principal of Adair County High School, citing inadequate performance. Young posted the position as vacant, received nine applications, and forwarded three applications to the Adair County High School’s site based decision making council (the Adair Council). The remaining six applications, including Akin’s, were not forwarded to the Adair Council because Young did not recommend these applicants.
The Adair Council reviewed the three recommended applications, rejected them, and subsequently requested that Young forward all remaining applications for consideration. Young refused, relying on KRS 160.345(2)(h) that he was not required to forward applications that he did not recommend. The 2002-2003 school year commenced, and Young appointed one of the three recommended applicants as the interim principal. The Adair Council filed a complaint and motion for a temporary injunction against Young. The motion sought to compel Young to forward all nine applications to the Adair Council for consideration. Akin filed a simultaneous complaint and a motion.
The Adair Circuit Court entered its joint findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order on August 27, granting the motions for temporary injunctions against Young. Young eventually did forward the remain*898ing applications to the Adair Council, which made the recommendation that Young re-hire Akin as the principal of Adair High School. Young refused to complete the hiring of Akin, and the Adair Council and Akin sought another temporary injunction against Young that would order him to hire Akin. Arguing that the Adair Circuit Court abused its discretion in granting the two temporary injunctions, Young sought interlocutory relief from the Court of Appeals. Incorporating by reference its opinion in Robinson v. Back, the Court of Appeals denied Young’s motion, determining that KRS 160.345(2)(h) does not require a school’s site based decision making council to fill a vacancy in a princi-palship only from those applicants bearing the local superintendent’s recommendation. Young now appeals to this Court.
II. Back v. Robinson
The appellant, Ronald Back (Back), is the Superintendent of the Russell Independent School District. In 1998, a vacancy occurred in the principalship of Russell High School. The appellee, Mary Robinson (Robinson), then the assistant principal of Russell High School, submitted her application for consideration. Pursuant to KRS 160.345(2)(h), Back forwarded to Russell High School’s site based decision making council (the Russell Council) four applications for the vacant principal position. Robinson’s application was not forwarded.
The Russell Council then requested additional applications from Back. Stating that he did not recommend any of the remaining applicants and was therefore not required to provide additional candidates, Back did not forward any additional resumes to the Russell Council. Consequently, Robinson’s application was not considered and a principal was selected from among the four applications originally provided to the Russell Council. Both parties agree, however, that Robinson was statutorily qualified for the position.
Robinson sued Back on three grounds: (1) that Back acted in violation of KRS 160.345(2)(h) when he refused to forward her application to the Russell Council; (2) that Back had discriminated against her on the basis of gender; and (3) that she had not been compensated for work performed in violation of KRS 337.020. The Greenup Circuit Court granted summary judgment dismissing all three claims. Robinson appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of Robinson’s compensation claim, but reversed the dismissal of her gender discrimination claim. Sitting en banc as to the issue concerning KRS 160.345(2)(h), the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision, holding that KRS 160.345(2)(h) requires a local superintendent to forward all available and statutorily qualified applicants to the site based decision-making council, including those whom the superintendent does not recommend. Back now seeks review by this Court of the Court of Appeals’ decision with respect to its reinstatement of Robinson’s gender discrimination claim and its interpretation of KRS 160.345(2)(h).
III. Interpretation of KRS 160.345(2)(h)
The primary question before us in both matters is the proper interpretation of certain portions of KRS 160.345(2)(h), which are highlighted below:
From a list of applicants submitted by the local superintendent, the principal at the participating school shall select personnel to fill vacancies, after consultation with the school council, consistent *899with subsection (2)(i)10 of this section. The superintendent may forward to the school council the names of qualified applicants who have pending certification from the Education Professional Standards Board based on recent completion of preparation requirements, out-of-state preparation, or alternative routes to certification pursuant to KRS 161.028 and 161.048. Requests for transfer shall conform to any employer-employee bargained contract which is in effect. If the vacancy to be filled is the position of principal, the school council shall select the new principal from among those persons recommended by the local superintendent. When a vacancy in the school principalship occurs, the school council shall receive training in recruitment and interviewing techniques prior to carrying out the process of selecting a principal. The council shall select the trainer to deliver the training. Personnel decisions made at the school level under the authority of this subsection shall be binding on the superintendent who completes the hiring process. Applicants subsequently employed shall provide evidence that they are certified prior to assuming the duties of a position in accordance with KRS 161.020. The superintendent shall provide additional applicants upon request when qualified applicants are available.
(Emphasis added).
Specifically, we must determine the meaning of the word “qualified” as it is used in the final sentence of the statute. Young and Back argue that the Court of Appeals erred in interpreting the term “qualified” to mean “meeting statutory requirements.” As read by Young and Back, the last sentence of KRS 160.345(2)(h) requires the superintendent to forward additional applications to the Council only when additional, recommended applications exist. To allow the Court of Appeals’ opinion to stand would mean that school councils might hire principals that are not recommended by the local superintendent, as was the case with Young. Young and Back assert that this interpretation removes the local superintendent from the hiring process, and creates an environment in which the local superintendent is expected to closely manage an employee whom he or she did not necessarily recommend for employment.
In their respective responses, Akin and Robinson urge this Court to affirm the Court of Appeals’ decision. Akin and Robinson point to the use of the word “shall” in the last sentence of KRS 160.345(2)(h) to support the interpretation that the superintendent must forward all remaining applicants to the school based decision making council, regardless of whether the local superintendent recommends those applicants. This reading also requires that the term “qualified,” as used in the last sentence of the statute, mean simply “meeting statutory requirements.” Akin and Robinson rely heavily on the Kentucky Educational Reform Act’s objectives of decentralization and shared decision-making authority to support this interpretation. According to Akin and Robinson, KRS 160.345(2)(h) sets up a two-tiered process whereby the superintendent initially recommends one or more candidates to the school based council for its consideration in the selection of a principal; it is only after the initial candidates have been selected and rejected that the superintendent then must forward all remaining applicants who meet the statutory requirements for the position.
We have considered the positions of both parties, as well as the numerous *900amicus curiae briefs filed in these matters, and conclude that the Court of Appeals’ interpretation of KRS 160.345(2)(h) is correct.
In deciding the issue of whether KRS 160.345(2)(h) requires the local superintendent to provide to the school council additional applications when qualified applications are available, even though such applicants may not carry the recommendation of the superintendent, it is imperative to revisit the objectives and goals of the Kentucky Education Reform Act (KERA), and the background against which the reform act was passed. The General Assembly passed KERA in response to this Court’s decision in Rose v. Council for Better Education, Inc.,1 in which we determined that the General Assembly had not fully complied with its constitutional duty to provide “an efficient system of common schools throughout the state”.2 Among other contributing factors, the Court in Rose concluded that the dire situation in Kentucky’s public schools was due largely to “improper nepotism” and “favoritism.”3 Moreover, in delineating the characteristics of a system of education that would meet the constitutional mandate of efficiency, this Court listed as a minimum requirement a common school system that operates with “no waste, no duplication, no mismanagement, and with no political influence.”4
Consequently, in constructing KERA, a central and fundamental goal of the reform act was to decentralize school management, to remove opportunities for nepotism and political influence, and to disperse decision-making authority among several interested parties. Especially important to consideration of the case sub judice are the underlying theories behind the bold and ambitious implementation of site based decision making councils. These councils were created in direct response to widely documented instances of mismanagement that most agreed were incubated in, if not caused by, an overly centralized system of school governance in which vast decision-making authority rested in the hands of a few key players.5 Decentralization of school management, however, allows for a higher level of accountability, in that it is easier to hold a particular school responsible for poor performance when school governance issues are actually being decided at the school, rather than at the county or state level.6 The language of KERA itself reflects the faith that was placed in decentralization as a vehicle for massive educational reform: “The General Assembly recognizes that public education involves shared responsibilities. State government, local communities, parents, students, and school employees must work together to create an efficient public school system.” KRS 158.645. Likewise, this Court has continually recognized decentralization as a cornerstone of educational reform in this Commonwealth.
Pervasive throughout all pertinent provisions, when considered as a whole statu*901tory framework, is one important theme. The essential strategic point of KERA is the decentralization of decision making authority so as to involve all participants in the school system, affording each the opportunity to contribute actively to the educational process.7
Bearing in mind the importance of decentralization to KERA, we turn to the interpretation of KRS 160.345(2)(h). We conclude that the word “qualified” as used in KRS 160.345(2)(h) must be interpreted to mean “meeting statutory requirements.” To hold that a school council may only select a principal from among those applicants recommended by the local superintendent would undermine the primary goal of decentralization of authority and would be at odds with KERA’s stated goal of shared decision-making authority.
A construction of KRS 160.345(2)(h) that would allow the local superintendent to provide the school councils with only those applications whom he or she recommends would run counter to these goals. Such a reading of the term “qualified” would essentially strip the school council of any actual authority, for the superintendent could simply choose to recommend only the applicant whom he or she personally selects. If the school council disapproved of the superintendent’s choice, the superintendent could simply state that no other “qualified” — i. e. recommended — candidates exist and the school council would have no option but to effectuate the superintendent’s choice for principal. More importantly, such a framework would remove virtually all accountability of the superintendent, who would essentially be authorized to subjectively choose school principals on the basis of any criteria, even personal or political. We do not believe the legislature intended to grant such singular and unfettered authority in the hands of one person.
Rather, KRS 160.345(2)(h) must be read so as to require the superintendent to forward to the school council all applications meeting the minimum statutory requirements for the position of principal. Interpreting the term “qualified” in that manner sets up an effective system of checks and balances that is in tune with KERA’s goal of shared decision making. The school council considers first the superintendent’s recommended candidates, and it should be noted that the superintendent is not limited in the number of candidates whom he or she may recommend. It is only after the council has reviewed and rejected these candidates that the council may then request all remaining qualified candidates. By this process, the superintendent has a voice in the selection of school principals. It should also be noted that the authority granted to the school council in selecting new principals is tempered by the restriction that the school council is not permitted to make recommendations as to transfers or dismissals; in the case of the position of principal, this power remains in the hands of the local superintendent. KRS 160.345(2)(f).
However, we believe that the legislature intended for the school councils to have ultimate authority in the selection of school principals. Reviewing the entirety of KRS 160.345, it is plainly evident that the General Assembly intended for these councils to have a real voice in school governance and to be vested with legitimate authority, not to be a body that merely makes recommendations that the local superintendent or school board may *902or may not adopt. Indeed, other portions of KRS 160.345 vest the school council with the authority to make such fundamental decisions as selection of the school’s curriculum and instructional materials, determination of methods of school assessment, and management of instructional practices within the school. KRS 160.345(2)(i). Therefore, it is not illogical that the General Assembly also intended for the school council to hold the ultimate authority when it comes to choosing the leader of the school.
Furthermore, a review of the language of KRS 160.345(2)(h) itself supports the conclusion that the school council, not the superintendent, makes the final decision in the selection of school principals. The statute requires that the “school council shall receive training in recruitment and interviewing techniques prior to carrying out the process of selecting a principal” and that the school council shall select the trainer to deliver such instruction. If the school council were only permitted to select the principal from among the candidates recommended by the local superintendent, then such training would be superfluous and it would be the superintendent receiving instruction. Rather, we believe that the General Assembly wisely included a requirement that the school council receive training in hiring techniques because it envisioned the school council as playing the key role in the selection of new principals.
We believe that such a reading of KRS 160.345(2)(h) ultimately enhances the relationship between the school council and the local superintendent by creating a meaningful dialogue in the selection of school principals. The superintendent reviews the applications before anyone else and, after removing those applicants not meeting state and local requirements, the superintendent may then apply his or her subjective criteria before making a final recommendation. Aware that the school council is under no obligation to select a recommended applicant, the superintendent is encouraged to base his or her recommendations on sound, legitimate criteria and is required to explain and justify such recommendations in an open and frank discussion. Moreover, the superintendent is less likely to recommend a clearly unsuitable, though favored, applicant. Even in circumstances where the school council disagrees with the superintendent and requests additional applications, the superintendent is still free to share his or her analysis of the remaining candidates and attempt to persuade the school council towards the recommended applicants. Where the recommendation is rooted in the best interests of the school, the capable superintendent should not have difficulty persuading the school council to accept his or her recommendation.
We conclude that the only reading of KRS 160.345(2)(h) that is in line with KERA’s stated goals of decentralization and shared decision-making authority is one by which the school council holds ultimate authority in selecting the school’s principal. We read “qualified,” as used in the last sentence of KRS 160.345(2)(h), to mean that, upon the request of the school council, the local superintendent is required to forward all remaining applications that meet statutory requirements for the position. The holding of the Court of Appeals with respect to this issue in Back v. Robinson, and the holding of the Court of Appeals in Young v. Hammond are, therefore, affirmed.
IV. Gender Discrimination
The Greenup Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of Back and *903dismissed Robinson’s claim of gender discrimination, holding that the claim was barred by the doctrine of election of remedies. Robinson claimed that she was discriminated against on the basis of her gender where her application for Russell High School principal was not considered, even though she was statutorily qualified for the position. Robinson had previously filed a claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the EEOC), prior to filing her claim in the present matter. The Greenup Circuit Court concluded that Robinson’s present claim was barred by the doctrine of election of remedies. We disagree and adopt the analysis of the Court of Appeals with regard to this issue, as set forth below:
The doctrine of election of remedies provides that when a person has at her disposal two modes of redress that are contradictory and inconsistent with each other, her deliberate and settled choice and pursuit of one will preclude her later choice and pursuit of the other. Wilson v. Lowe’s Home Center, Ky.App., 75 S.W.3d 229 (2001). The trial court relied on Vaezkoroni v. Domino’s Pizza, Inc., Ky., 914 S.W.2d 341 (1995), as authority for its finding that Robinson’s action in filing a claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (hereinafter EEOC) in 1998 precluded her from bringing this action. The trial court stated that the “filing of an administrative complaint bars such court action under the doctrine of election of remedies.”
While it is true that Vaezkoroni established a standard in the Commonwealth that provides both administrative and judicial sources of relief for claims arising under the Kentucky Civil Rights Act, the facts of Vaezkoroni and the statute indicate that this standard applies only to the Kentucky Human Rights Commission and local commissions. On appeal, the appellees argue that the case of Founder v. Cabinet for Human Resources, Ky.App. 23 S.W.3d 221 (1999), is controlling on this issue. This panel is of the opinion that Founder should be viewed narrowly. Furthermore, the opinion of Grego v. Meijer, Inc., 187 F.Supp.2d 689 (W.D.Ky.2001), and this Court’s more recent opinion of Wilson, supra, are more persuasive.
The trial court’s reliance on the doctrine of election of remedies in this case was misplaced. Robinson filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. After filing the charge, she was notified by the EEOC that her file was being closed and she was informed of her right to sue. It is not alleged that Robinson ever filed a complaint with any agency of the Commonwealth other than the instant circuit court action. As such, the trial court’s reliance on the doctrine of election of remedies to grant summary judgment was inappropriate.
Robinson v. Back, Ky.App., — S.W.3d —, —-—, 2001-CA-1933-MR at 8-9 (rendered May 16,2003).
We also agree with the Court of Appeals that Robinson has established a prima facie case for sex discrimination, and therefore summary judgment was not appropriate. The trial court correctly applied the analysis used in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,8 which sets forth a four-prong test for establishing a prima facie case for sex discrimination: (1) that the plaintiff was a member of a protected class, (2) that the plaintiff was qualified for *904the job, (3) that the plaintiff did not receive the job, and (4) that the position remained open and the employer sought other applicants. Id. The trial court concluded that Robinson did not satisfy the second prong of this test. In its consideration of the KRS 160.345(2)(h) matter, the trial court determined that a candidate is “qualified” for the position of school principal only when that applicant meets statutory requirements and bears the superintendent’s recommendation. The trial court then applied that definition of “qualified” to its analysis under the McDonnell test; that is, because the trial court believed Robinson was not “qualified” within the meaning of KRS 160.345(2)(h), she was therefore not “qualified” for purposes of the McDonnell test. We have interpreted KRS 160.345(2)(h) otherwise. Having concluded that KRS 160.345(2)(h) does not require a candidate to bear the recommendation of the local superintendent in order to be qualified for the position of school principal, Robinson has therefore met the four-prong test to establish a prima facie ease of sex discrimination.
V. Conclusion
In summary, we conclude that, in order for the objectives and principles of KERA as envisioned by the Kentucky General Assembly to be satisfied, KRS 160.345(2)(h) must be read to require the superintendent to provide to the school council all statutorily qualified applications upon its request, regardless of the superintendent’s personal recommendations. Therefore, in Young v. Hammond, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the Adair Circuit Court did not abuse its discretion in granting temporary injunctions against Young, and hereby affirm the Court of Appeals’ opinion in that matter. Similarly, in Back v. Robinson, we conclude that the Greenup Circuit Court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Robinson as to the violation of KRS 160.345(2)(h), and we affirm the Court of Appeals’ opinion regarding this issue. Finally, in light of our construction of KRS 160.345(2)(h), we conclude that Robinson did establish a prima facie case of gender discrimination, which was not barred by the election of remedies. Thus, we affirm the Court of Appeals’ holding that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment as to that claim.
LAMBERT, C.J.; GRAVES, STUMBO, and WINTERSHEIMER, JJ., concur. COOPER, J., dissents by separate opinion, with KELLER, J., joining that dissent.. Ky., 790 S.W.2d 186 (1989)
. Ky. Const. Sec. 183
. Id. at 193.
. Id. at 213.
. See generally, Molly A. Hunter, All Eyes Forward: Public Engagement and Educational Reform in Kentucky, 28 J.L. & Educ. 485 (1999).
. William H. Clune, Educational Adequacy: A Theory and Its Remedies, 28 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 481, 488 (1995) (discussing decentralization of authority in school governance as a method to increase accountability).
. Bd. of Education of Boone County v. Bushee, Ky., 889 S.W.2d 809, 812 (1994).
. 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973)