DISSENTING OPINION BY
Judge FRIEDMAN.I respectfully dissent. This case presents to this court an issue of first impression, i.e., whether ion scan test comparisons involving multiple samples of seized money are sufficient in a forfeiture proceeding to establish a nexus between the seized money and illegal drug activity when less than all of the samples register drug residue levels above the relevant “casual contact” level. This case also represents the first time that ion scan test comparisons have been challenged as a method for determining whether there is a nexus between seized money and illegal drug activity. For the reasons stated below, I consider the comparison of ion scan test results for seized money with ion scan test results for money in general circulation, as done in these cases, to be nothing more than junk science.1
I. 2454 C.D. 2004
The trial court found that, on April 4, 2002, Sergeant Anthony DeLuca (Sgt.De-Luca) of the Pennsylvania State Police stopped Dien Vy Phung’s (Phung) vehicle on the Pennsylvania Turnpike for speeding. Sgt. DeLuca asked to look through the car, and Phung consented. In the trunk, Sgt. DeLuca found a large amount of cash. Phung explained that he was traveling from Boston to Pittsburgh to buy a nail salon and that it is customary for people of Vietnamese extraction to pay with cash. Phung stated that he had saved $60,000 from his employment in Canada and that he borrowed $150,000 from a friend in Boston and $100,000 from his girlfriend in New Jersey. When a drug dog “alerted” on the money, the Commonwealth seized the $310,020 and filed a forfeiture petition.
At the forfeiture hearing, the Commonwealth presented the testimony of Sergeant Randy Wasserleben (Sgt. Was-serleben), who is an expert in ion scan technology. Sgt. Wasserleben testified that an ion scan machine is able to detect the amount of drug residue on a sample of money, which then can be compared with the “casual contact” level, i.e., the level of drug residue found on currency samples in general circulation, for the area in which the seized cash was known to have circulated.
Sgt. Wasserleben recommended the following testing procedure for seized money: (1) police hand-count the money while wearing gloves, to avoid contamination; (2) police fan out the money until the white bands are showing; (3) police run a vacuum known as a “dust buster” over the edges of the money to collect any drug residue; (4) police place the filter from the “dust buster” in the ion scan machine, which registers a max amplitude for specific drugs; and (5) police count the money using a money-counting machine. (R.R. II at 123, 128-29, 146.) When Sgt. DeLuca tested Phung’s money, he did not follow this procedure. Instead, he used a bank’s money-counting machine to count the money before performing the ion scan test. (Trial ct. op. at 3.)
The Commonwealth presented no evidence regarding the “casual contact” level for Canada. The “casual contact” levels for Boston and New Jersey were determined as follows: (1) thirty-eight currency samples were obtained from banks and/or *167businesses in a particular area, with each sample containing four bills of each denomination from the five-dollar bill to the one-hundred-dollar bill, i.e., twenty bills per sample; (2) the samples were fanned out; (3) the “dust buster” collected particles from each sample; (4) the “dust buster” filter was placed in an ion scan machine, which registered a max amplitude; and (5) the max amplitude was divided by thirty-eight to give the average drug residue on each sample of twenty bills. Sgt. Wasserleben stated that the “casual contact” level is 77.2 digital units for Boston and 38.47 digital units for northern New Jersey. (R.R. II at 125,144-45.)
Sgt. Wasserleben was not involved in the ion scan testing of the $310,020; the testing was done by Sergeant Alvin Griffin (Sgt.Griffin). Sgt. Griffin tested ten samples, and nine of the ten samples registered max amplitudes for “cocaine” between 540 and 893 digital units or for “cocaine high” between 643 and 1137 digital units. Sgt. Griffin stated that the size of each sample was based on the “luck of the draw,” i.e., whatever could be placed on the surface being used for testing. Sgt. Griffin testified that the smallest sample consisted of $20,000 and the largest sample consisted of $60,000. (R.R. II at 178-82, 184-85, 205.)
The question before this court is whether the Commonwealth met its burden of proving a nexus between the seized money and illegal drug activity with its ion scan evidence. In Part A, I address the inadequacy of the ion scan evidence in this case to establish a nexus between all of the seized money and illegal drug activity. In Parts B through E, I address the four reasons given by the majority for concluding that Phung cannot prevail on this issue.
A. Ion Scan Evidence
1. Sample Size
The record shows that the “casual contact” sample size is twenty bills, but the Commonwealth did not present evidence regarding the number of bills in a sample size for the seized money. Unless sample sizes are the same, I fail to see how there can be any legitimate comparison between the ion scan test results for seized money and the results for “casual contact” money.
Sgt. Griffin testified that, with respect to the sample size for the seized money, the number of bills was whatever fit on the surface he used for testing. In terms of the amount of money, Sgt. Griffin testified that the smallest sample was $20,000. Assuming that the $20,000 consisted of 200 one hundred dollar bills (200 x $100 = $20,000), the ion scan evidence would be comparing the drug residue on 200 bills with the drug residue on twenty bills.2 It certainly would not be surprising to me to find ten times the amount of drug residue on 200 bills than on twenty bills (20 x 10 = 200). Until ion scan test comparisons take into account the size of the money samples tested, I submit that, scientifically, the comparisons are worthless.3
*168In addition, because the ion scan test procedure deals with samples of multiple bills, the test results pertain only to the sample as a whole. The test results do not relate to particular bills within the sample. In other words, there is no way to know from ion scan test results which of the possibly thousands of bills in a sample contains the drug residue. Thus, the majority holds that, even though only a few bills in a sample, taken together, contain drug residue that exceeds “casual contact” levels, the entire sample may be forfeited.
2.“Casual Contact” Level Manipulation
The record shows that, in a given case, “casual contact” figures can be manipulated by collecting money samples from banks or businesses in areas with either high or low rates of illegal drug activity. Sgt. Wasserleben testified that “casual contact” levels depend on where the samples are collected. He stated that the “casual contact” level he reported for Pennsylvania, 234 digital units, is more than seven times higher than the “casual contact” level for New Jersey (33.47 x 7 = 233.89) and more than three times the “casual contact” level for Boston (77.2 x 3 = 231.6) because the Pennsylvania samples were collected from the “badlands” of Philadelphia.4 (R.R. II at 145, 164, 169.) Thus, I question whether it is possible to draw any reasonable conclusion from a comparison of the drug residue levels on seized money with the levels on “casual contact” money.5
3.$20,000 Passes Ion Scan Test
The ion scan evidence shows that only nine of the ten samples registered drug residue levels above “casual contact” levels. One $20,000 money sample “passed” the test. (R.R. II at 141, 205.) Thus, it appears to me that the Commonwealth failed to prove a nexus between this $20,000 and illegal drug activity.
Indeed, it is not explicit in the majority’s opinion, but the majority’s holding is that ion scan evidence can establish a nexus between seized money and illegal drug activity even when less than all samples exceed “casual contact” levels. Given such a holding, it seems that the Commonwealth could establish a nexus between all seized money and illegal drug activity when only one of ten samples exceeds “casual contact” levels. I could not accept such a result. Moreover, I point out that, because the majority’s holding pertains to multiple samples of seized money, the majority’s holding expands this court’s previous holding in Commonwealth v. $11,600.00 Cash, U.S. Currency, 858 A.2d 160 (Pa.Cmwlth.2004) (holding that ion scan evidence showing that drug residue on seized currency is five times more than on bills in general circulation is sufficient to negate an inference of casual contact), which dealt with only one sample.
4.$60,000 From Canada
The record shows that $60,000 of the currency was from Canada, and the Commonwealth presented no evidence as to the “casual contact” level for United States currency circulating in Canada. (R.R. II *169at 174, 176.) Thus, the Commonwealth failed to prove a nexus between this $60,000 and illegal drug activity.
B. Waiver
The majority concludes that Phung waived any challenge to the ion scan evidence because he failed to raise a challenge in his statement of matters complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa. R.A.P. 1925(b). I disagree.
In this case, the trial court issued an opinion and order on September 21, 2004, relying on the ion scan evidence to conclude that the Commonwealth proved a nexus between the seized currency and illegal drug activity. (R.R. II at 219-20.) Phung filed a notice of appeal, and the trial court issued an order directing Phung to file a statement of matters complained of on appeal. (R.R. II at 226.) Phung filed a statement, asserting that the “Commonwealth failed to demonstrate a nexus of criminal activity between the seized currency and an illegal activity.” (R.R. II at 227.) Inasmuch as the trial court relied on the ion scan evidence to conclude that the Commonwealth demonstrated a nexus between the seized cash and illegal drug activity, it is clear to me that Phung challenged the sufficiency of the ion scan evidence.
Although Phung did not refer specifically to the ion scan evidence in his statement of matters complained of on appeal, the dismissal of an appeal under Pa. R.A.P. 1925(b) for lack of specificity is not proper. Ryan v. Johnson, 522 Pa. 555, 564 A.2d 1237 (1989). Pa. R.A.P. 1925(b) is designed to assist a trial judge in writing an opinion which addresses only the issues being raised on appeal. Sung Choe v. Philadelphia Board of License and Inspection, 847 A.2d 214 (Pa.Cmwlth.), appeal denied, 580 Pa. 707, 860 A.2d 491 (2004). If a trial judge views a statement of issues furnished under Pa. R.A.P. 1925(b) and determines that it lacks adequate specificity to permit the preparation of an opinion addressing the issues on appeal, the trial court is to order that a more explicit statement be filed. Ryan. If an appellate court believes that the trial court’s failure to require a more explicit statement would hamper its review of a case, the appellate court is to remand the case to the trial court for compliance with Pa. R.A.P.1925(b). Ryan.
In sum, I find no defect in Phung’s statement of matters complained of on appeal. However, to the extent that the majority is hampered in its review by the failure of the trial court to require a more explicit statement, the proper disposition is to remand this case to the trial court for an order directing a more specific statement of matters complained of on appeal.
C. Reweighing the Evidence
The majority concludes that Phung’s challenge to the sufficiency of the ion scan test results would require that this court impermissibly reweigh the evidence. In reaching this conclusion, the majority states that Phung did not object to the admissibility of the ion scan test results. I disagree.
The record establishes that Phung objected to the admissibility of the ion scan evidence. After Sgt. Wasserleben was presented as an expert on ion scan technology, Phung stated, “I’m not going to object to his qualifications. I will, however, object to the ion scan itself .... ” (R.R. at 133) (emphasis added). At the conclusion of the hearing, the court advised the parties to file briefs addressing “the admissibility of the ion scan” as well as the forfeiture. (R.R. at 209.) Thus, the presiding trial court judge obviously believed that Phung had challenged the admissibility of the ion scan evidence.
*170Even if Phung had not challenged the admissibility of the ion scan evidence, the question presented here is no different than the one addressed in Commonwealth v. Marshall, 548 Pa. 495, 498, 698 A.2d 576, 578 (1997), which was “whether the trial court erred in concluding that the evidence presented was sufficient to sustain the Commonwealth’s burden” of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence a nexus between the seized money and illegal drug activity. Without imper-missibly reweighing the evidence, our supreme court held that the trial court erred in concluding that the evidence presented was sufficient to sustain the Commonwealth’s burden. Id. Thus, the question of the sufficiency of the ion scan evidence in this case is a question of law, and it is properly before this court.
D. Bank’s Money Counter
The majority concludes that Phung cannot prevail on his challenge to the sufficiency of the ion scan test results because, although Sgt. DeLuca failed to follow recommended procedures by using a bank’s money-counting machine prior to the ion scan test, Sgt. Wasserleben opined that the chance of contamination from the bank’s money counter was slim to zero. I disagree.
Sgt. Wasserleben’s opinion was only that the chance was slim to zero that the bank’s money counter was contaminated with THC, i.e., marijuana. He testified that only two samples registered hits for THC and that, if the money counter had been contaminated with THC, then all of the samples would have been contaminated with THC.6 (R.R. II at 153-54.) However, Sgt. Wasserleben also testified about possible contamination by the money being counted. (See R.R. II at 167-68.) In this regard, Sgt. Wasserleben testified:
Q. But if part of this money was highly contaminated it could have contaminated every other bundle afterwards, at least with the cocaine and cocaine high?
A. It could have, yes.
Q. And if the second sample they had run through the machine had been highly contaminated with cocaine and cocaine high, it’s possible that every following sample would also have been contaminated?
A. It could, yes.
Q. But just to clarify, taking what you’re saying at face value, that this bank’s money counter was not contaminated, okay, taking that at face value, is it still not possible that the money itself was contaminated and by running it through a money counter you contaminated all the money or at least some segment of the money was contaminated?
A. Yes....
(R.R. II at 158, 164, 167-68.) Given such testimony, I submit that Sgt. DeLuca’s failure to follow recommended procedures by using a bank’s money counter before the ion scan testing was conducted renders the ion scan evidence worthless.
E. Difficulty of Hand-Counting
The majority concludes that Phung cannot prevail on his challenge to the sufficiency of the ion scan test results based on the use of a bank’s money counter because it would have been very difficult to hand-*171count $800,000 in the form of $20 bills. I disagree.
First, the record shows that the money-consisted of all denominations of currency, not just $20 bills. (See R.R. II at 137-42.) Second, the fact that the recommended procedure is very difficult does not mean that it need not be followed in order to obtain valid test results. Third, upon the taking of property pursuant to a search warrant, a law enforcement officer must provide a receipt for the property seized. See Pa. R.Crim.P. 208 (relating to seizure pursuant to a search warrant). Obviously, it is not possible to give a receipt for $310,020 in currency unless the police have counted the money. Although it may be very difficult, the law requires it.
II. 2765 C.D. 2004
On May 22, 2004, Corporal Brian Merritt (Trooper Merritt) stopped a vehicle for speeding on the Pennsylvania Turnpike. Herman Keese (Keese) was a passenger in the car. Trooper Merritt, after gathering information about the driver, called for a drug dog, which alerted at the passenger door of the vehicle and in the luggage area. After obtaining a warrant, the police searched the vehicle and found a large amount of cash. Keese told Trooper Merritt that the money belonged to him. The police seized the money, a total of $141,370, and the Commonwealth filed a petition for forfeiture.
At the forfeiture hearing, Keese presented evidence showing that portions of the seized money came from South Carolina, San Francisco, Pennsylvania and Georgia. However, the trial court found Keese’s evidence as to “where the seized $141,370 came from” to be “completely unbelievable.” (Trial ct. op. at 10.) The Commonwealth presented expert testimony that ion scan levels are meaningless in forfeiture cases without “casual contact” levels. (R.R. at 158a.) The Commonwealth then offered ion scan evidence showing that the level of cocaine on the seized money was six times higher than “casual contact” levels in Pennsylvania and South Carolina.7 The Commonwealth presented no evidence regarding the “casual contact” levels for San Francisco or Georgia.
The question before this court is whether the Commonwealth’s ion scan evidence is sufficient to establish a nexus between the seized money and illegal drug activity. Inasmuch as the trial court rejected all evidence regarding the geographical origin of the seized money and made no specific finding as to where the money had been in circulation, the Commonwealth’s evidence regarding the “casual contact” levels for Pennsylvania and South Carolina means nothing. Absent the “casual contact” evidence, the ion scan test results for the seized money are meaningless. Thus, the Commonwealth’s ion scan evidence is not sufficient to establish a nexus between the seized money and illegal drug activity.
The majority states that, in order for Keese to prevail here, this court would be required to overrule $11,600.00 Cash. However, in $11,600.00 Cash, the ion scan evidence was not challenged. Indeed, this court stated that the appellant did not “object to the use of the ion scan ma-chine_” $11,600.00 Cash, 858 A.2d at 166. Thus, it would not be necessary to overrule that case here.
The majority also states that this court would have to renounce the principles es*172tablished in Commonwealth v. $6,1.25,00 Seized From Esquilin, 588 Pa. 544, 880 A.2d 528 (2005), specifically that “[e]vidence in a statutory forfeiture case is not to be subjected to an absolutist standard but, rather, a logical standard [based on the totality of the evidence].” (Majority op. at 165.) However, it is not logical to base any conclusion about seized money and illegal drug activity on ion scan evidence when that evidence lacks appropriate “casual contact” levels. Thus, I cannot agree that ruling in favor of Keese in this case would require that this court renounce the principles established in Esquilin.8
Accordingly, I would reverse.
Judge SMITH-RIBNER concurs in the result only.. The majority states that the record contains no evidence to support this assertion. (Majority op. at 160 n. 12.) However, the discussion that follows is based on the evidence in the record.
. Generally speaking, in this court’s case law, the bill of the drug trade is the twenty-dollar bill. If the $20,000 had consisted of twenty-dollar bills, there would have been 1,000 bills (1,000 x $20 = $20,000) in the sample.
. I note that the Commonwealth failed to present evidence that, under Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.Cir.1923), this type of comparison has general acceptance in the relevant scientific community. See Grady v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 576 Pa. 546, 839 A.2d 1038 (2003) (adopting the Frye test). The Frye evidence presented by the Commonwealth establishes only that ion scan testing is accepted as a means for determining the amount of drug residue on a sample of currency.
. I submit that the Commonwealth cannot establish the appropriate "casual contact” level without presenting: (1) credible evidence regarding the geographical origins of the seized money; (2) expert testimony regarding what constitutes a statistically valid "casual contact” sample; and (3) expert testimony regarding the standard deviation for “casual contact” samples taken within a particular area.
. I also question the validity of establishing a "casual contact” level for an entire state based on the collection of samples from certain neighborhoods of one city.
. This same reasoning would apply to the cocaine because only nine of the ten samples registered hits for cocaine. If the bank's money counter had been contaminated with cocaine, then all of the samples would have been contaminated.
. To determine the "casual contact” level for South Carolina, the Commonwealth collected money from a bank in Greenville, South Carolina, and a bank in Pendleton, South Carolina. (R.R. at 164a-65a.) Normally, the Commonwealth would collect four samples of each denomination of currency; however, the Pendleton bank had only one ten-dollar bill and only three five-dollar bills. (R.R. at 165a.)
. Moreover, because Esquilin was a drug bust case, it is not controlling here. Indeed, this case is more akin to Marshall and Commonwealth v. Fontanez, 559 Pa. 92, 739 A.2d 152 (1999), where, as here, the money was seized in traffic stops. In those cases, our supreme court stated that the presence of drug residue on some part of seized money establishes only the possibility or suspicion of a nexus between the money and illegal drug activity. Id.