Dissenting Opinion by HARRELL, J. which RAKER, J., Joins.
After searching this record in vain to locate a legally cognizable express warranty in Rite Aid’s instructions to Ms. Levy-Gray for taking doxycycline, “[t]ake each dose with a full glass of water ... [or] [t]ake with food or milk if stomach upset occurs unless your doctor directs you otherwise,” I respectfully dissent.
A.
Sections 2—313(1)(a) and (b) of the Commercial Law Article provide:1
(1) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows:
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the affirmation or promise.
(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the description.
Md.Code (1975, 2002 Repl.Vol.), Commercial Law Article § 2-315(1).2 To create an express warranty, the seller must affirm a fact, make a promise, or provide a description to the buyer that relates to the goods. That fact, promise, or description must be “part of the basis of the bargain” between the buyer and seller. § 2—313(1)(a) and (b); see also Official Comment 1 *637(“Express warranties rest on ‘dickered’ aspects of the individual bargain, and go so clearly to the essence of that bargain that vrords of disclaimer in a form are repugnant to the basic dickered terms.”); 2 (“[T]his section is limited in its scope and direct purpose to warranties made by the seller to the buyer as part of a contract for sale....”); 3 (“No specific intention to make a warranty is necessary if any [affirmations of fact by the seller, descriptions of goods or exhibition of samples] is made part of the basis of the bargain.”); 7 (“The sole question is whether the language or samples or models are fairly to be regarded as part of the contract.”) of § 2-313; Shreve v. Sears, 166 F.Supp.2d 378, 420-21 (D.Md.2001) (holding that the instruction for how to switch off a snow thrower provided in the Owner’s Manual did not constitute an express warranty because it was not an affirmation regarding the good that became a basis of the bargain, stating that it was “more sensible” to regard the buyer’s expectation that the good would work properly as part of an implied warranty of merchantability); In Re Rezulin, 133 F.Supp.2d 272, 291-92 (S.D.N.Y.2001) (refusing to hold pharmacies liable for breach of an express warranty because any representation made by the pharmacy would not form part of the basis of the bargain because patients do not purchase prescription medications based on representations from the pharmacy, but rather, based on advice from the prescribing physician). The purpose behind providing liability for breach of an express warranty is to ensure that the buyer gets what the seller promised regarding the goods that induced (or would have induced) the buyer to purchase the goods. See § 2-313 (defining express warranty); § 2-714 (providing buyer with damages for breach of warranty); Official Comment 4 to § 2-313 (stating that “the whole purpose of the law of warranty is to determine what it is that the seller has in essence agreed to sell”).
The pharmaceutical instruction for the modality of ingesting doxycycline if upset stomach occurred did not constitute an express warranty because the instructions were not part of the basis of the bargain and may not be said fairly to be part of the contract of sale. This Court has not analyzed before *638the “basis of the bargain” requirement of § 2-313(1)(a) and (b). The Majority’s interpretation of § 2-313(1) disposes of this statutory requirement all together by its effective holding that an express warranty existed in the instructions contained in an enclosed pamphlet of drug information read by the purchaser after the purchase of the drug, but which would not have been a factor in the decision to buy even had she read it before the sale. The medication instruction, regardless of whether Ms. Levy-Gray knew of it before the purchase, could not have been part of the basis of the bargain between Rite Aid and her because it was neither a dickered term nor part of the contract. Ms. Levy-Gray purchased doxycycline because her doctor advised her to purchase it.3 Thus, even assuming the instruction was a representation to Ms. Levy-Gray that the intended operative medicinal effectiveness of taking doxycycline was compatible with concurrent milk consumption at some level at the time of ingestion of the pill, as the Majority opinion characterizes it, the statement was not a representation that became part of the basis of the bargain as required by § 2-313(1).
A pharmacy should not be subject to liability, at least under a breach of express warranty theory, regarding statements about prescription drugs it dispenses on a doctor’s order. As the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York aptly noted in its well-reasoned decision, In Re Rezulin, pharmacies do not play the role of retail merchant when selling prescription drugs to patients. In Re Rezulin, 133 F.Supp.2d at 291-92 (“Patients who purchase prescription drugs from pharmacists do not negotiate or bargain with the pharmacist about the suitability of the product.”). Every state appellate court that has considered whether to hold *639pharmacies liable under a breach of warranty theory with respect to the operative properties of prescription drugs also has declined to do so. Id. citing Coyle v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 526 Pa. 208, 584 A.2d 1383, 1387 (1991) (refusing to find pharmacists strictly liable for dispensing defective drugs because “it is not the pharmacist on whom the public ‘is forced to rely’ to obtain the products they need”); Presto v. Sandoz Pharmaceuticals Corp., 226 Ga.App. 547, 487 S.E.2d 70, 75 (1997), cert. denied, (“because the patient is legally deemed to rely on the physician and not the package labeling for [a] warning, [plaintiffs] cannot show they were ‘relying on the seller’s skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods,’ as required to prove an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose”); Makripodis v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 361 Pa.Super. 589, 523 A.2d 374, 376-77 (1987) (druggist does not warrant that prescription drugs are fit for “ordinary uses,” as use of drug is a decision made by physician); Bichler v. Willing, 58 A.D.2d 331, 397 N.Y.S.2d 57, 58-59 (1st Dept.1977) (warranties not implied in sale of prescription drugs, as patient places confidence in doctor’s skill, not the pharmacist’s skill); McLeod v. W.S. Merrell Co., 174 So.2d 736, 739 (Fla.1965) (a transaction involving a prescription drug “is not one out of which a warranty, even under most modern standards, would be implied”); Batiste v. American Home Products, Corp., 32 N.C.App. 1, 231 S.E.2d 269, 276 (1977), cert. denied, 292 N.C. 466, 233 S.E.2d 921 (1977) (a pharmacy is not liable under general warranty principles for injury arising out of a prescription drug because a patient does not rely on the druggist’s skill, but instead on his or her physician’s skill and advice).4 Instead, prescription drug sales are *640attributable to the advice of the patient’s physician. Id. Hence, the purchase of prescription drugs is fundamentally different from the purchase of other consumer goods. Because patients generally do not base their decision to purchase a prescription medication on the instructions for its consumption or use or any information contained in the informational pamphlet accompanying the prescription drug, such information is not part of the basis of the bargain, and, therefore, no express warranty is created thereby.
The more appropriate theory of liability under which pharmacies may be held accountable for the instructions for use of a prescription medication is negligence. See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 6(e)(2) (1998) (providing that a retail seller of a prescription drug is subject to liability for harm caused by the drug if “at or before the time of sale or other distribution of the drug [ ] the retail seller or other distributor fails to exercise reasonable care and such failure causes harm to persons”).5 The purpose of the theory of liability for breach of an express warranty is not served by applying it to a pharmacy because a pharmacy does not make representations that induce patients to purchase a particular prescription drug. If a pharmacy breaches a duty to the buyer to provide the drug indicated on the prescription or *641supplies inaccurate instructions, then it may be held liable in negligence. In Ms. Levy-Gray’s case, she failed to convince the jury that Rite Aid was negligent, an issue not preserved for appeal (although she effectively may have convinced the Majority that Rite Aid was negligent).
The Majority opinion cites, as authorities found persuasive by it for its interpretation of § 2-313(1) that “basis of the bargain” does not require the buyer to be aware of the alleged warranty representation during the negotiation of the bargain, a multitude of cases regarding consumer goods like motor homes (e.g. Murphy v. Mallard Coach Co., 179 A.D.2d 187, 582 N.Y.S.2d 528 (N.Y.App.Div.1992)) and hay-baling chemicals (e.g. Bigelow v. Agway, 506 F.2d 551 (2d Cir.1974)), none of which require a prescription by a physician (or anything remotely analogous) in order to purchase. Majority slip op. at 18-22. These cases are not persuasive authority here because we are dealing with the purchase of a prescription medication from a pharmacy, which is a fundamentally different sale of goods. Unlike the buyer of a motor home, for example, who relies upon the affirmations of fact and descriptions by the motor home retailer when making the purchase, a buyer of prescription drugs does not rely upon representations of the pharmacy when deciding to purchase the drag prescribed by a physician. In addition, the instructions for taking the medication (which, even when followed, may not work as intended for each patient’s particular condition and diet) indicating to take it with food or milk if upset stomach occurs is quite different from a warranty policy or card that a mobile home is free of defects and which promises to repair or replace the goods.
The Majority opinion also relies on Official Comment 7 to § 2-313, which states:
The precise time when words of description or affirmation are made or samples are show is not material. The sole question is whether the language or samples or models are fairly to be regarded as part of the contract. If language is used after the closing of the deal (as when the buyer when taking delivery asks and receives an additional assurance), *642the warranty becomes a modification, and need not be supported by consideration if it is otherwise reasonable and in order (Section 2-209). (Emphasis added).
Majority slip op. at 17-18. Applying this reasoning, I conclude that it would not be fair to regard the instructions for use of a prescription medication as “part of the contract” because it is not the kind of affirmation of fact or description as to the prescription medication that would be a factor in a patient’s decision to purchase the medication from the pharmacy. If the patient reads the instructions for use provided by the pharmacy, while standing at the pharmacy counter, and decides that he or she is in doubt and may no longer wish to purchase the medication, the patient more properly would need to return to the prescribing physician to discuss any concerns and possibly obtain a new prescription more suited to his or her particular circumstances.
B.
Of equal significance to a lack of an express warranty in this case, the record does not support the Majority opinion’s conclusion that a reasonable jury could infer that the supposed “express warranty,” that the intended operative effects of doxycycline were compatible with milk consumption, was breached. Ms. Levy-Gray took the medication, as directed, twice daily: once in the morning and once in the evening. The instruction stated, in pertinent part, that if stomach upset occurred when using solely water to ingest the pill, then doxycycline may be taken with milk. A reasonable interpretation, indeed the only reasonable construction, of this advice is that you may take each pill accompanied by a volume of milk equivalent to that you would have taken with water, but for the stomach upset. Ms. Levy-Gray, however, consumed an additional, atypical number of dairy servings over the course of each day while on the medication: 8-10 glasses of milk per day, plus one or more of the following dairy products: macaroni with cheese, grilled cheese sandwiches, yogurt, ice cream, and/or cottage cheese. Her consumption amounted to many more servings of milk and dairy products than reasonably *643necessary for taking doxycycline twice daily with food or milk as the supposed warranty indicated. The instruction-for-use “warranty” recognized by the Majority did not imply or represent that doxycycline would still be as effective if the patient consumed 9 to 15 servings of dairy products per day. Thus, even if an express warranty was created as the Majority posits, a reasonable jury could not find that it was breached on the facts of this case.
Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals and remand the case to that court with directions to reverse the judgment of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County and direct it to enter judgment in favor of Rite Aid Corporation.
Judge RAKER has authorized me to state that she joins in Part A of the reasoning in this dissent and dissents on that basis alone.
. Section 2-313(1)(c) is not relevant to this case.
. Unless otherwise provided, all references are to sections of the Commercial Law Article.
. Ms. Levy-Gray’s prescribing physician testified that had Ms. Levy-Gray asked him, he would have given the same advice to take the doxycycline with food or milk if upset stomach occurred when taking it with water only. Of even greater factual significance is dte absence of any discussion between Ms. Levy-Gray and the Rite Aid pharmacist regarding her intended additional consumption of atypical amounts of dairy products during the on-going period of time she was taking the medication, over and above a mere glass of milk with each pill.
. The Majority opinion disregards In re Rezulin, and by implication other cases holding similarly, by distinguishing the present case on the basis that the description of how to take the drug was contained in a pamphlet predicated written material edited from other information provided by the drug manufacturer, while in the cases cited above the description relating to the prescription medication was not contained in material attributed to the pharmacy. Majority slip op. at 27. This "distinction” of fact is irrelevant to proper analysis under warranty law, although it may be relevant to analysis under a negligence theory. No *640matter the original source of the information, the statement provided by Rite Aid to Ms. Levy-Gray must be analyzed in the first instance to determine whether the statement constituted an express warranty under § 2-313. The cases cited above recognize the proposition that patients typically do not rely on statements provided by pharmacies when deciding to purchase the drug from the pharmacy. Indeed, that was the case with Ms. Levy-Gray. Patients do rely, however, on instructions for use when taking the medication purchased, but a breach of duty there at best presents a question of negligence in tort if the instructions are inaccurate, but not a claim of breach of warranty in contract.
. Even under a negligence theory of recoveiy, Comment h and Illustration 4 to Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prod. Liab. § 6 notes that courts have limited the tort liability of intermediary parties, including pharmacies, by holding "that they should be permitted to rely on the special expertise of manufacturers, prescribing and treating health-care providers, and governmental regulatory agencies.”