concurring. The dissent reduces the question of the court’s charge to one of inconsistent instructions. This is an oversimplification of the problem. There was no inconsistency unless one feels impelled to read it into what the trial judge said. At *294the outset, he told the jury that the plaintiff was seeking to recover for damages caused by negligent blasting. Having stated this once, was it necessary that he keep repeating himself? Should he have said, “damage caused by blasting” whenever damage was mentioned?
The situation before the jury was that the plaintiff’s house had existing damage in it before ever there was any blasting at all. The plaintiff argues that the court gave the jury to understand that the plaintiff could have no recovery unless the damage which occurred before the blasting was caused by the blasting. The mere statement of this proposition shows how strained is the plaintiff’s construction of the court’s charge. I entertain no fear that the jury placed such an astonishing misinterpretation upon the trial court’s language. Prejudicial error has not been shown.