filed the following dissenting opinion, in which Sybert, J., concurred.
The real question in this case, as specifically stated by counsel for the appellants in his brief and at argument, is whether the Circuit Court for Montgomery County had the power to adopt its General Rule 3 (the Rule) ; and no question of the desirability or advisability of uniformity in the rules of practice and procedure throughout the State is involved.
The majority hold that so much of the Rule as prohibits a Maryland attorney from filing a pleading in the Circuit Court, unless he maintains a bona fide office some place in Maryland, is invalid because “there are express or implied indications in at least two of them—Maryland Rules 301 and 306—that the Montgomery County * * * local rule * * * [is] contrary to and inconsistent with the general rules [adopted by the Court of Appeals].” All members of this Court agree that if said Rule conflicts with the Maryland Rules, as adopted by the Court of Appeals, the Rule must give way to the extent of the conflict. Hence, the only difference between the majority opinion and this one is whether there is such a conflict.
Although the majority opinion states “there are express or implied indications” in Rules 301 and 306 of inconsistencies with the Rule, the opinion fails to state any express ones, and a reading of Rules 301 and 306 discloses none. This means, of course, that the majority holding is that Rule 3 is invalid because of “implications” contained in said Rules 301 and 306.
Considering Rule 301 first, the majority hold that in Subsection f of said Rule “there is an implication that the address need not be that of a law office.” The reasoning as to how the implication is arrived at is not given. Subsection f, in full, states: “The first pleading filed by an attorney shall contain his address immediately below his signature, followed by his telephone number, if any.” Assuming that this subsection does permit the address given by a lawyer to be other than that of an office, does this permission, alone, create an implication sufficiently strong to invalidate a provision of a local rule of court adopted under special legislative authority (bearing in mind that we are not considering its desirability, vel non) ? I think not. Subsection f, literally read, is broad enough to permit the *334address given to be in California or somewhere in Soviet Russia; but I do not believe that this, by implication, would invalidate a provision of a local rule that would require an address given by an attorney to be somewhere in the United States.
The majority also hold that the words “followed by his telephone number, if any” clearly indicates “that a telephone is not required.” A careful reading of Rule 3 will show that it does not “require” a telephone, except by implication. But assuming this portion of Rule 3 to be inconsistent with Subsection f, it could be held invalid without materially affecting the purpose of Rule 3.
The majority states that in Rule 306 c 1 and 2 “there are clear indications that the attorney is not required to maintain an office at all.” Again, we have a conclusion without the reasons for it. A reading of these portions of Rule 306 will disclose that they deal with service “upon the attorney or the party [represented by the attorney].” And Subsections 1 and 2 provide for personal service and service by mail upon both an attorney and a party. I am unable to discover any implication from these subsections that a lawyer is required, or not required, to maintain an office, much less such an implication as would invalidate a local rule of court passed under specific legislative authority.
I think the well-known principles relating to statutory repeal by implication should be applied; namely, that repeals by implication are never favored by the courts, and the presumption is always against an intention to repeal or modify a pre-existing statute beyond the express terms or immediate scope of a later statute; and that courts should not hold that there has been a repeal by implication unless there is some express reference to the previous statute, or there is a manifest inconsistency in the two statutes or their provisions are so repugnant that they cannot stand together. Kirkwood v. Provident Savings Bank, 205 Md. 48, 55, 106 A. 2d 103, and the many cases therein cited. Therefore, I would sustain the lower court in its ruling.
I am authorized by Judge Sybert to say that he concurs in this dissent.