Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice Roberts:I must once again dissent from the majority’s holding that the trial court, after a timely request by counsel, commits no error in refusing to charge the jury, in a murder prosecution, on voluntary manslaughter. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Kenney, 449 Pa. 562, 570, 297 *399A. 2d 794, 798 (1972) (Egberts, J., dissenting, joined by Pomeroy and Maxuerino, JJ.); Commonwealth v. Davis, 449 Pa. 468, 477, 297 A. 2d 817, 818 (1972) (Roberts, J., Opinion In Opposition To Affirmance, joined by Pomeroy and Manderino, JJ.)1; Commonwealth v. Banks, 447 Pa. 356, 364, 285 A. 2d 506, 509 (1971) (Pomeroy, J., dissenting, joined by Roberts, J.); Commonwealth v. Matthews, 446 Pa. 65, 77, 285 A. 2d 510, 516 (1971) (Robert’s, J., dissenting).2
In my view, the majority again obstructs and obfuscates the salutary and well-settled rule that “ ‘where an indictment charges an offense which includes within its description another offense of lower grade or degree, the jury may find the accused guilty of the less offense; this rule is universally applied in criminal cases, and, under an indictment charging murder, defendant may he convicted of voluntary manslaughter and a conviction for the latter crime will be sustained though it may clearly appear from the evidence that defendant was in fact guilty of a higher grade. . . Commonwealth v. Arcuroso, 283 Pa. 84, 87, 128 Atl. 668, 670 (1925) (citation omitted) (emphasis supplied); Commonwealth v. Hill, 444 Pa. 323, 281 A. 2d 859 (1971); Commonwealth v. Hoffman, 439 Pa. 348, 266 A. 2d 726 (1970); Commonwealth v. Harry, 437 Pa. 532, 264 A. 2d 402 (1970); Commonwealth v. Dennis, 433 Pa. 525, 252 A. 2d 671 (1969); Commonwealth v. Cooney, 431 Pa. 153, 244 A. 2d 651 (1968); Commonwealth v. Pavillard, 421 Pa. 571, 220 A. 2d 807 (1966); Commonwealth v. Frazier, 420 Pa. 209, 216 A. 2d 337 (1966); Commonwealth v. Frazier, 411 Pa. 195, 191 A. 2d 369 (1963); Commonwealth v. Moore, 398 Pa. *400198, 157 A. 2d 65 (1959); Commonwealth v. Nelson, 396 Pa. 359, 152 A. 2d 913 (1959); Commonwealth v. Steele, 362 Pa. 427, 66 A. 2d 825 (1949); Commonwealth v. Kellyon, 278 Pa. 59, 122 Atl. 166 (1923); Commonwealth v. Gable, 7 S.&R. 422 (1821).” Davis, supra at 478, 297 A. 2d at 818 (Opinion In Opposition To Affirmance).
Given the fact that a jury, in a murder prosecution, retains the inherent dispensatory power to return a verdict of voluntary manslaughter (even absent any evidence to support such a verdict), which the trial court must accept, Kenney, supra at 570 n.1, 297 A. 2d at 798 n.l (dissenting opinion, citing cases) does not “the fair and proper administration of criminal justice [require] that in every murder trial the jury be charged on the elements of voluntary manslaughter?” Povillará, supra at 579, 220 A. 2d at 812 (Cohen, J., dissenting, joined by Jones, J.). In my judgment it does. “The jury ought to be made fully aware of all the verdicts that it has the power and, indeed, the right to return.” Id.
Mr. Justice Pomeroy and Mr. Justice Manderino join in this dissenting opinion.Mr. Justice Pomeroy also filed an Opinion In Opposition to Affirmance, 449 Pa. 468, 479, 297 A. 2d 817, 818 (1972) (joined by Roberts and Manderiuo, JJ.).
Mr. Justice Pomeroy also dissented, 446 Pa. 65, 78, 285 A. 2d 510, 516 (1971) (joined by Roberts, J.).