In Re Estate of Kingsbury

ALEXANDER, J., with whom SAUFLEY, C.J., and SILVER, J„ join, dissenting.

[¶ 10] This case should not be about disturbing the remains of the deceased. And this Court should not involve itself in this interlocutory discovery dispute. Robin Whorff, the appellant, seeks to make this a case about disturbing her father’s remains by refusing to submit a sample for simple, noninvasive DNA testing by providing a lock of her hair or some other similar means.

[¶ 11] Whorff is both the personal representative and a party-in-interest in this action. She is properly subject to a discovery request and order in either capacity. The Probate Court’s discovery order gives Whorff the option of providing a sample appropriate for genetic testing. She acknowledges that her appeal of that order is interlocutory. The Probate Court could have directed Whorff to provide a sample for DNA testing or, alternatively, face a default on the issue that would be subject to the genetic test. Such an order, part of ongoing discovery that occurs in civil and criminal cases, should not justify an interlocutory appeal. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the Court’s decision to reach the merits of this appeal.

[¶ 12] As the Court acknowledges in its opinion, the death knell exception to the final judgment rule permits appellate review of an interlocutory order only when “substantial rights of a party will be irreparably lost if review is delayed until final judgment.” Bruesewitz v. Grant, 2007 ME 13, ¶ 8, 912 A.2d 1255, 1258. The death knell exception applies “only to orders that, without an interlocutory appeal, result in a substantial loss or sacrifice of the rights, property, or claim at issue.” Id

[¶ 13] Having to give a small sample of one’s hair or other similar, noninvasive sample does not cause a substantial or irreparable loss of a right, property, or claim. Because on appeal after a final judgment we can “effectively provide a remedy to the appellant if we ultimately decided to vacate the interlocutory determination after a final judgment,” see In re Bailey M., 2002 ME 12, ¶ 8, 788 A.2d 590, 594, the death knell exception to the final judgment rule cannot apply to this case. Whorff should be given the choice of providing the sample ordered by the Court or suffering a default on the issue. There is no need for her to cause her father’s remains to be disturbed and use the prospect of that disturbance as a means to maintain *395this interlocutory appeal. I would dismiss this appeal as interlocutory.