concurring.
[¶ 17] I join in the Court’s opinion. I write separately to emphasize that the sole constitutional issue raised by Ngo is whether the post-conviction review statute, 15 M.R.S. §§ 2121-2132 (2007), violates his right to substantive due process under the United States and Maine Constitutions. Therefore, we have not addressed whether the statute affords all of the process that is constitutionally required for an individual who claims, long after completing any incarceration and probation, to be harmed by serious collateral consequences arising from an allegedly unconstitutional criminal conviction. See State v. Trott, 2004 ME 15, ¶ 13, 841 A.2d 789, 792-93 (finding it unnecessary to address a defendant’s claim to the writ of comm nobis where the defendant otherwise qualified for post-conviction review under 15 M.R.S. § 2124(1)(C)); see also Thoresen v. State, 239 A.2d 654, 655 (Me.1968) (finding the writ of coram nobis no longer available).