dissenting.
When Halina Jablonowska purchased her automobile insurance policy, she opted for the limitation on lawsuit threshold under the Automobile Insurance Cost Reduction Act (AICRA), N.J.S.A. 39:6A-1.1 to -35. Because of that choice, Ms. Jablonowska cannot recover noneconomic damages1 resulting from the automobile accident unless she can show that she suffered “a bodily injury which resulted] in death; dismemberment; significant disfigurement or significant scarring; displaced fractures; loss of a fetus; or a permanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability, other than scarring or disfigurement.” N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a).
Ms. Jablonowska claims that she suffered a permanent psychological stress a result of witnessing the death of her mother in a car crash, permitting her to vault the lawsuit threshold and recover for pain and suffering. I would hold that a permanent psychological injury, proven by objective credible evidence, is the equivalent of a permanent *113bodily injury under AICRA, and give Ms. Jablonowska the opportunity to prove that she suffered a permanent injury. Our case law supports and defendant concedes that a permanent psychological injury is indeed a permanent bodily injury that can satisfy AICRA’s limitation on lawsuit threshold.2
On the other hand, I disagree with the majority that a common law claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress under Portee v. Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88, 417 A.2d 521 (1980), arising from a motor vehicle accident and resulting in a nonpermanent psychological injury, is exempt from AICRA’s lawsuit threshold. With regard to automobile accidents subject to AICRA, the majority gives a Portee claim an exalted status, distinguishing it from all other claims alleging physical and psychological injury. I see no difference under AICRA between a nonpermanent psychological injury alleged in a Portee claim and a nonpermanent physical and psychological injury alleged in any other common law claim. Like a nonpermanent physical injury (other than a displaced fracture), a nonpermanent psychological injury does not vault the threshold.3 Because I believe that the majority’s resolution is inconsistent with the clear language of AICRA and will generate anomalous and even absurd distinctions that were never contemplated by the Legislature, I respectfully dissent.
I.
I disagree with the majority’s assertion that a Portee, nonper-manent psychological injury arising from a motor vehicle accident falls outside of the lawsuit threshold. Ms. Jablonowska witnessed her mother die after their car was struck by another vehicle. Because her psychological injuries are directly related to that *114accident, AICRA governs this is that simple. See N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a) (holding that limitation on lawsuit provision applies to injuries “arising out of the ownership, operation, maintenance or use of [an] automobile”).
The only threshold category that possibly applies in this ease is the one that allows for a recovery for pain and suffering damages when a person injured in an automobile accident sustains “a bodily injury which results in ... a permanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability, other than scarring or disfigurement.” N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a). For purposes of AICRA, a permanent injury is “when the body part or organ, or both, has not healed to function normally and will not heal to function normally with further medical treatment.” Ibid. Because the statute does not permit a recovery of noneconomic damages for a nonperman-ent physical injury, I do not see how a recovery for a nonperman-ent psychological injury, even if denominated a Portee injury, can be treated any differently.
Moreover, AICRA’s plain language makes clear that one cannot vault the verbal threshold on the basis of another person’s injury. N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a) provides that a tortfeasor is not liable “for noneconomic loss to a person ... unless that person has sustained a bodily injury which results in death ... or a permanent injury.” (Emphasis added). Thus, Ms. Jablonowska only vaults the threshold if she suffered a permanent injury herself; she does not vault the threshold because of her mother’s death.
In DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 874 A.2d 1039 (2005), we held that “generally, the best indicator of [the Legislature’s] intent is the statutory language,” and that it is not our role to “ ‘rewrite a plainly-written enactment of the Legislature []or presume that the Legislature intended something other than that expressed by way of the plain language.’ ” Id. at 492, 874 1039 (alteration in original) (quoting O’Connell v. State, 171 N.J. 484, 488, 795 A.2d 857 (2002)). In short, we cannot add to or detract from the clear meaning of the statute. As part of AICRA’s overall goal of containing the spiraling cost of automobile insurance, the Legisla*115ture precisely identified the kinds of injuries that would vault the threshold. Id. at 488, 493, 795 A.2d 857.
Nothing in AICRA suggests that a driver bound by the lawsuit threshold, who is involved in an automobile accident and witnesses a close family member suffer death or serious bodily injury, can recover damages for pain and suffering resulting from a nonper-manent injury, whether physical or psychological. AICRA has no carve-out for nonpermanent Portee injuries. Under the majority’s paradigm, a driver whose car is broadsided and who observes a close relative suffer serious bodily injury can recover for pain and suffering resulting from a nonpermanent post-traumatic stress disorder. However, if a sixteen wheeler crashes into a car, which explodes in flames, and the sole occupant suffers nonpermanent physical injuries and nonpermanent post-traumatic stress disorder, no recovery for pain and suffering is allowed. That absurd result does not follow from AICRA’s plain language, and could not have been intended or envisioned by the drafters of that statute. The Legislature did not make a psychological injury asserted in a Portee claim superior to a psychological injury asserted in any other common law claim when the injury occurs in a motor vehicle accident.
Accordingly, no distinction should be made between psychological injuries suffered by the sole occupant of a ear involved in a crash and by an occupant who witnesses a close relative injured in a crash. However, as indicated earlier, a permanent psychological injury sustained in an automobile accident as a result of another’s negligence is a sufficient ground for vaulting the lawsuit threshold. On that point, plaintiff, defendant, and amicus Association of Trial Lawyers of America-New Jersey all agree.
II.
AICRA’s lawsuit threshold, N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a), does not define “bodily injury” as excluding injuries to the mind or the brain. Nor does it define “permanent injury” as barring a permanent mental injury for the purpose of satisfying the threshold. Signifi*116cantly, this Court has construed similar “bodily injury” language in the Tort Claims Act (TCA), N.J.S.A. 69:1-1 to 59:12-3, to encompass permanent psychological injuries.
In Collins v. Union County Jail, 150 N.J. 407, 696 A.2d 625 (1997), we held that the verbal threshold provision of the TCA, N.J.S.A. 59:9-2(d), did not bar a recovery for pain and suffering in the form of a permanent post-traumatic stress disorder resulting from a corrections officer’s rape of a prison inmate. Collins, supra, 150 N.J. at 421-23, 696 A.2d 625. Moreover, we adopted that holding even though the inmate did not sustain residual physical injury. Id. at 422, 696 A.2d 625.
The TCA threshold provides that in a suit against a public entity or public employee, a plaintiff shall not be awarded pain and suffering damages “resulting from any injury” except “in cases of permanent loss of a bodily function, permanent disfigurement or dismemberment where the medical treatment expenses are in excess of $3,600.00.” N.J.S.A. 59:9-2(d). In Collins, supra, the plaintiff’s treating psychologist testified that the plaintiff suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder and that it was highly likely that that psychological injury was permanent. 150 N.J. at 415, 696 A.2d 625. We concluded that permanent psychological harm resulting from the rape “constitute[d] a ‘permanent loss of a bodily function’ within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 59:9-2(d).” Id. at 420, 696 A.2d 625. In reaching that conclusion, we noted that other jurisdictions have recognized post-traumatic stress disorder as a “physical injur[y].” Id. at 421, 696 A.2d 625. With a present-day understanding of psychological injuries, we observed that the “mind ... is as much a part of the body as the back, a leg, a hand, or a finger.” Id. at 423, 696 A.2d 625. We were persuaded that the Legislature did not intend to treat “psychological” injuries differently from “physical injuries under the [TCA’s] threshold provision when [those psychological injuries] arise in a context similar to that which precipitated plaintiff’s injuries.” Ibid.
Thus, at the time of AICRA’s enactment in 1998, the Legislature knew that this Court in Collins had construed the term *117“permanent loss of a bodily function” in the TCA’s verbal threshold to include permanent psychological injuries. Similarly, the Legislature was aware that in Saunderlin v. E.I. DuPont Co., 102 N.J. 402, 508 A.2d 1095 (1986), we interpreted the provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act, N.J.S.A. 34:15-36, permitting coverage for a “ ‘[disability permanent in quality and partial in character ... which restricts the function of the body or of its members or organs,’” to encompass “claims of psychiatric disability.” Saunderlin, supra, 102 N.J. at 405, 410, 508 A.2d 1095 (quoting N.J.S.A. 34:15-36). Significantly, in reaching that result, we did not accept “the argument that [the statutory] language excludes from compensation injuries that restrict the function of the mind as distinguished from the body.” Id. at 408 n. 4, 508 A.2d 1095.
Despite our pronouncements in those eases, the Legislature made no effort in enacting AICRA to define “bodily injury” or “permanent injury” as excluding permanent psychological injuries. Because “the Legislature is presumed to be aware of judicial construction of its enactments,” DiProspero, supra, 183 N.J. at 494, 874 A.2d 1039 (quotation omitted), we can conclude that the Legislature consciously omitted from AICRA’s lawsuit threshold any language limiting “bodily injury” and “permanent injury” to a physical injury.
It also bears repeating that a permanent injury under AICRA’s lawsuit threshold must be found by objective, credible evidence. Recently, in Patterson v. Board of Trustees, 194 N.J. 29, 942 A.2d 782 (2008), we found that within the medical profession, there are objective standards for determining both the existence and cause of a psychiatric illness, such as post-traumatic stress disorder. Id. at 49, 942 A.2d 782 (citing Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV-TR), “a handbook published by the American Psychiatric Association, [which] categorizes known mental disorders for the purpose of diagnosis”); see also Saunderlin, supra, 102 N.J. at 413-416, 508 A.2d 1095 (finding that “ ‘diagnostic criteria’” in DSM-III related to “manifestations of physical symptoms or descriptions of states of mind ... might constitute *118demonstrable objective medical evidence as the profession of psychiatry conceives it”).
Here, Ms. Jablonowska’s treating psychiatrist submitted a certificate of merit in which he concluded that his patient suffered a “permanent Post Traumatic Stress Disorder”— as a result of witnessing the death of her mother in the car accident. In his certification, the psychiatrist stated that his opinion was based on “objective clinical evidence,” including “psychiatric evaluation and ongoing treatment.”
Based on that certification, I would remand to the trial court. That Ms. Jablonowska filed the physician’s certification more than 60 days after defendant filed his answer is not necessarily fatal to her claim under AICRA. See Casinelli v. Manglapus, 181 N.J. 354, 355-56, 858 A.2d 1113 (2004) (holding that untimely filing of physician’s certification does not mandate dismissal of action); see also N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a). I would leave it to the trial judge to fix an appropriate penalty for Ms. Jablonowska’s failure to file a timely physician’s certification. See Casinelli, supra, 181 N.J. at 356, 858 A.2d 1113. Ultimately, a jury should determine whether Ms. Jablonowska suffered a permanent psychological injury related to the automobile accident.
III.
I conclude that AICRA does not allow a recovery for pain and suffering for a nonpermanent Portee injury. I would remand for a new trial to allow Ms. Jablonowska the opportunity to prove that she suffered a permanent psychological injury compensable under AICRA.
Justices LONG and WALLACE join in this opinion. For Justice RABNER and Justices LaVECCHIA, RIVERA-SOTO and For LONG, ALBIN and"Noneconomic loss" is defined as “pain, suffering and inconvenience." N.J.S.A. 39:6A-2(i).
Defendant, of course, does not concede that plaintiff in this case suffered a permanent psychological injury.
A displaced fracture that does not result in a permanent injury will satisfy the threshold. N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a). The displaced fracture category, however, would never apply to a psychological injury.