dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. One thing is clear: the Maryland Legislature is silent when it comes to the question of visitation with children when a non-traditional family is dissolved. In the face of this silence, I believe that a de facto parent is different from “third parties” and should be treated as the equivalent of a legal parent, with the same rights and obligations.1 See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 63, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 2059, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000) (noting that “[t]he demographic changes of the past century make it difficult to speak of an average American family”); N.A.H. v. S.L.S., 9 P.3d 354, 359 (Colo.2000) (observing that “[pjarenthood in our complex society comprises much more than biological ties, and litigants increasingly are asking courts to address issues that involve delicate balances between traditional expectations and current realities”). I would recognize the concept of de facto parenthood, and would hold that, in the context of visitation, once a *697party establishes that he or she fits within the status of a cle facto parent, proof of parental unfitness or exceptional circumstances is inapplicable, and the decision as to visitation is controlled by the best interest of the child standard alone.
The defacto parenthood test has its origins in the Wisconsin case of In Re Custody of H.S.H.-K, 193 Wis.2d 649, 533 N.W.2d 419 (1995), cert. denied, Knott v. Holtzman, 516 U.S. 975, 116 S.Ct. 475, 133 L.Ed.2d 404 (1995). H.S.H.-K. involved a custody battle after a lesbian couple ended their long-term relationship. The birth mother of the child, who had become pregnant through in vitro fertilization and had given birth during the course of the relationship, sought to deny her former partner visitation and custody. The lower courts agreed with the biological mother and denied visitation or custody to the petitioner. The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed.
Two questions were presented to the Wisconsin Supreme Court: whether Holtzman could petition for custody and whether she could petition for visitation. Id. at 420. The court said that she could not petition for custody but could petition for visitation based on the judiciary’s equitable power over visitation issues. Petitions for visitation were permissible when a court “determines that the petitioner has a parent-like relationship with the child and that a significant triggering event justifies state intervention in the child’s relationship with a biological or adoptive parent.” Id. at 435. The Wisconsin Supreme Court adopted the following four-part test:
(1) the biological or adoptive parent must have consented to, and fostered, the petitioner’s formation of a parent-like relationship;
(2) the petitioner and the child must have lived together in the same household;
(3) the petitioner must have assumed the obligations of parenthood by taking significant responsibility for the child’s care, education and development, including contributing to the child’s support, without expectation of financial *698compensation a petitioner’s contribution to a child’s support need not be monetary; and
(4) the petitioner must have been in a parental role for a length of time sufficient to have established with the child a bonded, dependent relationship parental in nature.
Id. at 435-36.
The Wisconsin test set forth a high bar for establishing de facto parent status, minimizing concerns that it could be applied too broadly. The first factor, that the biological parent consented to and fostered the formation of a parent-like relationship, eliminates the majority’s fear that recognition of de facto parenthood will open the floodgates for litigation by babysitters, foster parents and the like. See Janice M. v. Margaret K., 404 Md. 661, 686, 948 A.2d 73, 88 (2008) (“The issues ... could arise in a myriad of other circumstances, including disputes involving step-parents, grandparents, and parties in a relationship with ‘a significant other’ ”).
The court discussed also the necessity of a significant triggering event to justify state intervention in a child’s relationship with a biological or adoptive parent. The court reasoned as follows:
“To establish a significant triggering event justifying state intervention in the child’s relationship with a biological or adoptive parent, the petitioner must prove that this parent has interfered substantially with the petitioner’s parent-like relationship with the child, and that the petitioner sought court ordered visitation within a reasonable time after the parent’s interference.
The petitioner must prove all these elements before a circuit court may consider whether visitation is in the best interest of the child. The proceedings must focus on the child. When a non-traditional adult relationship is dissolving, the child is as likely to become a victim of turmoil and adult hostility as is a child subject to the dissolution of a marriage. Such a child needs and deserves the projection of *699the courts as much as a child of a dissolving traditional relationship.”
H.S.H.-K., 193 Wis.2d at 659, 533 N.W.2d at 421 (citations omitted).
Since H.S.H.-K, the American Law Institute has adopted and promulgated a definition for a defacto parent in a treatise setting forth principles governing the allocation of custodial and decision-making responsibilities for children. See Janice M. v. Margaret K., 404 Md. 661, 681, 948 A.2d 73, 85 (2008); American Law Institute, Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations § 2.03(l)(c) (2003) (adopted May 16,2000) (“ALI Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution”).2 In § 2.04, the American Law Institute includes a de facto parent as one of the parties with standing to bring an action for the determination of custody, subject to the best interests of the child analysis.3 The commentary to § 2.03(c) indicates that “[t]he requirements for becoming a de facto parent are strict, to avoid unnecessary and inappropriate intrusion into the relationships between legal parents and *700their children.” ALI Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution § 2.03 comment c. The requirement that the legal parent consent to the formation of a parent-child relationship, barring any complete failure of the legal parent that would amount to parental unfitness, again assuages any fear that the standard conflicts with the liberty interest of parents in the custody and care of their children identified in Troxel.
Many of our sister states have recognized that de facto parenthood4 status entitles a party otherwise considered as “a third party” to equal standing as a legal parent in visitation or custody matters. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court recognized the concept of defacto parent in E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 429 Mass. 824, 711 N.E.2d 886 (1999), cert. denied, L.M.M. v. E.N.O., 528 U.S. 1005, 120 S.Ct. 500, 145 L.Ed.2d 386 (1999). In E.N.O., the Massachusetts Supreme Court addressed a custody and visitation dispute between a same-sex couple. The biological mother had denied the petitioner access to a child born during the course of their relationship. The court held that the family and probate court traditionally enjoyed equity jurisdiction and, in spite of a lack of statutory authority, the court could find that, pursuant to the best interest of the child, the child’s de facto parent should be allowed visitation with the child. Id. at 892-93. The holding of the court was in part based on its conclusion that “recognition of de facto parents is in accord with notions of the modern family.” Id. at 891. The court explained as follows:
“A child may be a member of a nontraditional family in which he is parented by a legal parent and a defacto parent. A defacto parent is one who has no biological relation to the child, but has participated in the child’s life as a member of the child’s family. The de facto parent resides with the child and, with the consent and encouragement of the legal *701parent, performs a share of caretaking functions at least as great as the legal parent. The de facto parent shapes the child’s daily routine, addresses his developmental needs, disciplines the child, provides for his education and medical care, and serves as a moral guide.
The recognition of de facto parents is in accord with the notions of the modern family. An increasing number of same gender couples, like the plaintiff and defendant, are deciding to have children. It is to be expected that children of nontraditional families, like other children, form parent relationships with both parents, whether those parents are legal or de facto. Thus, the best interests calculus must include an examination of the child’s relationship with both his legal and defacto parent.”
Id. at 891 (citations and footnotes omitted). See also V.C. v. M.J.B., 163 N.J. 200, 748 A.2d 539 (2000) (recognizing special status for psychological parents); Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959, 976 (R.I.2000) (finding no “infer[ence] [of] legislative intent to preclude standing to a de facto parent” and concluding that “a person who has no biological connection to a child but who has served as a psychological or de facto parent to that child may ... establish his or her entitlement to parental rights vis-a-vis the child”); A.C. v. C.B., 113 N.M. 581, 829 P.2d 660 (Ct.App.2002) (recognizing same-sex dual parent relationship and reversing trial court’s ruling that a coparenting agreement was per se unenforceable), cert. denied, C.B. v. A.C., 113 N.M. 449, 827 P.2d 837 (1992).
Courts have continued to recognize the de facto parenthood concept post-Troxel. In In re Parentage of L.B., 155 Wash.2d 679, 122 P.3d 161 (2005), cert. denied, Britain v. Carvin, 547 U.S. 1143, 126 S.Ct. 2021, 164 L.Ed.2d 806 (2006), the Washington Supreme Court was confronted with a custody and visitation dispute between former partners in a same-sex relationship. The court held that Washington’s common law recognizes the status of de facto parents. Id. at 163. The court recognized that “[i]n the face of advancing technologies and evolving notions of what comprises a family unit, this case causes us to confront the manner in which our state, through *702its statutory scheme and common law principles, defines the terms ‘parents’ and ‘families.’ ” Id. at 165. The court concluded that parties who satisfy the requirements of de facto parenthood are “in parity with biological and adoptive parents in our state,” explaining as follows:
“Reason and common sense support recognizing the existence of de facto parents and according them the rights and responsibilities which attach to parents in this state. We adapt our common law today to fill the interstices that our current legislative enactment fails to cover in a manner consistent with our laws and stated legislative policy.
We thus hold that henceforth in Washington, a de facto parent stands in legal parity with an otherwise legal parent, whether biological, adoptive, or otherwise. As such, recognition of a person as a child’s de facto parent necessarily ‘authorizes [a] court to consider an award of parental rights and responsibilities ... based on its determination of the best interest of the child.’ A de facto parent is not entitled to any parental privileges, as a matter of right, but only as is determined to be in the best interests of the child at the center of any such dispute.”
Id. at 176-77 (citations and footnotes omitted). See also C.E.W. v. D.E.W., 845 A.2d 1146 (Me.2004) (recognizing de facto parent status and placing a defacto parent in parity with a statutory parent); Middleton v. Johnson, 369 S.C. 585, 633 S.E.2d 162 (Ct.App.2006) (finding that an ex-boyfriend who lived with the child for nine years should be recognized as a psychological parent or de facto parent, gaining visitation rights); In re Bonfield, 97 Ohio St.3d 387, 780 N.E.2d 241 (2002) (finding that because state statute specifically defined “parent,” it would be “inappropriate to ... broaden the narrow class of persons” to include biological mother’s same-sex partner and thus partner was “not entitled to the benefit of statutes that are clearly inapplicable to such a familial arrangement,” but concluding courts do have jurisdiction to consider petition for shared custody as not preempted by statute); T.B. v. L.R.M., 567 Pa. 222, 786 A.2d 913, 920 (2001) *703(concluding lesbian partner “assumed a parental status and discharged parental duties with the consent of [the biological mother]” and thus has standing as person in loco parentis to bring action for partial custody and visitation); In re Parentage of A.B., 818 N.E.2d 126, 131-33 (Ind.Ct.App.2004) (holding common law permits recognition of former same-sex partner of biological mother as legal coparent of child conceived by artificial insemination during relationship); In re E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d 546, 558-61 (Colo.Ct.App.2004) (finding a compelling state interest in preventing harm to child satisfies strict scrutiny analysis and affirming recognition of “psychological parent” doctrine in context of former same-sex partner’s petition for equal parenting time), cert. denied, Clark v. McLeod, 545 U.S. 1111, 125 S.Ct. 2551, 162 L.E.2d 287 (2005).
The rationale underlying the de facto parent test is not inconsistent with Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000), nor does it contradict the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, or this Court’s jurisprudence, in addressing the liberty interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children. See In re E.L.M. C., 100 P.3d 546 (holding that despite Troxel, parental unfitness need not be shown). Troxel did not decide whether a finding of unfitness is a condition precedent to recognizing rights of a nonparent. See W.C. ex rel. A.M.K., 907 P.2d 719 (Colo.Ct.App.1995) (rejecting father’s argument that unfitness must be shown to interfere with fundamental right to direct upbringing of child). A defacto parent fits within the category of legal parents and should be treated as though “in parity” with legal parents in visitation matters. See In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d at 178. As such, granting a de facto parent equal rights over a child does not implicate the liberty interest a legal parent possesses in the care, custody, and control of his or her child. Significantly, the Troxel plurality expressly decided that it would not:
“consider the primary constitutional question passed on by the Washington Supreme Court—whether the Due Process Clause requires all nonparental visitation statutes to include a showing of harm or potential harm to the child as a *704condition precedent to granting visitation. We do not, and need not, define today the precise scope of the parental due process right in the visitation context.”
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. at 73, 120 S.Ct. at 2064.
Furthermore, the test to determine de facto parenthood is narrowly tailored and allows a person to overcome the presumption in favor of a natural parent’s rights only after that party demonstrates that he or she is in essence a parent to the child. As Chief Judge Joseph F. Murphy, Jr. explained, writing for the Court of Special Appeals in Janice M. v. Margaret K.:
“The person who claims to be a child’s de facto parent must successfully shoulder the burdens of (1) pleading, (2) production of evidence, and (3) persuasion. We can take judicial notice that in almost every home occupied by adults and children, the adults perform some parental functions on behalf of the children. Under the above quoted test, however, a person who performed parental functions is not entitled to defacto parent status unless the court finds as a fact that the child’s legal parent has actually fostered such a relationship. Because the test we adopted in S.F. v. M.D., supra, is a strict one, neither our holding in that case nor our holding in the case at bar will open the floodgates to claims of de facto parenthood asserted by persons who can prove nothing more than that, while living with the natural or adoptive parent of a child, they performed some parental functions on behalf of the child.
“Rare are the case like the case at bar, in which the circuit court was presented with evidence that (as summarized in the argument of Margaret K.’s counsel) ‘Maya was with Margaret [K.] every day of her life in this country until August of 2004[and][t]he only reason that Margaret [K.] has been deprived of the opportunity to have a relationship with her daughter is because she wasn’t on that decree of adoption.’ ”
*705Janice M. v. Margaret K., 171 Md.App. 528, 539-40, 910 A.2d 1145, 1152 (2006) (transliteration in the original). I agree with Chief Judge Murphy.
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Troxel v. Granville did not prohibit the recognition of de facto parents. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68, 120 S.Ct. at 2061 (noting that “special factors ... might justify the State’s interference with [the biological mother’s] fundamental right to make decisions concerning the rearing of her [children]”). The Supreme Court refused to define the specific scope of a parent’s liberty interest, leaving the states to address the matter. As the majority in this case notes:
“The plurality [in Troxel] declined to define the precise scope of the parental due process right in the visitation context and declined to answer the question of whether the Due Process Clause requires all nonparental visitation statutes to include a showing of harm or potential harm. Id. at 73, 120 S.Ct. at 2064. Instead, the Court rested its holding on the sweeping breadth of the Washington statute, stating as follows:
‘In this respect, we agree with Justice Kennedy that the constitutionality of any standard for awarding visitation turns on the specific manner in which that standard is applied and that the constitutional protections in this area are best ‘elaborated with care.’ Because much state-court adjudication in this context occurs on a case-by-case basis, we would be hesitant to hold that specific nonparental visitation statutes violate the Due Process Clause as a per se matter.’ ”
See Janice M. v. Margaret K., 404 Md. 661, 674, 948 A.2d 73, 80 (2008) (citation omitted). The Troxel plurality noted the lack of “special factors” justifying interference with the parent’s liberty interest, comparing the Washington statute to other states, where a standard is required showing that a parent “has denied (or unreasonably denied) visitation to the concerned third party.” Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68, 71, 120 S.Ct. at 2061, 2063. Justice Souter, in his concurrence, criticized the Washington statute for not requiring a “substantial rela*706tionship” as a threshold matter. Id. at 77, 120 S.Ct. at 2066. Justice Kennedy went further, noting in his dissent that “a fit parent’s right vis-a-vis a complete stranger is one thing; her right vis-a-vis another parent or a de facto parent may be another.” Id. at 100-01, 120 S.Ct. at 2079.
We have attempted to clarify the principles noted in Troxel in McDermott v. Dougherty, 385 Md. 320, 869 A.2d 751 (2005), and Koshko v. Haining, 398 Md. 404, 921 A.2d 171 (2007). In McDermott we explained “that parental unfitness and exceptional circumstances are threshold considerations in third party custody determinations; Koshko made clear that those considerations apply in third party visitation disputes.” See Janice M. v. Margaret K., 404 Md. 661, 680, 948 A.2d 73, 84 (2008). Both opinions dealt with the rights of pure third parties, and not those of de facto parents. See McDermott, 385 Md. at 356, 869 A.2d at 772 (delineating the distinction between “pure third-party cases” and cases involving “psychological parents, third parties who have, in effect, become parents”); Koshko, 398 Md. at 443, 921 A.2d at 194. They do not address the issue before the Court today.
In my view, Monroe v. Monroe, 329 Md. 758, 621 A.2d 898 (1993), provides support for adoption of the de facto parent doctrine. Monroe dealt with a non-biological party who sought custody and visitation. Writing for the Court, Chief Judge Bell pointed out that “[w]hat is important, rather, is the relationship that exists between the child and each of the parties.” Id. at 775, 621 A.2d at 906. Significantly, we noted as to a man denying support to a child, even though the child turns out not to be his biological child, we stated as follows:
“Where a man provides support and care to a child believing, as a result of the mother’s representations, that he is the child’s father and, thereafter, after being told and, indeed, efforts have been made to prove that he is not, he continues to insist that he is, it is quite likely that he will be deemed to be equitably estopped to deny his obligation to continue to provide for the care and support of the child.”
*707Id. at 770 n. 7, 621 A.2d at 903 n. 7 (citation omitted). We noted in Monroe that protection of a child’s relationship with a non-biological parent is warranted “when the relationship is developed in the context of a family unit and is fostered, facilitated and, for most of the child’s life, encouraged by the biological parent.” Id. at 775, 621 A.2d at 906. Although in Monroe we were discussing “exceptional circumstances,” the rationale of our discussion applies to the de facto parent discussion. We stated as follows:
“Whether the child has established a relationship with a third party sufficient to constitute exceptional circumstances, rebutting the presumption of custody in the biological parent, is not dependent on its development during the absence of the biological parent. A relationship resulting in bonding and psychological dependence upon a person without biological connection can develop during an ongoing biological parent/child relationship. Particularly is this true when the relationship is developed in the context of a family unit and is fostered, facilitated and, for most of the child’s life, encouraged by the biological parent.”
Id. Monroe supports the argument that de facto parent status, if established, is different from a pure third party.
Monroe provides support also for an alternative basis for applying the best interests of the child analysis, the recognition of a parent by estoppel. As the majority notes, we theorized that “the putative father might even have been equitably estopped from disclaiming his parental obligations.” See Janice M. v. Margaret K., 404 Md. 661, 692, 948 A.2d 73, 91-92 (2008). We explicitly said in Monroe that “it is quite likely that [a man providing support and care believing that he is the child’s father] will be deemed to be equitably estopped to deny his obligation to continue to provide for the care and support for the child.” Id. at 770 n. 7, 621 A.2d at 903 n. 7. While the majority argues that equitable estoppel is not an equivalent concept to parenthood by estoppel, see Janice M. v. Margaret K., 404 Md. 661, 692 n. 12, 948 A.2d 73, 91-92 n. 12 (2008), the American Law Institute’s definition of a parent by estoppel includes any individual who, though not a legal *708parent, is obligated to pay child support under § 3 of the treatise.5 Section 3.03 provides for the kind of equitable estoppel we discussed in Monroe. The recognition of the psychological bond and equitable estoppel from denying parental support suggested by Monroe provide strong foundation for the recognition of de facto parenthood status in Maryland law.
As Margaret K. points out in her brief, a finding that a person qualifies as a de facto parent does not result automatically in visitation rights. Such determination only leads to the next question: What is in the best interest of the child? See, e.g., In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d at 177 (stating that “[a] de facto parent is not entitled to any parental privileges, as a matter of right, but only as is determined to be in the best interest of the child at the center of any such dispute”).
Several of our sister states, in considering non-parents’ assertions of parental rights, reject a finding of parental unfitness as a predicate for state interference with the par*709ent’s right to control the upbringing of their children. See, e.g., Downs v. Scheffler, 206 Ariz. 496, 80 P.3d 775 (Ct.App. 2003); In re Custody of C.C.R.S., 892 P.2d 246 (Colo.1995) (rejecting parental unfitness standard in favor of the best interests of the child test in contest between biological mother and psychological parents); Roth v. Weston, 259 Conn. 202, 789 A.2d 431(2002); Rideout v. Riendeau, 761 A.2d 291 (Me. 2000); Blixt v. Blixt, 437 Mass. 649, 774 N.E.2d 1052 (2002); Moriarty v. Bradt, 177 N.J. 84, 827 A.2d 203 (2003); Williams v. Williams, 132 N.M. 445, 50 P.3d 194 (Ct.App.2002); State ex rel. Brandon L. v. Moats, 209 W.Va. 752, 551 S.E.2d 674, 684 (2001) (concluding that two-prong standard of best interests of child and lack of substantial interference with parents’ right meets Troxel requirements).
For the reasons noted above, I would hold that a de facto parent stands in legal parity with a legal parent, whether biological, adoptive, or otherwise, for the purposes of visitation. Accordingly, I would not apply the threshold determinations of parental unfitness or exceptional circumstances that we required in McDermott and Koshko. A party who has demonstrated that he or she is a child’s de facto parent should be entitled to visitation rights if such a result is in the best interest of the child.
. Recognizing de facto parenthood status is especially relevant because, as the majority notes, whether same-sex couples may adopt in Maryland remains unsettled. See Janice M. v. Margaret K., 404 Md. 661, 665, n. 3, 948 A.2d 73, 75 n. 3 (2008) ("The issue of whether same-sex couples may adopt a child in Maryland has not been briefed in this case and we express no opinion on the issue”).
. The definition for a de facto parent is set forth in the American Law Institute, Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations § 2.03(l)(c) (2003) ("ALI Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution”), as follows:
“A de facto parent is an individual other than a legal parent or a parent by estoppel who, for a significant period of time not less than two years,
(i) lived with the child and,
(ii) for reasons primarily other than financial compensation, and with the agreement of a legal parent to form a parent-child relationship, or as a result of a complete failure or inability of any legal parent to perform caretaking functions,
(A) regularly performed a majority of the caretaking functions for the child, or
(B) regularly performed a share of caretaking functions at least as great as that of the parent with whom the child primarily lived.”
. Other parties include a legal parent, a parent by estoppel, a biological parent, an individual allocated custodial responsibility or decision-making responsibility regarding the child under an existing parenting plan, or where the court grants permission for intervention because it determines exceptional circumstances exist. ALI Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution § 2.04.
. States have used terms such as "parent-like status,” and "psychological parenthood” to address a third party who seeks custody or visitation because that party has played a parental role in a child’s upbringing. See, e.g., In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 193 Wis.2d 649, 533 N.W.2d 419 (1995) and V.C. v. M.J.B., 163 N.J. 200, 748 A.2d 539 (2000).
. Section 2.03(b) of the ALI Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution provides as follows:
"A parent by estoppel is an individual who, though not a legal parent, "(i) is obligated to pay child support under Chapter 3; or "(ii) lived with the child for at least two years and
(A) over that period had a reasonable, good-faith belief that he was the child’s biological father, based on marriage to the mother or on the actions or representations of the mother, and fully accepted parental responsibilities consistent with that belief, and
(B) if some time thereafter that belief no longer existed, continued to make reasonable, good-faith efforts to accept responsibilities as the child’s father; or
"(iii) lived with the child since the child’s birth, holding out and accepting full and permanent responsibilities as parent, as part of a prior co-parenting agreement with the child’s legal parent (or, if there are two legal parents, both parents) to raise a child together each with full parental rights and responsibilities, when the court finds that recognition of the individual as a parent is in the child’s best interests; or
"(iv) lived with the child for at least two years, holding out and accepting full and permanent responsibilities as a parent, pursuant to an agreement with the child’s parent (or, if there are two legal parents, both parents), when the court finds that recognition of the individual as a parent is in the child’s best interests.”