First National Bank of Lewisville v. Mayberry

Robert J. Gladwin, Judge.

The Columbia County Circuit Court granted First National Bank of Lewisville (“First National”) and Farmers Bank and Trust1 foreclosure on Eddie and Chylene Mayberry’s property when they defaulted on their payments. A foreclosure sale of the acreage portion of the Mayberrys’ property was held, and appellant bought the property. The documents from the sale reflected a purchase price of $86,534.90, which amount would have satisfied the Mayberrys’ debt as to all of their property that was foreclosed upon. When appellant attempted to conduct a sale on the Mayberrys’ home place, the Mayberrys sought and obtained an injunction barring the sale of their home. At that point, appellant realized there was an error as to the bid and purchase price of the acreage and immediately filed a motion to vacate all of the documents related to the foreclosure sale. Appellant’s motion was deemed denied after thirty days pursuant to Ark. R. App. P. — Civ. 4(b)(1). On appeal to this court, appellant argues that the trial court erred in not granting its motion to vacate because the documents contained a clerical mistake and error that arose from oversight or omission. We affirm.

After appellant initiated foreclosure proceedings against the Mayberrys, the matter went to trial. There was apparently some sympathy for the Mayberrys, and so an agreement was reached. The agreement was to have two sales, with the first sale being that of the land consisting of 11.69 acres and with the second sale being that of the Mayberrys’ home resting on 2.10 acres. It was agreed that the sale on the Mayberrys’ home place would be conducted only if the sale of the acreage failed to bring enough to satisfy the total debt, which was $74,660.77 plus accrued interest, costs, and attorney’s fees.

At the sale of the acreage, John Upton, an officer at First National, was appointed commissioner for the sale. When no serious bids were received, Upton bid on the property, and it was sold to appellant. Thereafter, documents were filed, including the commissioner’s report of sale, an order confirming the sale, an order approving the commissioner’s deed, and the commissioner’s deed. The sale price listed on all of the documents was $86,534.90.

A sale was then scheduled to sell the Mayberrys’ home place, and the Mayberrys filed and were granted an injunction because they contended that the acreage had been sold for the entire amount of the judgment. First National immediately filed a motion to vacate, requesting that all of the documents be set aside' because First National alleged that there had been a clerical error as to the bid and sale price.

At a hearing on the matter, Upton testified that, besides himself and appellant’s attorney, only a couple of people came to the sale of the acreage. He said that those people asked a few questions and stated that the most they would pay for the property was $5,000. Upton testified that he then made a bid on the property on behalf of First National for the total amount of the judgment less $60,000 (representing the equity in the Mayberrys’ home place), for a total of $26,534.90.

The trial court did not rule on First National’s motion to vacate, and so it was deemed denied after thirty days. See Ark. R. App. P. — Civ. 4(b)(1). This appeal followed.

Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 60(a) provides that the court may vacate an order within ninety days to correct errors or mistakes or to prevent the miscarriage of justice. There are two exceptions to the ninety-day limitation, which are set forth in (b) and (c). Rule 60(b) provides that clerical errors and mistakes arising from oversight or omission may be corrected at any time. There are seven enumerated grounds set forth in Rule 60(c), including: (1) granting a new trial because evidence was discovered after ninety days; (2) granting a new trial in proceedings against a defendant who was constructively summoned but did not appear; (3) misprisions of the clerk; (4) misrepresentation or fraud; (5) erroneous proceedings against a minor or person deemed incompetent; (6) the death of one of the parties; (7) errors in a judgment shown by an infant within twelve months after reaching the age of eighteen years. A trial court’s power to correct mistakes or errors is to make the record speak the truth, but not to make it speak what it did not speak but ought to have spoken. Lord v. Mazzanati, 339 Ark. 25, 2 S.W.3d 76 (1999).

First National argues that the trial court should have entered an order vacating all of the documents regarding the sale of the acreage because they each contained a clerical error arising from oversight or omission. While the trial court did not rule on appellant’s motion to vacate, there was evidence that the mistake here was more substantive than a mere clerical error. The dissent characterizes the error here as a “minor [mistake], being the substitution of one amount of money for another amount,” which seems to suggest that a mere typographical error occurred when some numbers were transposed. That was not the case. Appellant’s attorney, David P. Price, failed to instruct his secretary that the paperwork would not be done in the “usual and customary” manner in that the entire amount of the judgment was not bid at the sale; in fact, according to his affidavit, Price directed his secretary to prepare the normal post-foreclosure sale documents. Price did not check the numbers in any of the four documents before giving them to Upton, who further compounded the error. Upton, president and chief operating officer at First National, testified that he had acted as commissioner many times and acknowledged that, as a banker, he was required to review and sign documents. Despite his experience, Upton failed to catch what is described in appellant’s own motion as a “clear and obvious mistake.” Upton further testified that he generally accepted what was received by appellant’s attorney as being accurate. As a result of this assumption, Upton allowed four separate documents containing an “obvious” error to the tune of$60,000 escape his notice when all he had to do was check to see that the numbers were correct before signing the documents and submitting them to the court. While we recognize that everyone makes mistakes, Rule 60 should not be viewed as providing a loophole to correct an error that would otherwise amount to negligence.

Black’s Law Dictionary defines “negligence” as:

1. The failure to exercise the standard of care that a reasonably pmdent person would have exercised in a similar situation; any conduct that falls below the legal standard established to protect others against unreasonable risk of harm, except for conduct that is intentionally, wantonly, or willfully disregardful of others’ rights.
2. A tort grounded in this failure, usu. expressed in terms of the following elements: duty, breach of duty, causation, and damages.

Black’s Law Dictionary 1061 (8th ed. 2004).

We disagree with appellant’s assertion that the error complained of here was the type of “clerical error” contemplated by Rule 60(b). Rather, this error resulted from nothing but inadequate representation by appellant’s own president and by its attorney. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the trial court erred in not vacating all of the foreclosure documents pursuant to Rule 60(b).

Affirmed.

Griffen, Vaught, Baker and Roaf, JJ., agree. Bird, J., dissents.

Farmers Bank & Trust was named as a defendant in First National’s original complaint because First National’s lien was subject to a first mortgage held by Farmers as to the second portion of the Mayberrys’ property; however, Farmers is not a party to this appeal.