dissenting.
The Missouri Merchandising Practices Act, at section 407.040, authorizes the attorney general to use a “civil investigative demand” to investigate possible violations of the merchandising practices act. A civil investigative demand requires “such person to appear and testify, or to produce relevant documentary material or physical evidence” in accordance with the civil investigative demand “concerning the advertisement, sale or offering for sale of any goods or services or the conduct of any trade or commerce or the conduct of any solicitation that is the subject matter of the investigation.” Section 407.040, RSMo. 1994.
The principal opinion correctly focuses the inquiry on whether a violation of the Motor Fuel Marketing Act, sections 416.600 to 416.635, RSMo Supp.1998, con*242stitutes an “unfair practice” within the meaning of the merchandising practices act, specifically section 407.020.1 The term “unfair practice” is not defined in the statute; but it is hard to imagine a broader concept. The attorney general is given the authority, in section 407.145, to promulgate “all rules necessary to the administration and enforcement” of the merchandising practices act. Pursuant to that authority, the attorney general promulgated 15 CSR 60-8.02, which defines “unfair practice” as follows:
(1) An unfair practice is a practice which—
(A) Either—
1. Offends any public policy as it has been established by the Constitution, statutes or common law of this state, or by the Federal Trade Commission, or its interpretive decisions; or
2. Is unethical, oppressive or unscrupulous; and
(B) Presents a risk of, or causes, substantial injury to consumers. (Emphasis added.)
From the structure of the sentences in this regulation, it would appear that an unfair practice can simply be a practice that “offends any public policy as ... established by statutes ... of the state” and also presents “a risk of ... substantial injury to consumers.”
A practice that violates the motor fuel marketing act would fit this definition. Petroleum marketers occasionally engage in below-cost competition in order to drive their competitors from the field. Such competition obviously benefits consumers in the short run. In the long run, however, it is probably the legislature’s judgment that such competition produces an oligopolistic market in which the remaining players can inflict uncompetitively high prices on consumers. See Fleming Foods v. Runyan, 634 S.W.2d 183, 186-188 (Mo. banc 1982).
In ascribing this intent to the legislature in enacting sections 416.600 to 416.635, it is not necessary to agree with the legislature as to the existence of the evil or with the remedy that the legislature has prescribed. But that is not the Court’s function. The legislature has declared that it is unlawful “to sell or offer to sell motor fuel below cost ... if ... the intent of the sale or offer is to injure competition.... ” Section 416.615.1.2 The economic theory underlying this statute may be wrong or foolish. The principal opinion points out that sale of motor fuel below cost “is indeed a benefit to the buyer.” But the Court’s job is not to judge the wisdom of the economic theory of the regulatory scheme, but to apply the law.
*243The principal opinion does not challenge the authority of the attorney general to issue the regulation, nor does it find the regulation to be invalid. To the contrary, the regulation, as stated above, is explicitly authorized by section 407.145. Because the concept of “unfair practice” in section 407.020 is so broad, the regulation’s definition is actually a limitation on the concept and the attorney general’s authority, not an expansion of his authority. See State v. Polley, 2 S.W.3d 887, 890-891 (Mo.App.1999).
An injury to competition would meet the test of the attorney general’s regulation, that is, that the practice under investigation offends the law of the state and presents a risk of substantial injury to consumers. 15 CSR 60-8.02. '
The civil investigative demand is an investigative tool provided to the attorney general by statutes that give broad authority to ensure that commerce in this state is beneficial to consumers. There is nothing in the law that prohibits the attorney general from investigating violations of the motor fuel law, and in fact it is his duty to do so. Nothing, of course, forbids the attorney general from investigating the case the way a lawyer would without the power of a civil investigative demand.
Without being able to use the civil investigative demand, the attorney general may be in the position of having to sue first and ask questions later. The civil investigative demand authorizes him to ask questions first, and then, if the investigation shows there is a basis for suit, to bring an action under the relevant statute.
This civil investigative demand certainly is intrusive as to Ports Petroleum, and the resulting action may conflict with one’s favorite’ economic theories. But the attorney general does have the law on his side, and ought to be permitted to use the tool of the civil investigative demand which section 407.040 gives him.
. Section 407.020 provides in pertinent part:
The act, use or employment by any person of any deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation, unfair practice or the concealment, suppression, or omission of any material fact in connection with the sale or advertisement of any merchandise in trade or commerce ... in or from the state of Missouri, is declared to be an unlawful practice....
. Section 416.615 in its entirety provides:
1. It is unlawful for any person engaged in commerce within this state to sell or offer to sell motor fuel below cost as defined in subdivision (2) of section 416.605, if:
(1) The intent of the sale or offer is to injure competition; or
(2) The intent of the sale or offer is to induce the purchase of other merchandise, to unfairly divert trade from a competitor, or otherwise to injure a competitor.
2. It is unlawful for any person engaged in commerce within this state to sell or offer to sell motor fuel at a price lower than the seller charges other persons at the same time and on the same level of distribution, if the intent of the sale or offer is to injure competition.
3. It is unlawful for a person engaged in commerce in this state to sell or transfer motor fuel to itself or an affiliate for resale in this state on a different marketing level of distribution at a transfer price lower than the price it charges a person who purchases for resale at the same time and on the same level of distribution, if the intent of the sale or transfer is to injure competition.