dissenting.
The sole issue before us is whether see-tions 42-4-1601(1) and -1603(1), C.R.S. (2010), require a driver involved in an accident to identify himself as the person driving the vehicle, or otherwise admit to driving. See maj. op. at 570. There is no question that neither section 42-4-1601, nor section 42-4-1608, contains an express identification requirement. There is, however, a serious question as to whether such an identification requirement can be implied into these two provisions.
On the one hand, the majority explains that the language of the statute, which repeatedly references "the driver" in section 42-4-1603(1), "logically implies" an identification requirement. Id. at 571. The majority further explains that the General Assembly enacted sections 42-4-1601(1) and -1603(1) to compel a driver to "exchange information." Id. at 572 (quoting People v. Rickstrew, TTS P.2d 570, 575 (Colo.1989)). The majority declares that the "only plausible purpose of requiring such exchange of information is to identify the drivers of vehicles involved in accidents." Id. at 578. The majority thus concludes that the statute, in order to reflect the General Assembly's intent, must implicitly require the driver to identify himself as such or otherwise admit to driving.
Alternatively though, it is at least equally plausible that the General Assembly purposefully omitted the identification requirement *576that it did not include in the text of either section 42-4-1601 or -1608. As drafted, the statute merely requires the driver to provide "the driver's name," "the driver's address," and "the registration number of the vehicle he or she is driving." § 42-4-1608(1). The statute thus appears to carefully avoid requiring the driver to admit to driving and instead focuses on obtaining his name, address, and registration number. Because the statute lacks the simple requirement that the driver admit to driving, it could be inferred that the General Assembly did not intend to criminalize the driver's failure to identify himself as the person driving the vehicle-a potentially incriminating admission.
That is, the statutory text may reveal the General Assembly's intent to stop short of requiring drivers to admit to driving a vehicle involved in an accident. Instead, the General Assembly designed the statute to promote the "exchange of information" by merely requiring the driver to provide his name, address, and the registration number of his vehicle. After all, the General Assembly may have reasoned, it is not difficult to ascertain the identity of the driver through an accident-seene investigation.
In this light, there are at least two possible ways to interpret the General Assembly's intention as shown by its omission of an identification requirement from sections 42-4-1601 and -1603. The majority, however, overlooks the possibility that the General Assembly's intention may be consistent with the precise language of the statute. Instead, the majority identifies, as an overarching concern, the possibility that a driver could technically comply with the statute as written while "provid[ing]l misinformation about his role in the accident (by indicating he was a passenger and failing to correct false representations made by his girlfriend who claimed to be the driver)." Maj. op. at 573. Such a result, the majority claims, "thwarts" the General Assembly's intent. Id. at 573. To prevent such an outcome then, the majority assumes that section 42-4-1603(1) must
In its zeal to punish drivers who provide misinformation to authorities, the majority too easily dismisses the fact that the General Assembly has already criminalized false reporting to authorities. Section 18-8-111, C.R.S. (2010), provides that it is a misdemeanor for a person to commit false reporting to authorities.1 Quite simply then, the driver who obfuscates or deceptively conceals his identity as the driver can be prosecuted for a Class 3 misdemeanor under section 18-8-111. Because this section of the criminal code addresses the majority's concern, there is no need to imply an identification requirement into section 424-1603 to eatch those drivers who provide misinformation.
Indeed, by implying an identification requirement into the statute, the majority unnecessarily expands the seope of section 42-4-1608 to encompass conduct that is already criminalized under section 18-8-111. In so doing, the majority cireumvents the General Assembly's carefully calibrated statutory scheme and express decision to classify false reporting as a Class 3 misdemeanor offense, not a strict liability felony. See $ 18-8-1112). As a result, the majority affirms Hernandez's conviction for a Class 5 felony under section 42-4-1608 and his resultant twelve-year sentence under the habitual criminal sentencing statute. This twelve-year sentence exceeds Hernandez's criminal liability if he had been charged for a misdemeanor under section 18-8-111, a charge that would not trigger liability under the habitual criminal sentencing statute.
The majority's error is further compounded by its disregard for the fact that section 42-4-1608 is a strict liability statute. The majority recognizes that, as a result of implying an identification requirement into the statute, "a driver could unintentionally violate the statutory provisions by failing affirmatively to declare he was the driver, subjec*577tively believing that role to be apparent, and without knowing the cireumstances indicated otherwise (e.g., that someone else claimed to be the driver)." Maj. op. at 578. To diffuse this concern, the majority explains, "Presumably, however, authorities faced with ambiguous cireumstances will provide the actual driver with an opportunity to clarify his role." Id.
This presumption is hardly reassuring. As an initial matter, there is no guarantee that the police will question the individuals at the scene of an accident and request that they admit to driving the vehicle involved in the accident. More problematic, the majority's presumption overlooks our well-settled law regarding the concepts of due process and notice. As we explained in People v. Castro, "Due process of law is satisfied as long as the statutory terms 'are sufficiently clear to persons of ordinary intelligence to afford a practical guide for law-abiding behavior and are capable of application in an even-handed manner by those responsible for enforcing the law'" 657 P.2d 932, 939 (Colo.1983) (quoting People ex rel. City of Arvada v. Nissen, 650 P.2d 547, 551 (Colo.1982)). Here, however, neither section 424-1601 nor section 42-4-1603 contains an express identification requirement that would alert drivers to the potential for criminal liability if they failed to affirmatively admit they were driving. Indeed, the majority recognizes that a driver could, "without knowledge," be held Hable for failing to admit to driving (e.g. when someone else claims to be the driver without the actual driver's knowledge). Its presumption that a police officer will ask the right questions at the accident scene does little to cure the lack of notice to drivers, let alone ensure that the law is enforced in an even-handed manner.
Fundamentally, the majority's erroneous and problematic interpretation of sections 42-4-1601 and -1608 stems from its disregard for the principle that criminal statutes "must be strictly construed in favor of the accused and they cannot be extended either by implication or construction." People v. Home Ins. Co., 197 Colo. 260, 262, 591 P.2d 1036, 1087 (Colo.1979); see also People v. Boyd, 642 P.2d 1, 4 (Colo.1982). In Home Insurance, we faced the issue of whether defendants could be convicted under Colorado's theft statute for stealing a "thing of value," namely confidential medical information. Id. at 261, 591 P.2d at 1086. Our theft statute at the time, section 18-1-901(8)(r), C.R.S. (1973), did not, however, explicitly list medical records as a "thing of value." In contrast, however, we noted that the General Assembly had already imposed (1) civil penalties to protect medical information and (2) criminal penalties for the violation of analogous privacy interests. Id. at 262-68, 591 P.2d at 1037. In light of these civil and criminal statutes, we explained:
The legislature, therefore, has taken specific steps to protect the confidentiality of medical information by creating statutory duties, the breach of which could serve as the basis for a civil remedy. However, the legislature has not imposed eriminal penalties for violations of the confidentiality or privilege.
Id. at 263, 591 P.2d at 1087. We honored the General Assembly's competent decision to mot impose criminal liability for the theft of medical information by steadfastly refusing to "expand unduly the traditional concept of intangible property" to encompass confidential medical records. Id. at 262, 591 P.2d 1036.2
Home Insurance governs our statutory analysis of sections 42-4-1601 and -1608. It is undisputed that neither of these provisions contains an express identification requirement. To the contrary, the General Assembly has explicitly identified the information the driver must provide: the driver's name, the driver's address, and the registration number for the vehicle he or she is driving. See § 42-4-1603(1). Furthermore, the General Assembly has already criminalized false reporting to authorities. See § 18-8-111. *578The General Assembly has, therefore, demonstrated its competence to impose specific duties on drivers involved in accidents. Pursuant to Home Insurance then, we must honor the General Assembly's legislative decision by refusing to extend eriminal liability by implication or construction.
To avoid Home Inswrance, the majority attempts to narrow and distinguish it from the instant case. The majority explains that Home Insurance stands for the simple proposition that a court should not criminalize civil violations. Maj. op. at 575. In Home Insurance, the majority explains, we did not extend criminal liability to the theft of medical information because the General Assembly had only imposed civil penalties to protect such information. Id. Based on this reading, the majority concludes that Home Insurance is inapposite here where the General Assembly has expressly criminalized the failure to comply with the statutory disclosure provisions. Id. at 575.
The majority misreads our analysis in Home Insurance. In that case, we cited the General Assembly's decision to impose civil penalties to protect confidential medical information. 197 Colo. at 262-63, 591 P.2d at 1037. We then explained that "[the foregoing amply demonstrates that the General Assembly has legislative competence, if inclined to do so, to make illegal the invasion of privacy or confidentiality." Id. at 262, 591 P.2d at 1037. The crux of our analysis, then, was our observation that the General Assembly had demonstrated its competence to criminalize certain conduct by imposing civil penalties. As such, it would have been improper to extend eriminal liability by implication or construction. The majority thus erroneously simplifies Home Insurance to stand for the position that we may not criminalize civil penalties. In so doing, the majority waters down the fundamental principle that criminal statutes "cannot be extended either by implication or construction." Id.; see also Boyd, 642 P.2d at 4. As a result, the majority overlooks the real possibility that the General Assembly competently and purposefully designed sections 42-4-1601 and -1603 to omit an identification requirement.
In sun, the majority implies an identification requirement into sections 42-4-1601 and -1608, thereby extending the scope of criminal liability to encompass a driver who fails to affirmatively identify himself as the driver of the vehicle. This requirement is nowhere to be found in the text of these provisions. -It is therefore reasonable to conclude that the Generally Assembly did not intend to include an identification requirement in either sections 42-4-1601 or -1603, reasoning that such a requirement was neither necessary to promote the exchange of information nor essential to punish drivers who falsely report to authorities. Implying such an identification requirement contravenes the General Assembly's intent and upsets its carefully crafted statutory scheme. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
. Section 18-8-11(1)(c) provides that a person commits false reporting if:
He or she makes a report or knowingly causes the transmission of a report to law enforcement authorities pretending to furnish information relating to an offense or other incident within their official concern when he or she knows that he or she has no such information or knows that the information is false[.]
. Our current theft statute, section 18-1-901(3)(x), C.R.S. (2010), now defines a "thing of value" to explicitly include "medical records information." This confirms our reasoning in Home Insurance that the General Assembly "has the legislative competence, if inclined to do so, to make illegal the invasion of privacy or confidentiality." 197 Colo. at 262, 591 P.2d at 1037. A court should not therefore expand criminal statutes by implication or construction.