Fewell v. Pickens

Annabelle Clinton Imber, Justice, concurring.

I concur in the result reached by the majority, but I write separately to point out that the first argument on appeal can be decided without resorting to statutory interpretation. The majority’s interpretation of Ark. Code Ann. § 23-68-104 (Repl. 1994) is simply unnecessary because Fewell and Floldingsco waived their rights under the statute when they entered into the 1999 Agreements with the Commissioner.

The majority takes notice of these Agreements and properly concludes that the waiver found in those agreements “extends to this case.” However, the majority fails to recognize the full extent of that waiver. The Agreements provided in pertinent part as follows:

However, upon breach of any one of the aforesaid covenants, the Company, the Parent and Fewell hereby agree and consent to the immediate commencement and entry of an order granting receivership against the Company by the Department under Ark. Code Ann. 23-68-101 through 23-68-132 and waive prior notice of entry of an order of permanent receivership.

(Emphasis added.) The consent to a permanent receivership by Fewell and Holdingsco was tantamount to an agreement that the Commissioner had the authority to be appointed receiver without notice or hearing, see Fewell v. Pickens, 344 Ark. 368, 39 S.W.3d 447 (2001)(“Fewell I"), and more significantly, they agreed that the receiver had all of the tools of the Uniform Insurers Liquidation Act at his disposal.

By executing the 1999 Agreements, Fewell and Holdingsco agreed to “an order granting receivership . . . under Ark. Code Ann. § 23-68-101 through § 23-68-132.” Section 23-68-102, entitled “Definitions,” provides that “ ‘Receiver’ means receiver, liquidator, rehabilitator, or conservator as the context may require.” Ark. Code Ann. § 23-68-102 (Repl. 1994, Supp. 1999). Thus, as we stated in Fewell I, Fewell and Holdingsco waived their rights under § 23-68-104 and consented to the immediate entry if a receivership order for liquidation as well as rehabilitation. It is therefore clear that our decision on the first point on appeal should begin and end with the waiver contained in the 1999 Agreements.

Glaze, J., joins in this concurrence.