concurring:
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that PECO is not a statutory employer and that Dresher is a statutory employer. As to PECO I would reverse and remand.
Unlike the majority, however, I would not affirm the summary judgment as to Dresher in toto. I would remand for amendment of the summary judgment in order to preserve PECO’s cross claim for indemnification.
The majority declines to address the issue of indemnification because “[t]he issue of indemnification was not addressed by the trial court ...” (Maj. op. at 607). While the majority’s statement is accurate, the question of indemnification is implicitly before us. The trial court could not address the issue, because once it granted summary judgment to both PECO and Dresher the indemnification issue was moot.
I would find that despite the granting of summary judgment in favor of Dresher, Dresher is not completely immune from suit in the instant case. In its response to Zizza’s complaint, PECO filed a cross-claim for indemnity against Dresher, citing a provision of its contract with Dresher.1 See Answer and New Matter of [PECO] to Zizza’s Complaint in Trespass at ¶¶ 9-11. Under the Act, third party cross-claims against a statutory employer are disallowed except as provided for in 77 P.S. § 481(b):
In the event injury or death to an employee is caused by a third party, then such employee ... may bring [an] action at law against such third party, but the employer ... shall not be liable to a third party for damages, contributions or indemnity in any action at law, or other*609wise, unless liability for such damages, contributions or indemnity shall be expressly provided for in a written contract entered into by the party alleged to be liable prior to the date of the occurrence wich gave rise to the action.
(Emphasis added). In the instant case, PECO’s contract with Dresher expressly provides that Dresher shall indemnify PECO for any loss or damages resulting from injury to Dresher’s employees arising out of the performance of the contract, thus giving rise to PECO’s cross-claim.
The better view is for the Superior Court to recognize that its reversal of the trial court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of PECO revives the cross-claim against Dresher and requires that the order granting Dresher’s motion for summary judgment be modified accordingly. I therefore would remand to the trial court so that its order may be amended to reflect the fact that summary judgment should have been granted in favor of Dresher only with respect to Zizza’s complaint and not with respect to PECO’s cross-claim for indemnification.
. Article 13 of PECO’s contract with Dresher provides, in pertinent part:
The Contractor shall indemnify and hold harmless Owner and its Agent, the Construction Managers, and all officers, agents and employees from any loss, damage, liability or expense, on account of damage to persons, including Contractor’s employees, arising or in any manner growing out of the performance of any work or the supplying of any material under this Contract, regardless of whether or not it is cause in part by the act or omission, whether negligent or not, of a party indemnified hereunder, and shall defend *609at its own expense any suits or other proceedings brought against Owner and its Agent, the Construction Managers, and all officers, agents and employees, or any of them, on account thereof, and pay all expenses and satisfy all judgments, which may be incurred by or rendered against them or any of them in connection therewith.