joined by KAREN ANGELINI, Justice, dissenting.
I agree with the majority on one issue: that the Agreed Special Setting and Docket Control Order (“docket control order”) is unambiguous and can be given a definite and certain meaning as a matter of law. I disagree, however, with the meaning the majority confers on the order. The majority holds that the deadline for reports from all retained experts, which would include medical liability experts under section 74.351(a) of the medical liability section of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code and retained consulting experts, was extended by the docket control order. Under the plain terms of the docket control order, however, only the deadline for the reports of retained testifying experts was extended. Tex. Civ. PRAC. & Rem.Code Ann. § 74.351(a), (b) (Vernon Supp.2006). Accordingly, McDaniel’s expert report was *796untimely and the trial court properly dismissed the health care liability claim with prejudice. Id. I respectfully dissent.
Deadline Relating to Plaintiffs’ Designation of Testifying Experts
The docket control order is fairly generic, with deadlines for the parties to designate expert witnesses they intend to call to testify at the trial of the case, a deadline for mediation and a deadline for completion of discovery as well as the date of the trial setting. The majority holds that the following paragraph (“paragraph 1”) constitutes an agreement by the parties to extend the deadline for the provision of the section 74.351(a) expert report:
1. Plaintiffs will designate all expert witnesses that they intend to call at the trial of this case, live or by deposition, and shall provide a written report and curriculum vitae of all retained experts in this case on or before January 11, 2006.1 (emphasis added)
The majority reasons that because paragraph 1 specifically references “retained” experts and a section 74.351 expert is always a “retained” expert, the provision perforce extends the deadline for serving the section 74.351 report. This interpretation fails to recognize that the retained experts referenced in paragraph 1 are limited to those that plaintiffs “intend to call at the trial.” Rather than construe the paragraph based on its plain meaning, the majority uses two additional paragraphs to provide new meaning to the word “retained.” The majority’s holding misconstrues the rules of civil procedure relating to expert discovery, as well as, the purpose and rules relating to the expert report under section 74.351(a) of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code.
Paragraph 1 unambiguously sets forth the deadline for designating plaintiffs’ testifying experts and requires the provision of a curriculum vitae and report for those testifying experts that are retained. Civil Procedure Rule 192.7 defines two types of experts: testifying and consulting. Tex.R. Crv. P. 192.7. Both types of these experts may be retained.2 The difference is that the consulting expert is retained, but is not a testifying expert. Id. Under Rule 192.3(e), a party is not required to disclose a retained consulting expert, provided his mental impressions and opinions have not been reviewed by a testifying expert. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 192.3(e) (“consulting only” experts). The distinction between testifying and consulting experts is critical. The majority’s failure to limit paragraph l’s application to testifying experts results in the requirement to produce reports and curricula vitae of all “retained” experts including any retained “consulting only” expert. Such an interpretation of this generic language is unreasonable given the protection afforded by the rules to “consulting only” experts, and the lack of any language indicating an intent to forego this protection by the parties. Here, the parties clearly intended, through paragraphs 1 and 2, to modify the deadlines to designate their testifying, rather than consulting experts, and provide their retained testifying experts’ reports and resumes. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 195.1-195.7.
*797The application of paragraph 1 to only-retained testifying experts is supported by the very purpose of the section 74.351 expert report. To accomplish its purpose, a section 74.351 report must detail the specific conduct the plaintiff has called into question. Am. Transitional Care Ctrs. of Tex., Inc. v. Palacios, 46 S.W.3d 873, 878-79 (Tex.2001). Additionally, the report must provide a basis for the trial court to conclude that the claims have merit. Id. Under Chapter 74, “expert report” means a “written report by an expert that provides a fair summary of the expert’s opinions as of the date of the report regarding applicable standards of care, the manner in which the care rendered by the physician or health care provider failed to meet the standards, and the causal relationship between that failure and the injury, harm, or damages claimed.” Tex. Civ. PRAC. & Rem. Code Ann. § 74.351(r)(6). There is no requirement that the report address anything other than an issue relating to liability or causation. Id. § 74.351®. Provided the claimant does not use the report in any fashion, no mention of either the report or its author may be made in the case. Id. § 74.351(k), (t). Like consulting only experts, the experts referenced in section 74.351, are not, by statute, testifying experts under the discovery rules without some further action on the part of the plaintiff.3 Paragraph 1 simply does not suffice to transform a section 74.351 expert report into a report of a testifying expert under the discovery rules. Although a section 74.351 expert is a retained expert, such expert is not a retained testifying expert unless the plaintiff has specifically designated him as such.
Moreover, section 74.351 has a discrete purpose separate and apart from the rules relating to discovery. It is designed to dispose of frivolous medical liability suits at the outset. It has specific provisions and requirements not addressed by this docket control order. The section 74.351 expert report is a “threshold” requirement in a health care liability suit without which the plaintiff cannot proceed to trial. “Thus, the expert report required by § 74.351 is separate from the designation of experts contemplated under the discovery rules.” Rugama v. Escobar, No. 04-05-00764-CV, 2006 WL 923701, at *2 (Tex.App.-San Antonio Apr.5, 2006, no pet.) (mem.op.) (citing Murphy v. Russell, 167 S.W.3d 835, 838 (Tex.2005)).4 The purpose of designating testifying experts and producing expert reports during discovery is to prevent trial by ambush and to allow the parties to obtain full knowledge of the expert opinions before trial. Gutierrez v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 729 S.W.2d 691, 693 (Tex.1987). The contrast between the full disclosure and discovery of the testifying expert and the statutory restrictions under section 74.351© reinforces the differences between the two experts. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code ANN. § 74.351®.
Not only does a plain reading of paragraph 1 exclude its application to a section *79874.351 expert report, our court has previously determined that similar language in a docket control order did not extend the deadline for serving the article 4590i expert report under the Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act of Texas.5 Essentially the same language in paragraph 1 was in the docket control order at issue in Olveda v. Sepulveda, 141 S.W.3d 679, 683 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2004, pet. denied). The docket control order provided: “Plaintiffs shall designate any and all expert witnesses and provide curriculum vitaes and reports of retained experts on or before June 11, 2003.” (emphasis added). In Olveda, we determined the docket control order did not extend the article 4590i expert report deadline for a number of reasons, including that “the order mentions expert witnesses and ‘retained’ experts, indicating testifying experts” rather than the experts referenced under the Act. Id. at 684. Thus, we recognized in Olveda the important distinction between a testifying expert and a medical liability expert under article 4590L The language in paragraph 1 in this case is even clearer — it applies only to testifying experts and the requirement of a written report and curriculum vitae applies only to the retained testifying expert witnesses.
Other courts reviewing discovery control orders have deemed them insufficient to extend the deadline for submission of the expert report under either article 4590i or section 74.351. See, e.g., Brock v. Sutker, 215 S.W.3d 927, 929 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2007, no pet.) (scheduling order requiring plaintiff provide report from any retained expert did not extend section 74.351 expert report deadline); Hall v. Mieler, 177 S.W.3d 278, 282 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (docket control order did not extend the 4590i expert report deadlines and Hall’s failure to file the report did not constitute a mistake or accident). Given the recognized distinction between testifying experts and Chapter 74 experts, without a clear reference to section 74.351 experts or their reports in paragraph 1, I cannot find any intent on behalf of the parties to extend the threshold expert deadlines.
Additional PaRagraphs
Faced with the clear meaning of paragraph 1, the majority relies on two additional paragraphs in the docket control order to convert a section 74.351 expert into a “retained expert.”
It is further ORDERED to the extent these deadlines may be in conflict with deadlines set by rule or statute, the deadlines established by this Docket Control Order shall take precedence.
It is further ORDERED that the parties shall conduct discovery as soon as practicable, notwithstanding the limiting provisions found in Chapter 74 of the Texas Civil Practices and Remedies Code.
The first provision is a common “belt and suspenders” provision indicating the attorneys intend the docket control order to govern the discovery and other deadlines they previously identified. It is important to note the operative language is “these deadlines may be in conflict,” not that the deadlines are in conflict, (emphasis added) Yet, the majority is compelled to find some statutory deadline that will conflict with the deadlines set forth in paragraph 1 under the auspices of contract construction.6 The rule of construction “that each part of the contract must be given effect” is used to give a whole new effect to *799paragraph 1, rather than meaning to the provision being construed. It is not necessary to create a statutory conflict to give this provision the meaning intended: that in the event there is a conflict with a rule or statute, which the parties did not envision or they would have specifically addressed the conflict, the deadlines spelled out in the docket control order would be maintained. The provision simply cannot support an interpretation that the parties intended to extend the deadline for the section 74.351 expert report through this oblique reference to a possible conflict with a rule or statute.
I now address the provision in the docket control order that specifically references Chapter 74 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code. The majority interprets the language in this section to mean the docket control order permits the parties to conduct discovery not otherwise permitted until the section 74.351 expert report is filed. See § 74.351(s), (u). I agree. This paragraph is clear evidence of the parties’ intent to proceed with discovery outside the limitations specifically provided by section 74.351(s):
Until a claimant has served the expert report and curriculum vitae as required by Subsection (a), all discovery in a health care liability claim is stayed ...
and section 74.351(u):
Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, after a claim is filed all claimants, collectively, may take not more than two depositions before the expert report is served as required by Subsection (a).
I disagree, however, that the phrase “notwithstanding the limiting provisions found in Chapter 74” shows the parties’ intent to extend the deadline for serving the expert report.7 Rather it shows the parties knew how to reference specifically the applicable medical liability provisions of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code they wanted to extend, and continue the discovery that was initiated in the federal suit. However, this provision does not purport to address the expert report deadline of section 74.351(a). The majority opinion correctly states: “[HJaving expressly referenced chapter 74, the parties were cognizant of the limitations and deadlines established by that statutory provision.” Yet, the majority never addresses the pertinent question-knowing the deadlines of chapter 74, why didn’t the parties expressly extend the deadline for the expert report? The parties need not specifically cite the statute, but they must do more to reach an agreement than reference a standard discovery order provision. Neither of the paragraphs relied on by the majority to support their interpretation of paragraph 1 support its application to the section 74.351 expert report deadline.
*800Conclusion
The docket control order, signed by the parties on July 15, 2006, modified the discovery deadlines as provided under the rules of civil procedure. The order, however, lacks any hint of the parties’ intent to extend the deadline for serving the section 74.351 expert report. The language reflected in paragraphs 1 and 2 is common to many docket control orders and unambiguously sets the deadline for providing reports by retained testifying experts. The two additional provisions relied on by the majority cannot transform a standard docket control order into an agreement to extend the section 74.351 expert report deadline. Absent a written agreement, McDaniel’s section 74.351 expert report was untimely and the trial court had no discretion but to dismiss McDaniel’s health care claims with prejudice and award reasonable attorneys fees. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 74.351(b). Because the trial court’s dismissal was statutorily mandated, I respectfully dissent.
. This language is mirrored in paragraph 2 which provides the deadlines for the defendant to designate its testifying experts.
. A retained testifying expert is an expert who is retained by, employed by, or otherwise subject to the control of the party. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 194.2(f)(4), 195.3. Generally, parties make no agreement to provide reports from non-retained experts not subject to their control.
. The majority's conclusion that "no statutory support currently exists for the notion that the expert who provides the Chapter 74 report is necessarily distinct from any other retained expert” ignores the statutory scheme set forth in Chapter 74 and specifically the expert rules in section 74.351.
. The majority attempts to distinguish Ruga-ma because the docket control order did not mention a specific deadline for an expert report as contrasted with paragraph 1 in this case. Yet, the stated reasoning in Rugama, that there is a distinction between testifying experts and section 74.351 experts, still applies. Rugama, 2006 WL 923701, at ⅞2. Indeed, most generic docket control order forms, including those offered to the public in Bexar County, contain a provision for deadlines for a plaintiff to produce expert witness reports from retained experts.
. Article 4590i was repealed by Act of June 2, 2003, 78th Leg., R. S„ ch. 204, § 10.09, 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 847, 884, and has been re-codified at Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 74.351 (Vernon Supp.2005) (effective Sept. 1, 2003).
. The majority finds that the statutory conflict envisioned by the parties must be the section *79974.351 expert report deadline. No reference is made to the section 74.352 discovery deadlines in health care liability claims. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 74.352. Should they be implemented, the discovery deadlines referenced in the docket control order would conflict with those in section 74.352. Specifically, section 74.352 has deadlines for interrogatories and requests for production that would conflict with the deadline for completion of discovery in the docket control order. So it is just as likely these are the statutory deadlines with which they "may” conflict once implemented.
. This case was originally filed in federal court on April 15, 2004 and the scheduling order signed on July 2, 2004 sets forth the discovery deadlines. The federal court dismissed the suit on November 16, 2004, four months into the discovery process. The case was re-filed in state court on May 25, 2005. The plaintiffs did not file their expert report until January 11, 2006, some 234 days after the case was filed in state court and 639 days after the case was filed in federad court.