dissenting.
From the majority’s sustention of appellant’s first ground of error and the consequent reversal of this cause, I must respectfully dissent. The majority correctly *796concedes that the video portion of the questioned videotape was admissible. They further concede that the oral portions of the videotape wherein the officer obtained from appellant his name, address, and social security number, and where appellant refused to take an intoxilyzer test until he had talked with his attorney were admissible. Even so, they conclude that the admission of the portion of the tape containing the officer’s field-sobriety test questions and appellant’s responses thereto require reversal. I cannot agree.
Police words or actions “normally attendant to arrest and custody” do not constitute custodial interrogation within the purview of Miranda and cases of like ilk. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 1689, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980); McCambridge v. State, 712 S.W.2d at 505. Although it did not make an express holding to that effect, our Court of Criminal Appeals, in a similar case, recognizing the above rule, has indicated that continued discussions with a defendant concerning the advisability of taking a breathalyzer test after that defendant had sought to terminate the interview may not require reversal. See Mills v. State, 720 S.W.2d 525 (Tex.Crim.App.1986).
Moreover, where evidence of guilt is overwhelming and the prejudicial effect of improperly admitted evidence is insignificant by comparison, admission of that evidence is harmless error. Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 430, 92 S.Ct. 1056, 1058, 31 L.Ed.2d 340 (1972); Pruitt v. State, 683 S.W.2d 537, 541 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1984, no pet.). As the majority has noted, the test is whether there is a reasonable probability that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction or affected the punishment assessed. Johnson v. State, 660 S.W.2d 536, 538 (Tex.Crim.App.1983).
I would point out those portions of Officer Stevens’ testimony wherein he testified that at the scene of arrest he required appellant to perform four tests for intoxication; (1) recitation of the alphabet; (2) touching of his nose with his right and then his left hand; (3) standing on one foot, extending the other foot in front and counting to twenty; and (4) walking straight ahead and then turning around and walking back. He also said that the only difference between the sobriety tests he conducts on the street and those done at the jail is that, at the jail, an accused is required to read a card, and when that accused stands on one foot, he must count to thirty instead of twenty. Stevens stated that at the scene of arrest appellant’s speech was slurred and the letters “I” and “J” were deleted from the recited alphabet, and that he, appellant, could not count to twenty without losing his balance. He also testified that appellant “did better in the video than he did out on the streets.”
In cross-examination, Stevens admitted that he did not notice any slurred speech on the videotape. Moreover, he testified that the only specific signs of intoxication that appellant exhibited on the video were the visual signs that he was unable to stand on his right leg with his left leg extended in front of him and that he, appellant, was unbalanced in walking a line. Of course, even under the majority’s theory, this testimony was admissible. Moreover, while Stevens did state that appellant got ahead of himself when reading a card and stumbled, on cross-examination he admitted the difficulty in reading was not, in and of itself, a sign of intoxication. Stevens further admitted that, in fact, he, Steven, had trouble reading statutory warnings that he reads “all the time.”
In summary, in view of the admittedly admissible portions of the State's evidence, even assuming, arguendo, that the challenged oral portions of the videotape were inadmissible, any prejudicial effect of those challenged portions is so insignificant as not to require reversal. I would overrule this ground, and to the majority’s failure to do so, I must respectfully dissent.