dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion because the appropriate standard of appellate review has not been employed in this case.
The basic question is whether the trial judge committed reversible error in directing a verdict in favor of the defendants at the close of Baylis' evidence for failure to prove causation to a reasonable medical probability. A unanimous panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial judge.
A review of the evidence indicates that Baylis became ill in 1984 and took an antibiotic called “Keflex” which she had left over from an old prescription from her dentist. She suffered a reaction and went to the emergency room where it was determined she was probably allergic to Keflex. A few weeks later, she called the office of Dr. Wheeler concerning her stomach problems and was informed that he was in surgery at the hospital but that if she would go to the emergency room he might be able to see her. Upon her arrival at the emergency room, she was examined and asked if she were allergic to any medication. She replied that she was allergic to penicillin, which was noted in the emergency room records. Following further consultation and X-rays, she was given Phenergan. Dr. Wheeler also prescribed Mylicon and Ke-flex and left instructions for her to call him.
Baylis left the hospital, obtained her prescriptions, went home and took a dose of Keflex. She had an immediate reaction and was taken by her family back to the emergency room where she was diagnosed as having anaphylactic shock with cardiovascular collapse. Baylis was treated for shock and responded fairly quickly. Following a three-day hospital stay, her final *126diagnosis was “anaphylaxis shock with cardiovascular collapse, gastric ulcer, probable mitral valve prolapse, with a history of diverticulosis, hiatus hernia, and hysterectomy.” When her hospital bill was riot paid, it was turned over to the credit bureau which brought suit to collect. Baylis and her husband filed this action alleging both the hospital and Dr. Wheeler were negligent.
At the conclusion of her evidence, the trial judge directed a verdict in favor of the defendants on the ground that Baylis had not established an essential part of her claim, to-wit: that the taking of Keflex caused the anaphylactic reaction for which she is seeking damages.
The Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed, stating that causation and medical malpractice must be established by expert testimony unless the negligence is so apparent that a layman with general knowledge would have no trouble recognizing it. The panel further observed that the medical testimony must establish that causation is probable and not merely possible. Bay-lis’ expert at trial, Dr. Boyarsky, a lawyer and a board-certified urologist, never stated that the anaphylactic reaction was the result of the ingestion of Keflex.
It is clear that the Court of Appeals panel examined the evidence and unanimously agreed with the trial judge that Baylis’ burden of proving causation was not established. It behooves this Court not to substitute its judgment for that of the trial judge. Certainly a reviewing court has the right to consider the sufficiency of the evidence but the majority here has exceeded its traditional limits.
The role of an appellate court in reviewing the granting or denial of a motion for directed verdict in a negligence case is limited to viewing the evidence from a standpoint most favorable to the prevailing party. Horton v. Union Light Heat & Power Co., Ky., 690 S.W.2d 382 (1985).
I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals and the circuit court.