with whom NEWMAN, Chief Judge, joins, concurring:
I concur in Judge KERN’s opinion with one exception: I do not share the view that D.C.Code 1973, § 4-137,1 coupled with an obligation of comity, provides a reason to favor sealing over expungement. As I read it, § 4-137, while generally providing for retention of police records, is fundamentally a procedural statute authorizing an orderly document destruction program. See Sullivan v. Murphy, 156 U.S.App.D.C. 28, 61-63, 478 F.2d 938, 971-73, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 880, 94 S.Ct. 162, 38 L.Ed.2d 125 (1973). It does not limit this court’s broad equitable power to act here. See Menard v. Saxbe, 162 U.S.App.D.C. 284, 290, 498 F.2d 1017, 1023 (1974); Sullivan v. Murphy, supra, 152 U.S.App.D.C. at 63, 478 F.2d at 973. Nor does comity, a concept of forbearance — of deference to the other branches of government — provide a satisfactory reason to deny an aggrieved person the expungement of his or her arrest record, if that is the most suitable remedy. As I see it, therefore, this court has the unfettered authority — indeed the responsibility — to adopt the remedy it believes to be most just.
Given this free rein, I nevertheless agree that sealing is the best remedy. With a properly designed sealed record system, we can accomplish the goals of expungement without taking an unnecessary risk that someone will have other records of the arrest which cannot effectively be refuted, absent court-ordered access -to the official file.
Any evaluation of the remedy should begin with a recognition that neither ex-pungement nor sealing will be foolproof; there is bound to be leakage. In the first place, these cases concern only Metropolitan Police Department central criminal records, D.C.Code 1973, § 4-134a, and District of Columbia court records; we are not asked to expunge “arrest books” at police precincts. D.C.Code 1973, § 4-134(4). Moreover, no one reasonably can expect that police officers, judges, relatives, neighbors, reporters, or others who learn about an arrest will forget about it, let alone destroy all newspaper accounts or personal records of it. Furthermore, when a court orders the MPD to retrieve an already-disseminated arrest record from other law enforcement agencies, whether for expungement or sealing, I am not confident that the other agencies will absolutely honor the request in every case; in fact, by the time a retrieval order is entered, one or more agencies may have passed the records on to still others beyond reach of the MPD or the District of Columbia courts. Thus, whether we speak of sealing or expungement, the remedy will have its loopholes, however few or inaccessible.
This suggests a serious drawback to any expungement scheme. There will be no way to recreate and verify a destroyed official file of an erroneous arrest, in order to refute the memory, newspaper clippings, or other personal records of someone who, for a variety of motives (perhaps even honorable ones), may choose to publicize that arrest. If, however, we authorize a tightly controlled system for sealing erroneous arrest records, we shall provide the functional equivalent of the most feasible expungement scheme, as these records cannot be reopened without a court order based on a finding of “compelling need.” At the same time, by also providing the moving party with a court order containing detailed findings of fact and a legal conclusion of innocence, this system will assure both a court-certified explanation and, if needed, complete access to the official file. Sealed arrest records, unlike expunged ones, can be reopened to protect against injustice. The whole truth will be preserved.2
*185Finally, we should note the following provision in the District of Columbia statute on the sealing of juvenile records, D.C.Code 1978 Supp., § 16-2335(c):
Upon the entry of the [sealing] order, the proceedings in the case shall be treated as if they never occurred. All facts relating to the action including arrest, the filing of a petition, and the adjudication, filing, and disposition of the [Family] Division shall no longer exist as a matter of law. The Division, the law enforcement department, or any other department or agency that received notice under subsection (b) and was named in the order shall reply, and the person who is the subject matter of the records may reply, to any inquiry that no record exists with respect to such person.
Although Judge KERN’S opinion explains the virtues of equipping the arrested person with an exculpatory court order, solely for his or her use as needed, I do not understand the opinion to preclude a court-ordered provision similar to § 16-2335(c) as part of our final disposition of this case. In fact, such a provision is implicit, for any remedy must provide directions to the re-cordkeeper, whose response to inquiries must be consistent with the purposes of sealing.
Separate Statement by NEBEKER, Associate Judge, with whom HARRIS, Associate Judge, and REILLY, Chief Judge, Retired, join:
There are three aspects of the interim opinion of the court with which I am in agreement: (1) that we must presume that arrest records, as such, have an appropriate role in law enforcement; (2) that we should not order the executive branch of government to destroy Metropolitan Police Department records; and (3) that we cannot permit nor purport to permit an arrestee to lie about the fact of his arrest at a future time. With respect to the rest of the interim opinion, I reserve the right to file a statement of views upon final disposition of these cases.
. D.C.Code 1973, § 4-137, provides:
All records of the Metropolitan Police force shall be preserved, except that the [Commissioner of the District of Columbia) [now Mayor], upon recommendation of the major and superintendent of police, may cause records which it considers to be obsolete or of no further value to be destroyed.
. Conceptually, perhaps, we could couple ex-pungement with detailed findings of fact and a legal conclusion of innocence to protect against possible misunderstandings, but that would ac*185tually amount to a culled and sealed record which would probably satisfy no one. I do not understand the proponents of expungement to advocate that approach.