The State of Missouri, Department of Social Services (Department), appeals the trial court’s order dismissing its claim against Wanda Bowling, personal representative of the Estate of Susie Thomas, for reimbursement of medical payments made on behalf of the decedent by the Department through its Division of Family Services.
The estate was opened March 15, 1985 with the first publication of notice March 20. On September 27, six months and six days following the publication of notice, the State filed claim in Barry County Circuit Court, Probate Division, seeking reimbursement of $1,923.16 for medical payments made on behalf of the deceased by the Department of Social Services. The claim was premised on sec. 473.398, RSMo 1986, which provides in pertinent part that upon the death of a recipient of aid or of one for whom monies have been expended by the Department of Social Services, the “total amount paid shall be a debt due the state ... [collectible] ... as provided by the Probate Code of Missouri.” (Emphasis added.)
The personal representative refused the claim, pointing to sec. 473.360.1, RSMo 1986, as amended in 1980, which bars claims not filed within six months from the first publication of notice of letters. Responding, the State contended its claim fell within the statute’s exemption provision, relieving it from the six months limitation period. The provision specifically exempts “claims of any taxing authority within the United States” from which the State argued the claim was for a debt due the State, and as a “taxing authority within the United States” it enjoyed the protection of the exemption. The trial court, apparently unimpressed with that contention, summarily denied the claim and after the judgment was affirmed in the Court of Appeals, Southern District, we accepted transfer and decide the cause as though on original appeal. Mo. Const, art. V, sec. 10.
The sole issue is whether the State’s claim, concededly filed beyond the statutory six-month non-claim period, falls within the statute’s provision exempting such claim from the statute’s narrow limitation requirement. Holding that it does, we reverse and remand.
Section 473.360.1, RSMo 1986, which reflects a 1980 amendment to the prior statute, provides in pertinent part:
1. Except as provided in sec. 473.370 [pertaining to judgment creditors], all claims against the estate of a deceased person, other than costs and expenses of administration, ... claims of the United States and claims of any taxing author*76ity within the United States, ... which are not filed ... or paid ... within six months after the first published notice of letters testamentary or of administration, are forever barred against the estate. ...
(Emphasis added.) Before the 1980 amendment, the above emphasized portion of section 473.360.1 exempted “tax claims of the state of Missouri and subdivisions thereof.” Section 473.360.1, RSMo 1978. The 1980 amendment effected two changes pertinent to our inquiry: It expanded the class of entities whose claims are eligible for the exemption by substituting the words “any taxing authority in the United States” for the phrase “the state of Missouri and its subdivisions thereof”; and it broadened the category of exempt claims from tax claims to any claim of a taxing authority. Now, not only are Missouri tax claims exempt from the six months non-claim statute, but also, all other claims of any taxing authority within the United States be it in or outside the State of Missouri.
The personal representative disputes this construction of the plain language of the statute, contending that the phrase “claims of any taxing authority in the United States” contains a latent ambiguity and urges that we look beyond the words for a legislative intent narrowing the exemption’s scope. Despite the statute’s expansive term “claims,” the personal representative argues the legislature’s use of the words “taxing authority” indicates an intention to qualify the term and exempt only the tax claims of such taxing authorities. She argues this must be true because the predecessor section (sec. 473.360, RSMo 1978) exempted from its operation only “tax claims” of the State of Missouri and its political subdivisions, and refers us to the following Committee Comment (adopted from the Missouri Bar Drafting Committee) to the revised exemption: “The [1980] amendment to Subsection 1 would exempt from the filing requirement, claims for exempt property, family allowance, homestead allowance and taxes of any type, as well as all other claims actually paid by the personal representative within the six-month period.” (Emphasis added) She urges the sole purpose of the language change from “tax claims” to “claims of any taxing authority” was to allow tax claims from other states and their political sudivi-sions to be filed beyond the six-month period.
However, when the language of the statute is unambiguous and conveys a plain and definite meaning, “the courts have no business foraging among such rules [of construction] to look for or impose another meaning.” DePoortere v. Commercial Credit Corporation, 500 S.W.2d 724, 727 (Mo.App.1973). When statutes are “[without ambiguity, courts should regard laws as meaning what they say; the General Assembly is presumed to have intended exactly what it states directly and unambiguously.” Id, Although the personal representative’s contention is not without support in the scholarly literature1, the canons of construction operate only to resolve not to create a statutory ambiguity. State ex rel. Sei v. Haid, 332 Mo. 1061, 61 S.W.2d 950, 954 (1933).
As previously discussed, sec. 473.360.1 provides an exemption from the six months limitation period for claims of a “taxing auchority.” While this phrase has not been heretofore judicially considered in the context of the non-claim statute, there can be no question that the State of Missouri is a principal entity among the class intended as “taxing authorities]” whose claims enjoy the exemption. The term “taxing authority” is defined in sec. 141.220(15), RSMo 1986, governing revenue and taxation, to include:
any governmental, managing, administering or other lawful authority, now or hereafter empowered by law to issue tax bills, the state of Missouri or any county, municipality, school district, road district, water district, sewer district, levee district, drainage district, special benefit district, special assessment district, or *77park district, affected by sections 141.210 to 141.810.
Assisted by this definition, it is manifest that a “taxing authority” in the context here is a governmental entity possessing the authority to levy taxes.
By the 1980 amendment the legislature made clear its intent to modify the prior law, and the statute’s unambiguous terms must be given their plain and ordinary meaning. Dunn v. Bemor Petroleum, 737 S.W.2d 187, 189 (Mo. banc 1987). As noted above, sec. 473.398 describes the sums paid decedent as a debt due the state, collectible as provided in the probate code. In probate the term “liability” typically, if not exclusively, refers to a debt or a pecuniary obligation. Strumberg v. Mercantile Trust Co., 367 S.W.2d 535, 538 (Mo.1963); Hartog v. Siegler, 615 S.W.2d 632, 638 (Mo.App.1981). Hence, we conclude the express statutory liability to the State under sec. 473.398 for monies expended by the Department of Social Services on behalf of the deceased is a “claim” of the sort contemplated in probate which falls within the scope of sec. 472.010(3), RSMo 1986, defining “claims” as “liabilities of the decedent which survive whether arising in contract, tort or otherwise (Emphasis added.)
The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings.
BLACKMAR, ROBERTSON and HIGGINS, JJ., concur. DONNELLY, J., dissents in separate opinion filed. BILLINGS, C.J. and WELLIVER, J., dissent and concur in separate dissenting opinion of DONNELLY, J.. See 4 Hanna, Missouri Practice and Procedure, Probate Code Manual, sec. 473.360 (1986) (legislature intended to restrict exemption to the tax claims of taxing authorities).