specially concurring.
I cannot hold that the district court abused its discretion and, therefore, concur. Two Jinn accepted responsibility for Bardsley’s appearances and did not manage to surrender him within the 180-day period. However, I do not agree with certain assertions made by the State and the district court. A fair review of the record demonstrates affirmative action and ultimate assistance by Two Jinn to the State in producing Bardsley.
First, the district court concluded that “Two Jinn did not find the defendant.” This is simply incorrect. The fact that Two Jinn located the defendant while he was in federal custody is of no consequence. As between the State and Two Jinn, relative to Bardsley’s failure to appear, Two Jinn located him.
Second, the district court stated that “[t]here was no effort to assist the State with getting the defendant back to Idaho.” Two Jinn, in fact, sent a letter to Bardsley on August 11, 2009, requesting that he voluntarily arrange to appear in Idaho by exercising his rights under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, and provided him with a copy of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers. It is not surprising that the letter was disregarded. However, one of the additional factors for consideration set forth in State v. Quick Release Bail Bonds, 144 Idaho 651, 655, 167 P.3d 788, 792 (Ct.App.2007), is “whether the bonding company has attempted to assist or persuade the defendant to expedite his return to Idaho by exercising his rights- under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers.” That is what Two Jinn did. Moreover, Two Jinn notified the Ada County Prosecutor of Bardsley’s whereabouts on August 12, 2009, who, apparently, proceeded to do absolutely nothing with that information. It was not until the San Diego District Attorney’s Office reached out to Ada County in September 2009, that Ada County did anything, and four days prior to the expiration of the 180th day began the process of extradition. The extradition process was cancelled after Two Jinn produced the defendant in October 2009.
Third, the district court stated that “[fjrom the record, there are no mitigating factors.” I cannot agree. In June of 2009, less than ninety days after Bardsley failed to appear, he was in the Ada County Jail. While the record may be somewhat confusing as to why he was there, the fact is he was. The affidavit submitted by the State indicated that “[¡Identity documents for the Governors warrant were obtained from an arrest on Federal charges for the Internal Revenue Service, by the U.S. Marshal’s Service on June 09, 2009, while housed in the Ada County Jail, Boise, Idaho." (Emphasis added.) Whether Bardsley was arrested by the U.S. Marshal’s Service while Bardsley was in the Ada County Jail or whether Bardsley was locked up in the Ada County Jail after being arrested and awaiting transport is really of little conse*269quence. In this high-tech world, one would think that a few key strokes by someone at Ada County in regard to someone in its jail would reveal a failure to appear in March and an outstanding warrant. Had that simple event occurred, the warrant could have been served, the prosecutor notified, and the defendant produced before the district court before being shipped off to California. But it did not. One of the other additional factors set out in Quick Release Bail Bonds is “whether the state exhibited any actual interest in regaining custody of the defendant through prompt efforts to extradite him.” Id. Not only did the State not engage in prompt extradition efforts, but it apparently took no interest in determining whether this individual in the Ada County Jail in June 2009 had any outstanding warrants, even from Ada County itself.
Finally, the district court stated that “[t]he State claims there were many costs associated with attempting to extradite the defendant back to Idaho.” I fail to see, from the record, just what efforts the State really made and how the State can assert, as it did below, that “at least a dozen government employees” were involved.