dissenting.
I am in substantial agreement with Judge Leadbetter’s position expressed in dissent in the Commonwealth Court. As the opinion is unpublished, it is set forth here as an appendix.
*401Centrally, I believe that the question of whether the renovations at issue are subject to reassessment is at least a mixed question of law and fact, dependent, for example, upon case-specific factors such as the fungibility of the alterations involved. Resolution of the issue should therefore derive, in large part, from the record presented. As Judge Leadbetter aptly notes, however, the taxpayers here simply failed to create an adequate record to rebut the taxing authority’s prima facie case for reassessment.* Accordingly, the conclusions of the common pleas court, the Commonwealth Court, and ultimately a majority of this Court suggest a per se rule barring any reassessment premised upon interior alterations made to accommodate a new use.
Since I disagree with such a rule, and for the reasons furnished by Judge Leadbetter, I also respectfully dissent.
Justice NIGRO joins this dissenting opinion.Appendix
December 8, 2000
Dissenting Opinion by Judge LEADBETTER.
*402I must respectfully dissent. As the majority notes, Section 602.1 of the Fourth to Eighth Class County Assessment Law1 specifically allows a new assessment to be made “when improvements are made to real property or existing improvements are removed from real property.” The legislature further provided that “painting of a building or the normal regular repairs to a building aggregating one thousand dollars ($1,000) or less in value annually shall not be deemed cause for a change in valuation” (emphasis added). Id. Here, the renovations undertaken by taxpayers, which fall within the general understanding of the term “improvements,” far exceeded $1,000.00,2 and were not by any definition normal regular repairs. Nonetheless, the majority finds the statute inapplicable because it characterizes the work done as “cosmetic alterations” that would not “increase the property’s market value for tax assessment purposes.” In so holding, I believe that the majority has substituted its judgment for that of the legislature as to the types of improvements which will justify a reassessment, an action beyond our authority.3
I further believe that the majority has substituted its own notions of the effect of renovations upon real estate values for that which the law requires-evidence presented to the trial court. In Deitch Co. v. Board of Property Assessment, 417 Pa. 213, 209 A.2d 397 (1965), our Supreme Court noted that the procedures in a tax assessment appeal have long been established:
[T]he taxing authority first present[s] its assessment record into evidence. Such presentation makes out a prima facie case for the validity of the assessment in the sense that it fixes the time when the burden of coming forward with evidence shifts to the taxpayer. If the taxpayer fails to *403respond with credible, relevant evidence, then the taxing body prevails.
Id. at 221, 209 A.2d at 402. Here, the taxpayer presented no evidence that the assessed value was not accurate, let alone any evidence of a contrary valuation.3 Thus, the assessment value must be accepted.
Finally, the trial court’s rejection of the assessment as a “value-in-use” is erroneous for two reasons. First, as noted above, the basis for the assessment does not come into issue unless and until the taxpayer presents evidence to dispute the value contained in the assessment, which this taxpayer did not do. Second, the assessment here was not based upon a value-in-use analysis. As noted by the majority, “value-in-use refers to a value unique to the particular owner, such as the value of a business operated on the property rather than the value of the property itself, which would remain constant if the property were sold and the business moved elsewhere.” Air Products & Chemicals, Inc. v. Board of Assessment Appeals of Lehigh County, 720 A.2d 790, 793 (Pa.Cmwlth.1998) [emphasis added beyond that in original]. The assessment in the present case was not based upon any value unique to the particular owner. Rather, the assessor’s approach here was based upon the principle that if an office suite is the most profitable use of a commercial building, a hypothetical willing buyer will pay more for that building after it has been fitted out for offices than he would if the work (and related capital expenditures) were to be undertaken after his purchase. As this court’s opinion in Air Products goes on to say, in discussing the interrelationship between the concepts of highest and best use and value-in-use:
Properly understood, the Schaeffer Brewery holding which prohibits value-in-use assessments for tax purposes does not, as the County suggests, abrogate the principle discussed below that fair market value is to be determined based upon the current condition of the property.... *404[Hjypothetical ways in which the property could be used by potential buyers should be considered in determining what a willing buyer would pay for the property. That is not to say, however, that the property should be valued as though it were already in that hypothetical condition.
Id. at 793-94. Conversely, the higher value will attach after the work has been done.
For these reasons, I would reverse the order of the trial court.
In the text of its opinion, the majority correctly describes the appropriate allocation of burdens in a tax assessment appeal. See Majority Opinion, at 1272. Nevertheless, in a footnote responsive to this dissent, the majority announces that the Board’s determination that certain renovations constitute improvements is not entitled to the same initial presumption of validity as other components of its decision-making. See id. at 1272 n. 2. With respect, I find such approach to be inconsistent with the provisions of the Fourth to Eighth Class County Assessment Law channeling assessment and reassessment appeals through the same procedures, see, e.g., 72 P.S. §§ 5453.701(b), 5453.702; contrary to widely-accepted practice, see generally 72 Am. Jur. 2d State and Local Taxation § 692 (2002) ("There is a presumption of validity of assessments by taxing authorities, absent a demonstration that those findings are clearly unreasonable or unlawful, and thus, such assessments will not be set aside in the absence of evidence showing them to be incorrect.”); and inimical to the policies underlying the assessment laws. See generally Cedarbrook Realty, Inc. v. Nahill, 484 Pa. 441, 452, 399 A.2d 374, 379 (1979) (referencing the “traditionally accepted importance of the tax collection process to the perpetuation and the continuing vitality of the government”).
. Act of May 21, 1943, P.L. 571, as amended, 72 P.S. § 5453.602a, added by Section 2 of the Act of January 18, 1952, P.L. (1951) 2138.
. The building permit obtained for the renovations estimated their cost at $58,000.00.
. The taxpayers did not challenge the constitutional validity of the statute as written.
. The taxpayers simply argued that their improvements should not have "opened the door” to a new assessment based upon the new configuration for office use.