concurring and dissenting:
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that appellee’s conduct in these proceedings would constitute a waiver *451of any objections appellee might have had to the lower court’s in personam jurisdiction. However, I do not find that conclusion dispositive. Appellee has not objected to the lower court’s jurisdiction. Rather, he moved the lower court to dismiss the action on the ground that it was barred by the statute of limitations. The lower court sustained appellee’s position on that issue. At least with respect to the personal injury aspect of appellants’ action, I believe the lower court was correct.
Appellants’ action arose out of an automobile accident that occurred on July 3, 1971. The action is both for personal injuries to appellants and for property damage to appellant William Cox’s automobile. On June 25, 1973, just within the two year statute of limitations for personal injury actions,1 appellants filed a praecipe for a writ of summons and thus commenced their action. Pa. R.C.P. 1007. The effect of filing the praecipe was to toll the relevant statute of limitations for a period as long again as the original period. Peterson v. Philadelphia Suburban Transportation Co., 435 Pa. 232, 255 A.2d 577 (1969); Zarlinsky v. Laudenslager, 402 Pa. 290, 167 A. 2d 317 (1961). Thus, as to appellants’ action for personal injuries, filing the praecipe extended the statute of limitations for another two years (to June 25, 1975); as to the action for property damage, it extended the statute of limitations for another six years (to June 25, 1979).2
The extended statute of limitations for each of the actions could have been satisfied either by service of the writ of summons within thirty days, Pa.R.C.P. 1009(a), or by reissuance of the writ and service of the reissued writ within thirty days, Pa.R.C.P. 1010(a). (In fact, the writ might have been reissued “any number of times,” as long as this was done within the period of *452time in which the writ was valid. Pa.R.C.P. 1010, as construed by Zarlinsky v. Laudenslager, supra.)
Appellants, however, neither had the original writ nor a reissued writ served. Instead, on July 11, 1973, they had a complaint served on appellee. According to the law at the time, as expressed in Yefko v. Ochs, 437 Pa. 233, 263 A.2d 416 (1970), the complaint, while serving as a pleading, was not proper process for purposes of service; having commenced their action by writ, appellants should have served the writ, not the complaint.3
On November 5, 1975, appellee filed his motion for judgment on the pleadings, pleading the statute of limitations as a bar to appellants’ action. In considering this motion, the majority focuses on the conduct of appellee between the time he became aware of the existence of the action, when the complaint was “served”, and the time of the motion. Appellee’s conduct during this period, when he filed responsive pleading and engaged in discovery, the majority contends constituted a waiver of any objections that appellee might have had to the court’s jurisdiction. I grant the point, but it is irrelevant to appellee’s claim that the action is barred by the statute of limitations. Apparently what the majority is saying is that appellee, having waived any defect in service so far as service relates to jurisdiction has also waived any defect in service so far as service relates to the statute of limitations. This reasoning, I submit, confuses the several functions service may perform.
Service may confer personal jurisdiction; it may provide notice of the commencement of an action; and it may serve to define the relevant period of time in which an action must be brought under the statute of limitations. See generally R. Anderson,4 Commentary Intro*453ducing Title 12 of Purdon’s Pennsylvania Statutes Annotated, 12 P.S. Vol. 1, XV (1953).
This case presents a textbook example. The “service” of the complaint on appellee was defective in conferring in personam, jurisdiction over appellee because the complaint was not the proper process. Yefko v. Ochs, supra. Nevertheless it did have the effect of notifying appellee of the pendency of the action that appellants had commenced against him by way of the unserved writ. However, it had no effect with respect to tolling or satisfying the statute of limitations. Yefko v. Ochs, supra. Appellee apparently had no objection to the court’s personal jurisdiction over him; he waived it by engaging in adversary conduct. Therefore, the first two functions of service — to confer jurisdiction and to give notice — have been performed. That fact, however, has no bearing on whether the third function — to toll or satisfy the statute of limitations — has also been performed.
The majority would have appellee object within twenty days that the service of the complaint was defective. I can see no reason, consistent with appellee’s position, for doing this. Nor do I see any reason to punish a defendant who, rejecting dilatory techniques, simply submits to the court’s jurisdiction. When appellee received the complaint, any statute of limitations claim was speculative only: it would not ripen until (1) appellants had failed to have the writ served within thirty days of its issuance (when the complaint was served, on July 11, 1973, there remained fourteen days for timely service of the writ), and (2) appellants failed to have the writ reissued within two years after its issuance. The majority, apparently, would impose a duty on a defendant to anticipate, by almost two years, his adversary’s failure to satisfy the statute of limitations, thereby reminding his adversary of his responsibility under the Rules of Civil Procedure.5
*454The majority may have been confused by the fact that in Yefko v. Ochs, supra, both the statute of limitations and the personal jurisdiction issues were present. Since the defendant there had never waived his objection to the court’s jurisdiction, the Court, in sustaining his preliminary objections, referred to both issues. There is no such problem, however, in Trost v. Clover, 234 Pa.Super. 255, 338 A.2d 630 (1975), where this court applied the rule of Yefko v. Ochs to a case remarkably similar to this one. In Trost, the plaintiffs in a personal injury action also filed a praecipe for a writ of summons that was never served or reissued. The plaintiffs did, however, serve a complaint on the original defendants, which caused them to file responsive pleadings, join additional defendants, and otherwise to become actively involved in the proceedings. After the writ of summons expired without having been served or reissued, all of the defendants (original and additional) moved for judgment on the pleadings, citing the statute of limitations. Judgment was granted and we affirmed (WATKINS, P. J., noting his dissent). We did not suggest that by participating in the proceedings, and thus waiving any possible jurisdictional claims, the defendants had waived their statute of limitations claim. I believed at the time that Trost was a correct application of Yefko v. Ochs, and I still do.
I would affirm the order of the lower court granting judgment on the pleadings for appellee on the action for personal injuries because the statute of limitations bars that action. As to the action for property damage, however, the issuance of the writ of summons tolled the statute of limitations until June 25, 1979, so that appellant can still have the writ reissued and served in time. I *455therefore concur that as to that action, the order of the lower court granting judgment on the pleadings was error and should be reversed.
JACOBS and PRICE, JJ., join in this opinion.. Act of June 24, 1895, P.L. 236, § 2, 12 P.S. § 34.
. Act of March 27,1713, 1 Sm.L. 76, § 1, 12 P.S. § 31.
. Pa.R.C.P. 1010(e) now permits the service of a complaint, as alternative process, where an action was commenced by writ. Appellants are without the benefit of that provision since it was the result of an amendment effective June 28, 1974. See the majority’s opinion at 447, 371 A.2d at 922, n. 2.
. Author of Anderson Pennsylvania Civil Practice and Forms.
. In effect, appellee did exactly that. After he received the complaint, appellee filed a responsive pleading in which he raised the *454statute of limitations as a bar in New Matter. While the issue was then premature (since the statute of limitations had been tolled by the unserved writ), it served at least to bring the issue to appellants’ attention.